ORDER T.C. Shrivastava, J. 1. This petition for revision has been filed by the plaintiff against the order of the courts below returning the plaint under Order 7 Rule 10 C. P. C. for presentation to proper Court. 2. The facts in the case, for the purpose of this application, are not disputed. The plaintiff had placed an order with the defendant for supply of linseed oil on 18-12-53. The defendant's firm is at Bhawani Mandi in Rajasthan. The contract is incorporated in a document Ex. P/I. The plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 2000 as a deposit against the contract. This sum was paid by the plaintiff at Jaora on a Hundi which was drawn by the defendant on him and had been sent to Lira through bank, for payment at Jaora. According to the contract, the goods were to be despatched to Lilua (near Calcutta) and the Railway Receipt was to be sent by V. P. P. or through bank to be delivered to the plaintiff on payment of the price. The plaintiff brought this suit for refund of the amount of deposit on the ground that the defendant failed to deliver the goods according to the contract. 3. The trial court held that the contract took place at Bhawani Mandi and no part of the cause of action accrued within the jurisdiction of the court. The plaint was hence returned under Order 7 Rule 10 C. P. C. This view of the trial court was upheld in appeal. 4. In suit arising out of contract, cause of action arises within the meaning or Section 20 C. P. C; (a) at the place where the contract was made; (b) at the place where the contract was to be performed or the breach thereof occurred; and, (c) at the place where any money under the contract was expressly or implidly payable. 5. In this case, the offer and acceptance relating to the contract look place at Bhawani Mandi and therefore the contract would be deemed to have been entered into at that place, This position is not disputed by Shri Sanghi for the petitioner. 6. 5. In this case, the offer and acceptance relating to the contract look place at Bhawani Mandi and therefore the contract would be deemed to have been entered into at that place, This position is not disputed by Shri Sanghi for the petitioner. 6. Before considering the question whether any part of the cause of action accrued at Jaora, it will be necessary to decide the effect of the terms of making a deposit by a Hundi and the payment of the amount for the Railway Receipt which was to be sent by V.P.P. I will take up the second point first. In this connection, I may refer to the decision in Hazarimal vs. Gulabchana (1955 NLJ 645). In that case, a merchant at Waroda had placed an order for supply of goods with another merchant at Kareli. It was found that the price for payment of the goods was to be made on a Hundi drawn by the seller against the buyer and sent through a bank along with the Railway Receipt. It was held that the cause of action accrued at Waroda where the Railway Receipt accompanied by a Hundi, was sent for collection. Shri Chitale for the non-applicant contends that sending of the Railway Receipt by V. P. P. post amounts to entrusting the receipt to the post office which is appointed as an agent by the buyer and therefore, the payment should be deemed to have been nude at the piece where the seller resides. For this contention, he relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Messrs Ogale Glass Works A.I.R. 1954 SC 429). The facts of that case were that the firm of Ogale Glass Works had agreed to supply goods to the Government of India and the payment was to be made by despatching cheques from Delhi drawn on the branch of the Reserve Bank at Bombay. The question was whether the income from supply of goods had accrued within British India. It was held that the post office was constituted an agent to receive the cheque at Delhi from the Government of India and therefore the payment took place at that place where the cheque was posted for transmission by post office to the form. The question was whether the income from supply of goods had accrued within British India. It was held that the post office was constituted an agent to receive the cheque at Delhi from the Government of India and therefore the payment took place at that place where the cheque was posted for transmission by post office to the form. The reasoning would not apply to a case where the Railway Receipt is sent by V. P. P. In the case of the posting of a cheque, the party drawing the cheque retains no control over the cheque which is, in due course, unconditionally delivered to the addressee, In the case of a V. P. P., however, the addressee cannot get the packet unless he pays for it The sender retains full control over the packet until it is delivered to the addressee on payment. In such a case, it would be more correct to say that the post office acts as an agent of the sender until the amount is collected on his behalf from the addressee. The view taken in 1955 NLJ 645 (Supra) has thus full application in the case of a Railway Receipt which is sent by V. P. P. Similarly, in a case where the Railway Receipt is sent through a bank for being delivered to the buyer on payment, the