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1958 DIGILAW 202 (MAD)

Ramaswami Naidu v. Marudaveera Moopan

1958-07-25

BALAKRISHNA AYYAR

body1958
Judgment.- The properties which form the subject-matter of this petition consist of some 2 acres and 91 cents of land in Thiruchendur village. The properties belonged to one Bagirathi Ammal. As she was residing in Madras, she leased the properties to one Venkatarama Aiyar, a nephew of hers, who was residing in the village. Venkatarama Aiyar, in his turn, sub-leased the property to Marudaveera Moopan. On 26th December, 1955, Bagirathi Ammal sold 42 cents of land to Ramaswami Naidu. The same day she sold the remaining extent of 2 acres and 49 cents (besides some other lands with which we are not concerned) to Lakshmana Naidu. On 29th February, 1956, Marudaveera Moopan delivered 30 kalams of paddy to Ramaswami Naidu and obtained from him, the receipt, Exhibit A-1. As the rent due to Lakshmana Naidu was not paid he filed Original Suit No. 462 of 1956 on the file of the District Munsif of Kulitalai against Venkatarama Aiyar and Marudaveeran. Then various proceedings followed as a result of which Marudaveera Moopan was deprived of his possession of the suit property. Thereupon he filed a petition before the Special Deputy Collector and Revenue Court, Kulitalai, against Lakshmana Naidu and Ramaswami Naidu in which he prayed that he should be restored to possession. The Revenue Court allowed the application. In this revision petition Lakshmana Naidu and Ramaswami Naidu now canvass the correctness of the order, passed by the Deputy Collector. The first contention of Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar, the learned counsel for the respondent, was that there was a valid agreement of tenancy between Lakshmana Naidu and Ramaswami Naidu who purchased the property from Bagirathi Ammal and Marudaveera Moopan, the sub-lessee from Venkatarama Aiyar. In support of this argument he referred to Exhibit A-1 a receipt which Ramaswami Naidu granted on 29th February, 1956, to Marudaveera Moopan and contended that from its terms, a tenancy agreement between Ramaswami Naidu and Marudaveera Moopan can be spelt out. I am unable to see anything in the receipt to support that contention. It merely acknowledged receipt of a quantity of 30 kalams of paddy from Marudaveera Moopan — and — this is noteworthy-Ramaswami Naidu purported to give the receipt on behalf of Venkatarama Aiyar. This recital seems to me to be inconsistent with the notion that Marudaveera Moopan was a lessee from Ramaswami Naidu. It merely acknowledged receipt of a quantity of 30 kalams of paddy from Marudaveera Moopan — and — this is noteworthy-Ramaswami Naidu purported to give the receipt on behalf of Venkatarama Aiyar. This recital seems to me to be inconsistent with the notion that Marudaveera Moopan was a lessee from Ramaswami Naidu. If Ramaswami Naidu had been the lessor he would have granted the receipt in his own name and in his own right. So far as Laksh-mana Naidu is concerned, Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar contended that there are admissions in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the plaint which Lakshmana Naidu filed in Original Suit No. 462 of 1956 which show that Marudaveera Moopan was his lessee. Paragraph 4 of the plaint runs as follows:- "On 26th December, 1955, the plaintiff bought the following lands from Bagirathi Animal, Nagammal, Venkatarama Aiyar, Sundaram Aiyar and Ramachandra Aiyar, for a sum of Rs. 7,999 ana was given immediate possession of the same. The first defendant was the lessee of lands for fash 1365, and he was in possession at the time of purchase. He was duly attorned by the vendors to pay the rent to the plaintiff and the lessee and the plaintiff agreed thereto." In paragraph 6 the following sentence occurs: "The first defendant being obliged to be absent from the village for some time would appear to have sub-let the lands to the second defendant, directing him to carry out the terms of the lease and attorning him to pay the rent to the plaintiff and he and the plaintiff agreed to that." Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar laid stress on the words "attorned" and "attorning" occurring in these paragraphs and contended that they show that there had been an agreement of tenancy between Lakshmana Naidu and Marudaveera Moopan. Now, reading the plaint as a whole, it appears to me to be clear that whoever drafted the plaint used the words "attorned’ ‘and "attorning" without understanding their legal significance. Apparently, he understood the word ‘attorned’ as equivalent to ‘directed’ and nothing more. The matter, however, does not rest on the construction of either Exhibit A-1 or the plaint. Marudaveera Moopan gave evidence before the Special Deputy Collector and that evidence makes it manifest that there was not the relationship of tenant and landlord between him and either Lakshmana Naidu or Ramaswami Naidu. The matter, however, does not rest on the construction of either Exhibit A-1 or the plaint. Marudaveera Moopan gave evidence before the Special Deputy Collector and that evidence makes it manifest that there was not the relationship of tenant and landlord between him and either Lakshmana Naidu or Ramaswami Naidu. I shall quote the material portions of that evidence: "Last year, I measured 30 kalams of kuruvai to Bagirathi Ammal through Venkatarama Ayyar. He asked me to measure 30 kalams of samba to counter-petitioners as they had purchased the lands in Margali last year. Counter-petitioners are brothers. I gave 30 kalams to counter-petitioner 1 in Samba." There is nothing in this so far to suggest that there was any relationship of tenant and landlord between Marudeevara Moopan and either Ramaswami Naidu or Lakshmana Naidu. Lower down he stated: "Then I asked counter-petitioner 1 (Ramaswami Naidu) for lease for last year (1956-57); He demanded 100 bags of paddy and Rs. 200. I offered 5 kalams more than previous