JUDGMENT K.T.Koshi, C.J. 1. This is an appeal from an Order of M S. Menon.J., refusing to quash the cancellation of the stage carriage permit of T.C.K. 622, which was operating on the Thodupuzha-Kanjar route. The cancellation order, was passed by respondent 1, the Road Traffic Board, Kottayam. The order bears the date 20th February 1956 and in the proceeding giving rise to this appeal (O.P. No. 199 of 1956) it has been marked as Ext. O. On appeal by the owners of the vehicle, the United Motor Union (Private) Ltd., Palai, respondent 2, the Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, confirmed the first respondent's order as per Ext. S, dated 13th June 1956. Soon afterwards, on 25th June 1956, the appellants filed O.P. No. 199 of 1956 to quash both the orders, Ext. O and Ext. S. 2. The learned Single Judge's Order dismissing the said Original Petition was passed on 7th November 1956. The cancellation order, Ext. O is in these terms : "Stage carriage T.C.K. 622 permitted to operate between Thodupuzha and Kanjar was not conducting service from 12th October 1954 due to expiry of certificate of fitness and the travelling public was put to difficulties. The permit holder has not intimated the non-operation of the service as per rule 293 of the M.V. Rules, The explanation offered by the permit holder, dated 2nd January 1956, is not satisfactory or acceptable. The permit of the vehicle is cancelled. " 3. For purposes of this appeal it is not necessary to quote here the appellate order (Ext. S). It was conceded before the learned Single Judge and was also reiterated before us that any violation of rule 293 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1952, cannot sustain the cancellation of the permit. Rule 293 reads : "If at any time a stage carriage is prevented from running in accordance with the schedule prescribed or where no schedule is prescribed, is prevented from performing the service for which a permit has been granted, the holder of the permit shall forthwith report the fact and the reason therefor to the authority which granted the permit and the authority, if any, which has endorsed or extended the permit." 4. It was however contended before the learned Single Judge that the violation of the above rule was not the foundation for the cancellation order and that reference to the violation of rule 293 in Ext. O was no more than the statement of a fact. That contention found favour with the learned Single Judge. Hence his order dismissing O.P. No. 199 of 1956. , 5. We are afraid that if the violation of rule 293 cannot sustain the cancellation of the permit, it was not permissible to sustain the order on other grounds. In our opinion the learned Single Judge should have quashed Ext. O and the appellate order thereon, Ext. S. In para- graph 6 of the order under appeal the learned Single Judge has set out the reasons which according to the learned Government Pleader who appeared before him induced respondent 1 to cancel the permit. That paragraph is as follows : "The cancellation of the permit according to the learned Government Pleader was in exercise of the powers conferred by section 60 (1) read with section 48 (d) (iii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. According to section 60 (1) the Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit on the breach of any condition contained in the permit. Section 48 (d) (iii) permits a Regional Transport Authority to attach to a stage carriage permit a condition that copies of the time-table shall be exhibited on the stage carriage and that the time-table so exhibited shall be observed. Such a condition, viz., that a time-table should be exhibited and observed has been attached to the permit issued to the company (Ext. 1) and there can be no doubt that the condition that the time-table should be observed has been continuously violated right through the long period between 12th October 1954 and the date of Ext. O (20th February 1956). In view of this I must hold that Exts. O and S are not liable to be quashed and that this petition be dismissed ". 6. O (20th February 1956). In view of this I must hold that Exts. O and S are not liable to be quashed and that this petition be dismissed ". 6. While we might agree that respondent 1 could have cancelled the permit for the reasons set out in the above extract, the present order cannot be sustained inasmuch as an opportunity has not been given to the petitioners to submit their explanation regarding the default referred to by the learned Single Judge. A proviso appended to section 60 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, has enjoined that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation. Section 60 (1) states” "The transport authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit” (a) on the breach ..or of any condition contained in the permit, or (b) .....................or (c) ....................or (d) ..................... Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity bas been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation." and sub-section (2) states : "Where a transport authority cancels or suspends a permit, it shall give to the holder in writing its reasons for the revocation or suspension." 7. The opportunity to be given to the holder of the permit is to offer his explanation with respect to the ground on which the cancellation is proposed to be made; otherwise it would be meaningless. We have seen what the reasons stated in Ext.O are. That order makes no reference at all to the reasons the learned Single Judge sets out in paragraph 6 of his order quoted above. In this context it is useful to refer to the notice respondent 1 issued to the petitioners to show cause against the then proposed cancellation. That notice is Ext. F, it bears the date 24th November 1955 and it reads : "The registration certificate and the permit of the vehicle was suspended till the defects of the vehicle are rectified. But, you have not yet rectified the defects of the vehicle. Hence please show cause within a week why the permit of the vehicle should not be cancelled." 8. F, it bears the date 24th November 1955 and it reads : "The registration certificate and the permit of the vehicle was suspended till the defects of the vehicle are rectified. But, you have not yet rectified the defects of the vehicle. Hence please show cause within a week why the permit of the vehicle should not be cancelled." 8. We have here therefore an instance of respondent 1 cancelling a permit where the 'show-cause' notice asks for explanation about a certain set of facts, the cancellation order mentions different reasons for the cancellation and to sustain the cancellation yet a third set of facts has to be depended upon. Respondent 1 did not conform to the requirements of the proviso to section 60(1) in cancelling the permit and that order and the appellate order confirming it, have therefore to be quashed. Though the absence of a notice as contemplated by section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act is seen referred to in the affidavit in support of the Original Petition (vide ground No. 8) it does not appear that, that ground was seriously urged before the learned Single Judge. At the same time there is nothing to show that the point was given up. Further it affects the competence or the jurisdiction of respondent 1 to cancel the permit. The cancellation is in violation of all known canons of natural justice. 9. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the learned Single Judge's Order, allow O.P. No. 199 of 1956 and quash the impugned orders, Ext. O. and Ext. S. However as the appeal succeeds on a ground which apparently was not presented before the learned Single Judge in the form in which it was put before us, we make no order for costs in the appeal or in the matter of the Original Petition. Order accordingly