payment is made to the seller, at the place where the Railway Receipt is taken by the buyer on presentation by the bank. 7. Turning to the question of the payment of deposit on presentation of a Hundi drawn by the seller in this case, I have no doubt that the payment took place at Jaora where the Hundi was presented. In Messrs Ronnuswamy Aiyar and Narayanaswamy Aiyar vs. Damodar Hunsraj, (A.I.R. 1924 Mad 464) it has been held that:-- When a firm outside Madras draws Hundis on a firm in Madras which, under the contract, the Madras firm has to honour and pay, when presented to them in Madras, the payment cannot be considered to be made, when the Hundi is negotiated by the firm outside Madras, but only when the payment is actually made by the firm in Madras on the Hundi. In the present case, the seller at Bhawani Mandi drew the Hundi on the plaintiff and handed it over to the Rajasthan Bank for realisation. In the present case, the seller at Bhawani Mandi drew the Hundi on the plaintiff and handed it over to the Rajasthan Bank for realisation. The Rajasthan Bank sent it through the Bank of Indore to Jaora, where the money was collected from the plaintiff. The Rajasthan Bank and the Bank of Indore were thus acting as agents of the seller for realising the amount from the plaintiff at Jaora The payment of Rs. 2,000 was thus made within the jurisdiction of the court at Jaora. 8 Under Section 20 C. P. C. a court has jurisdiction to try a case, if the cause of action, whole or in part, arises within the local limits of its jurisdiction. In Hazarimal's case (Supra) it has been observed that:-- The expression "cause of action" has been compendiously difined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Thus a cause of action comprises every fact which is necessary to be proved by the plaintiff. In Barola Oil Cakes Traders vs. Parshottam Narayandas Bagulia [A.I.R. 1924 Bom 491], it has been observed that every fact, which is material, to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed is covered by the expression "causation of action". A distinction was, however, drawn between the facts constituting the cause of action and the facts which may be b. ought in evidence. 9. In the instant case, the fact, that the amount of Rs. 2000 was paid by the plaintiff, constitutes a part of the cause of action, as the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he proves this fact The payment took place at Jaora and therefore a part of the cause of action accrued at that place. Further as the Railway Receipt was to be tendered for payment to the plaintiff, at Jaora the contract was partly to be performed at that place and for this reason also the cause of action partly accrued there. 10 Accordingly the court at Jaora had jurisdiction to decide the plaintiff's claim for refund of the deposit. 11. Reliance is also placed by the petitioner on the decision in Seth Gappulal vs. M/s. Khanderwal Bros. 10 Accordingly the court at Jaora had jurisdiction to decide the plaintiff's claim for refund of the deposit. 11. Reliance is also placed by the petitioner on the decision in Seth Gappulal vs. M/s. Khanderwal Bros. [1955 M. B L. J. 1215] In that case a distinction has been drawn between suits for damages for breach of contract and suits for refund of deposit. It has been observed that the amount of advance paid by the buyer becomes a debt when he is entitled to a refund of it on failure of consideration. According to the rule that the debtor must find the creditor, it has been held that a suit for refund is maintainable where the buyer resides. Shri Chitale for the non-applicant has drawn my attention to the decision in Galley & co., vs. Dathi China Appalaswami A. I. R. 1946 Mad 300] in which the following observations occur:-- There has been a pronounced disinclination on the part of the Indian Courts to apply to this country unreservedly the English common law rule that a debtor should find and pay his creditor. It might in some cases, strictly arising out of the relation-ship of debtor and creditor, be useful to invoke it as a matter of inference or of implication; but in other cases and particularly in cases where the relationship is one of agency, the place of payment has to be determined independently of any such general maxim, with reference to the terms of the contract the circumstances attending on it and the necessities of the case and having regard also to the statutory-provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code and in S. 49, Contract Act. Shri Chitale contends that this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided Seth Gappulal's case [Supra ] and therefore the decision requires reconsideration and the matter should be placed before a Division Bench. I do not consider this necessary as in the instant case, Jaora Court has jurisdiction to try the case on other grounds as discussed earlier. 12. In the result the order of the Court below directing the return of the plaint for want of jurisdiction is set aside. The suit shall now be proceeded with and disposed of in accordance with law. The costs of this revision shall be borne by the non-applicant.