rent. He refused to lease." This passage makes it perfectly manifest that there was no relationship of tenant and landlord between Marudaveera Moopan and Ramaswami Naidu. Marudaveera Moopan explained in his evidence that he approached the Tahsildar who asked him to cultivate the lands and thereupon he ploughed the field. Thereupon: "Counter-petitioners prevented me. Then I ploughed with police bundobust. Counterpetitioners raised seedlings without my consent. Then I purchased seedlings and transplanted. Then police asked me not to enter land as counter-petitioners got stay order from High Court." This passage, it seems to me, wholly negatives the story of there having been any agreement between Marudaveera Moopan and either Ramaswami Naidu or Lakshmana Naidu. On the other hand, this passage makes it clear that the parties were fighting with each other and not that they had agreed on any point. The second contention of Mr. On the other hand, this passage makes it clear that the parties were fighting with each other and not that they had agreed on any point. The second contention of Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar was this: Clause (a) of section 2 of Madras Act XXV of 1955 defines "cultivating tenant" in these terms: "‘Cultivating tenant’ in relation to any land means a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes- (i) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, and (ii) the heirs of such person, but does not include a mere intermediary or his heirs;" In order to come within the scope of this definition, said Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar, it is sufficient to satisfy two conditions: One is, that the person should carry on personal cultivation of the land; the other is that there should be a tenancy agreement, express or implied. He argued that the section does not say that the tenancy agreement should have been with the owner of the land, that the relationship of a sub-lessee via vis the head lessee may properly be described as a tenancy: and that therefore, a sub-lease would come within the scope of this definition. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar that a sub-lessee can claim the benefits of this Act. A tenancy agreement means an agreement creating a tenancy and when we speak of a tenancy we normally understand that there is on the one side a landlord and, on the other side, a tenant or lessee. In relation to sub-lessees we do not usually use the term tenancy agreement: instead we speak of the assignee of a lease. It will also be appreciated that if the contention of Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar were right, it would be possible for a lessee to create rights larger than he himself has and normally a construction which produces such a result should not be accepted. It will also be appreciated that if the contention of Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar were right, it would be possible for a lessee to create rights larger than he himself has and normally a construction which produces such a result should not be accepted. No doubt in some statutes the word ‘Tenant’ is used to include a sub-lessee or an assignee from a lessee (see paragraph 8 at page 2983 of Volume IV of Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary.) The material passage there runs: "The assignee of a lessee (Doe d. Whitfield v. Roe1, Williams v. Bosanquet2, or a sub-lessee (Doe d. Wyatt v.Byron3) was a ‘tenant’ within section 210, Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 and 16 Vict. c. 76) and the decision of Erle, J., in that case was followed in Moore v. Snee4, and so of sections 172, 173, ibid., and R.S.C., Ord. 12, Rr. 4-25; see here on Landlord." But it is equally clear that in other enactments the word ‘tenant’ does not include an assignee from the original tenant. See paragraph 13 (b) at page 2985 of Stroud which reads: "The tenant in section 10 (1) means the original tenant and not an assignee of the original tenancy agreement (Artillery Mansions v Macartney5. The reference is to the actual tenant whose rent is under review and not to the average or normal tenant for that class of property (Palser v. Grinling6 . Whether a sub-lessee is included or excluded from the scope of the word tenant occurring in a particular enactment must, therefore, it seems to me, be ascertained by examining the context in which the word is actually used. When we read again the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ in clause (a) of section 2 we find that it is intended to take in (1) a person in whose favour the agreement of tenancy has been made; and (2) the heirs of such person. It is distinctly provided that an intermediary or his heirs are not included. The expression "heirs, legal representatives and assigns" is a very familiar one. When, therefore, the Legislature said that the ‘heirs of such person’ shall be deemed to be tenant but did not, at the same time include’ his legal representatives or assigns’ in that category the inference must be that it did not want to confer the benefit of the Act on the legal representatives or assignees of the original lessee. When, therefore, the Legislature said that the ‘heirs of such person’ shall be deemed to be tenant but did not, at the same time include’ his legal representatives or assigns’ in that category the inference must be that it did not want to confer the benefit of the Act on the legal representatives or assignees of the original lessee. Otherwise, it will be hard to explain the omission of the words "legal representatives and assigns." I find that in Pichammal v. Sinniah Pandaram7, Ramachandra Aiyar, J., took much the same view of the matter that I am now taking. He observed: "The agreement contemplated in section 2 (a) of Madras Act XXV of 1955, whether it was express or implied should be with the landlord directly." The order complained of appears to be plainly erroneous. This petition is therefore, allowed with costs. R.M. ------ Petition allowed.