Judgment :- 1. This revision is by the 33rd defendant in a partition suit among the members of a marumakkathayam tarwad, and is directed against the order of the lower court rejecting his application for issue of a Commission to divide off his share which he put down as 1/59, along with those of others. 2. The suit was by six plaintiffs claiming their 6/59 share of the tarwad properties. The preliminary decree was passed on 3-9-1935 in their favour for partition and delivery of the shares of the plaintiffs as prayed for, all the defendants remaining exparte. Long later on 27-2-1953 it was that the 33rd defendant made this application. On objection raised by the plaintiffs 1-3 and other defendants, the court below rejected the application, on the grounds that in the absence of claim for his share before preliminary decree was passed in this suit and made by the 33rd defendant, he was not entitled to move for grant of his share on partition thereof and the application was anyhow belated having been filed more than 3 years, after the preliminary decree and therefore barred under Art.181 Limitation Act. The court below also found one more difficulty facing the 33rd defendant viz.; his own written statement as 34th defendant, in a later suit for partition in the family filed by some other members as O. S.882 of 1949 claiming 1/7 share on the basis of the number of members then existing. 3. Learned counsel for the 33rd defendant-revision petitioner urges before me that the present suit must be deemed to be still pending, so long as a final decree has not admittedly been passed therein and there could accordingly be no objection to the defendant, cosharer claiming partition and delivery of his own share. He says that Art.181 cannot apply to the defendant's application but even so the period of 3 years thereunder must run only from when the cause of action arises in his favour viz. according to learned counsel day to day. For it was nobody's case that the 33rd defendant has lost his share. Learned counsel says that the question of the later suit and his client's written statement is irrelevant for the purpose here. His client is entitled to 1/59 share so long as the rest of the defendants did not question such quantum. For it was nobody's case that the 33rd defendant has lost his share. Learned counsel says that the question of the later suit and his client's written statement is irrelevant for the purpose here. His client is entitled to 1/59 share so long as the rest of the defendants did not question such quantum. Having heard learned counsel, it seems to me that the order of the lower court is perfectly right and does not call for interference. 4. On the first question whether the 33rd defendant can come in at this stage with a claim for fresh preliminary decree, the point has to be noted that he was exparte in the suit and the decree as passed directs a partition only in the plaintiff's favour. We have the authority of 57 T.L.R. 220 to say that in a suit for partition, ordinarily there should be only one preliminary decree and such decree should declare the shares of the members entitled to have a partition, leaving actual division to a final decree; further that such defendants as objected to partition at all or others who did not claim division of their own shares, should not be allowed after preliminary decree to intervene in respect of their shares. But learned counsel referred to AIR 1953 T. C. 241 for the proposition that in a partition suit, all the co-sharers on the defendant array were in one sense plaintiffs and can be allowed to work out their shares even after preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff. There are no doubt some observations in this case in support of the 33rd defendant's contention as here. But that case was really concerned with the share of a defendant who had filed a written statement asking for division of his share in the suit itself. The observations again, were made on the basis of a case in 15 Coch. 237 F. B. This Full Bench case was for extending the principle laid down in 14 Coch. 66, as regards defendants who had claimed their shares already to cases, when they had not made such claim. It may be that the extension could be made in the case of co-sharers as held in 15 Coch. 237 F. B. This Full Bench case was for extending the principle laid down in 14 Coch. 66, as regards defendants who had claimed their shares already to cases, when they had not made such claim. It may be that the extension could be made in the case of co-sharers as held in 15 Coch. 237 but it is difficult to accept that case as authority even in cases where the status of the defendants inter se may be one of jointness in spite of the plaintiff cutting himself off from the joint family by the institution of the suit. According to the well settled rules governing partition by suit, among the members of the joint families the fact of plaintiff's separation does not mean by itself a division inter se between the defendants-respondents of the members-See 1952 S.C. 72. It follows therefore that it is not open to the 33rd defendant exparte as he was, in this suit, to claim allocation of his share, as if he had also separated along with the plaintiff. 5. Indeed it is not the contention of learned counsel for 33rd defendant in this Court that the 33rd defendant had already become divided under the preliminary decree in the case. Even otherwise it would be impossible because he has not filed the application nor exercised any volition in the matter. And if he could become separate only by the present application, what is the extent of his share Mt will be less than the 1/71 for which he made a claim in the later suit. Again how could he now separate having become separate by his definite expression of intention in the written statement in the later suit. So viewing the matter from any point of view the position taken up by the 33rd defendant is impossible to maintain. It is unnecessary in the above view to consider the applicability of Art.181 to the application here. Respondent's learned counsel in this connection cited 1929 Oudh.117, as laying down that the article applied. I am not satisfied that it lays down the correct law; in fact the opinion expressed there, was unnecessary for the decision of the case. If an expression of my view was really called for, I would be inclined to hold that no question of limitation can arise at all. It follows that the order of the lower court is perfectly right. If an expression of my view was really called for, I would be inclined to hold that no question of limitation can arise at all. It follows that the order of the lower court is perfectly right. The revision therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.