Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to revise the decree in a small cause suit brought on a promissory note. The point taken in revision is that the suit was barred by limitation and the lower court was, therefore, wrong in decreeing it. The promissory note was executed on 14-12-1953 and the suit was brought on 31-8-1957. The suit is, therefore, prima facie barred by limitation, but the plaintiff relies upon the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Ordinance, 1953 (Madras Ordinance V of 1953), the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1954 (Madras Act V of 1954), and the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Repayment of Debts) Act, 1955 (Madras Act No I of 1955) to save the suit from limitation. It was conceded before me that the defendant was an agriculturist within the definition of that term as given in these enactments during the relevant times. 2. S.3 of the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Ordinance, V of 1953, provided: "No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted, and no application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in any such suit shall be made, against any agriculturist in any civil court before the expiry of an year from the commencement of this Ordinance" The Ordinance was passed on the 5th December 1953, and therefore the effect of S.3 was to prevent the plaintiff from filing a suit on the promissory note till 5th December 1954. S.5 of the Ordinance provided: "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit for the recovery of a debt or an application for the execution of a decree passed in a suit for recovery of a debt, the time during which the institution of the suit or the making of the application was barred by S.3, or during which the creditor refrained from instituting the suit or making the application in the honest belief that S.3 applied to such suit or such application, shall be excluded". The Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 5 of 1954, replaced Madras Ordinance V of 1953, and S.3 of that Act provided : "No suit for the recovery of a debt shall be instituted, no application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt shall be made, and no suit or application for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of a debt shall be instituted or made, against any agriculturist in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of a year from the date of commencement of this Act". Section 5 of Act V of 1954 provided : "In computing the period of limitation or limit of time prescribed for a suit for the recovery of a debt or an application for the execution of a decree passed in such suit, the time during which the institution of the suit or the making of the application was barred by S.3 of the Ordinance or S.3 of the Act, or during which the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title, believing in good faith that S.3 of the Ordinance or S.3 of this Act applied to such suit or such application, refrained from instituting the suit or making the application, shall be excluded. The effect of S.5 of the Act V of 1954 would be that in computing the period of limitation the time during which plaintiff was prevented from filing a suit by S.3 of the Madras Ordinance V of 1953 as well as by S.3 of the Madras Act V of 1954 had to be excluded, that is to say, over and above the normal period of limitation the time would be extended by the periods during which the institution of the suit was prohibited by these two enactments. Plaintiff thus gets a further period of two years. S.3 of Madras Act I of 1955 provides: "No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted, and no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made, against any agriculturist in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of four months from the commencement of this Act. S.3 of Madras Act I of 1955 provides: "No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted, and no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made, against any agriculturist in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of four months from the commencement of this Act. S. 8 of that Act enacts: "In computing the period of limitation for a suit for recovery of a debt or an application for the execution of a decree in respect of a debt, the time during which the institution of the suit or the making of the application was barred under S.3 shall be excluded". Under this Act, therefore, the plaintiff, would get period of limitation extended by a further period of four months. The total extension under the three enactments comes to two years and four months, and so, the plaintiff has time till 14-4-1959 to file the suit. As a matter of fact, he filed the suit on 31-8-1957. Hence the lower court was clearly right in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation. 3. Although this case can easily be decided on a plain reading of the relevant sections of the three enactments, the plaintiff's counsel also relied upon the decision of Mr. Justice Varadaraja Iyengar in 1958 K.L.T. 804, in support of his contention that the suit is not barred by limitation. In that case the learned judge, after an elaborate consideration of case law, came to the conclusion that the effect of these three enactments would be to extend the period of limitation. It would appear from Para.9 of the judgment in that case that it was urged before him that my judgment in C. R. P. No. 258 of 1957 would support the contention that these enactments would not serve to extend a period of limitation. Before me also in this case it was contended by the revision petitioner's counsel that the decision in C.R.P. 258 of 1957 was to the effect that the period of limitation would not be extended. Para.9 of the judgment in, 1958 K.L.T. 804 reads: "Finally learned counsel for the defendant drew my attention to a judgment of Kumara Pillai, J., in C. R. P. 258 of 1957, accepting contention as to limitation, similar that urged on behalf of the defendant here. Para.9 of the judgment in, 1958 K.L.T. 804 reads: "Finally learned counsel for the defendant drew my attention to a judgment of Kumara Pillai, J., in C. R. P. 258 of 1957, accepting contention as to limitation, similar that urged on behalf of the defendant here. There is no reference to and much less discussion the relevant provisions of the enactments other than Act 11955. I am therefore with the deepest regret, unable to follow that decision". What I said in C.R.P. No. 258 of 1957 was: "The suit filed on 2-11-1955, having been instituted more than three years after the execution of the promissory note and after the period provided for in S.3 of Madras Act I of 1955, is clearly barred by limitation." The plaintiff in that case had not relied upon the Madras Ordinance V of 1953 and the Madras Act V of 1954 to save the suit from limitation. He had relied only upon S.3 of Madras Act I of 1955 That Act was passed on the 1st March 1955 and the period during which suits were prohibited by S.3 of that Act expired on 1-7-1955. The suit was filed on 2-11-1955, and so, even after the exclusion of the period of four months provided for by S.3 of Madras Act I of 1955 it was still barred by limitation. I have not said anything in C. R. P. No. 258 of 1957 contrary to the provisions in Madras Ordinance V of 1953 and Madras Act V of 1954 as was wrongly contended in 1958 K.L.T. 804 and before me by the revision petitioner's counsel in this case. According to me, the question arising for decision in this revision petition is very simple and can be decided on a plain reading of the enactments. 4. For the reasons stated above, I hold the revision petition to be groundless and dismiss the same with costs. Dismissed.