JUDGMENT V.R. Nevaskar, J This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment and mesne profits. The house is situated in the City of Indore to which the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan applied at the material time. The Plaintiff claimed ejectment on two of the grounds under Section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, under which existence of one or the other of the grounds was necessary in order to enable the Plaintiff to succeed in his case for ejectment. The two grounds set up by the Plaintiff were (1) that the house was in a dangerous condition and needed repairs, and (2) that the Defendant had contrary to the terms of the tenancy set up a work-shop without obtaining the permission of the Plaintiff and that the electric dynamo is used in working therein and further that the Defendant had increased the number of points and plugs over and above those which were permitted by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. In para 6 of the plaint the Plaintiff called the facts mentioned in the second ground to be an injury. The Defendant in the written statement denied both the grounds. The trial Court after recording evidence found in favour of the Plaintiff on both these grounds and passed a decree for ejectment and mesne profits. An appeal was preferred against that decision by the Defendant. The only question that seems to have been argued in the lower appellate Court was whether ejectment could properly have been given on the ground that the house was in a dangerous condition and needed immediate repairs. It was argued before the learned Judge that the repairs could be made in the house without requiring the Defendant to vacate the premises. The lower appellate Court considered this question and held that the view taken by the trial Court on this question to be proper. He agreed with the view of the trial Court that ejectment was necessary to enable the Plaintiff to repair the portion of the house in question. The other ground with regard to the Defendant having started a workshop contrary to the terms of the tenancy and his having increased the number of points and plugs over and above those provided by the Plaintiff did not appear in the discussion of the lower appellate Court's judgment. The other ground with regard to the Defendant having started a workshop contrary to the terms of the tenancy and his having increased the number of points and plugs over and above those provided by the Plaintiff did not appear in the discussion of the lower appellate Court's judgment. The lower appellate Court however confirmed the decree for ejectment and mesne profits as granted by the trial Court subject to two conditions. One was that one month's time was allowed by him in order to enable the Defendant to secure alternative accommodation and second was that after the house had been repaired the Defendant will have a right to secure back the premises on lease in accordance with Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. The Court finally passed an order that having regard to the circumstances of the case the parties should bear their costs. This is a Plaintiff's second appeal against that decision. Mr. Chitale for the Appellant contended that the lower appellate Court had no jurisdiction to impose any condition or make a declaration with respect to any right referred to in Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan while awarding a decree for ejectment. He contended that according to the findings of the trial Court two conditions under Section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan were held to have been established which justified grant of a decree for ejectment in Plaintiff's favour. The lower appellate Court dealt with only one of the grounds, failed to deal with the other and while dealing with that one ground he proceeded to declare the right of the Plaintiff under Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. This the Court was not justified in doing. He further contended that the lower appellate Court's order with regard to costs is also unjust. The learned Judge did not give any specific reason for disallowing a successful Plaintiff his costs. He relied upon the decision reported in Rukminibai v. Shankarsingh 1955 MBLR (Civil) 181 in support of his contention. Mr. Patel on the other hand, who appeared for the Respondent, contended that the Plaintiff had completely succeeded in his case and so far as the reliefs claimed by him are concerned there could be no grievance. The Plaintiff therefore had no proper ground for coming up in second appeal. Mr. Patel on the other hand, who appeared for the Respondent, contended that the Plaintiff had completely succeeded in his case and so far as the reliefs claimed by him are concerned there could be no grievance. The Plaintiff therefore had no proper ground for coming up in second appeal. According to the learned Counsel what the lower appellate Court did was merely to state what the legal position under Section 15 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan justified and what the Defendant under that provision was entitled to. Under the circumstances it is unnecessary to interfere with the decision of the lower appellate Court on that ground alone. On the question of costs he contended that the Plaintiff has not paid necessary court-fees for the purpose. He also contended that the matter in respect of awarding costs was entirely in the discretion of the Court below and this Court in second appeal ought not to interfere with it. As regards the first question with regard to the justifiability on the part of the lower appellate Court to refer to a right under Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, it appears to me to be clear that that reference or a declaration of a right thereunder is altogether out of place. There is nothing in Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan to justify a civil Court while granting decree for ejectment to include that right as a part of the decree. According to the scheme of the Act when a Plaintiff desires to eject the Defendant, apart from the existence of cause of action under the general law, existence of one or more of the conditions of Section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidban would be necessary. When such conditions are proved to exist the Plaintiff has got a cause of action under the general law. Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidban deals with a case where the ejectment is granted on the ground that the house was in a dangerous condition and needed repairs. It is provided there in Sub-section (2) of Section 15 that the landlord after repairing the premises which he had got vacated from his tenant under Section 4(5) to give an intimation of that fact to the Rent Controller and the Rent Controller thereafter would require the tenant to take the premises on fair rent. It is provided there in Sub-section (2) of Section 15 that the landlord after repairing the premises which he had got vacated from his tenant under Section 4(5) to give an intimation of that fact to the Rent Controller and the Rent Controller thereafter would require the tenant to take the premises on fair rent. The tenant on his part is to express his consent to take it on fair rent within one week of the receipt of the Rent Controller's order referred to above. On such consent being received the premises are to be given on rent to the tenant. According to this scheme it is clear that the civil Courts are not concerned any way with what might have taken place between the landlord and the tenant after the grant of decree for ejectment. It is not open for them either to declare or put up any condition referable to Section 15. All that the Court could do is to grant decree for ejectment in case the condition required for that purpose under Section 4 is held to have been established. Under these circumstances the lower appellate Court was not any way justified in holding that the Defendant will have a right for getting back the premises under Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthah; Niyantran Vidhan. The reference to the last mentioned fact in the decree of the lower appellate Court is clearly erroneous. The decree granted by the trial Court was in this respect perfectly correct. The counsel for both the parties have argued the question before me regarding the existence or non-existence of the second ground for the purpose of ejectment which the lower appellate Court has not referred to in his judgment. Mr. Patel for the Respondent contended that the second ground was practically abandoned by the Plaintiff while Mr. Chitale for the Appellant contended that there is nothing in the judgment of the lower appellate Court to justify this contention. If at all there is abandonment there must have been abandonment by the Defendant and not by the Plaintiff. In the absence of any specific mention about this abandonment in the judgment of the lower appellate Court I am unable to say one way or the other whether it was the Plaintiff or the Defendant who abandoned his stand on the ground of the condition mentioned in Section 4. In the absence of any specific mention about this abandonment in the judgment of the lower appellate Court I am unable to say one way or the other whether it was the Plaintiff or the Defendant who abandoned his stand on the ground of the condition mentioned in Section 4. In this state of things I permitted the counsel for both the parties to address arguments before me. It was contended by Mr. Patel for the Respondent that the lower appellate Court was not justified in giving a finding in Plaintiff's favour on the ground referable to Section 4. The Plaintiff's allegation with respect to that ground was that the Defendant had started a work-shop in a part of the premises contrary to the terms of the tenancy and had increased the number of points and plugs therein. This ground is clearly one covered by second part of Section 4 and the question for consideration before the trial Court ought to have been as to 103 what were the terms of tenancy. It is admitted by the Plaintiff that there is no written rent-note for the premises in which the work-shop has been set up. Moreover, it is contended, having regard to second paragraph of Section 4 it is clear that putting up a shop or a work-shop cannot be taken to be inconsistent with the purpose for which the tenancy is given. He therefore contended that this finding of the lower Court with regard to the existence of the ground under Section 4 is clearly wrong and the Plaintiff visualizing these facts did not make reference in the argument and no reference was made by the lower appellate Court for that reason. On the other hand Mr. Chitale for the Appellant contended that on proper construction of the pleadings there is reference to both the parts of Section 4. There is a reference to the circumstance that contrary to the terms of the tenancy the Defendant has set up a workshop and there is also reference to the circumstance that he had created something there which was injurious or amounted to nuisance. He further contended that the exception contained in para. 2 of Section 4 should be construed to mean that the tenant could use the premises for something that can be reasonably construed to be ancillary to the main purpose. He further contended that the exception contained in para. 2 of Section 4 should be construed to mean that the tenant could use the premises for something that can be reasonably construed to be ancillary to the main purpose. In this case, according to the learned Counsel setting up of a work-shop is altogether a different purpose and cannot be said to have been covered by the exception. The word according to the learned Counsel only means an establishment or an office and cannot mean a work-shop or a factory. The finding of the trial Court is that the Defendant had created something in the premises which was injurious at a certain point of time and this can be enough to justify the loss of protection which the Act afforded to the tenant. On consideration of these respective contentions of the learned Counsel I feel that the finding of the trial Court with regard to the ground under Section 4 is untenable. The allegation made in para 5 of the plaint which referred to the ground under Section 4 emphasises the fact that the Defendant contrary to the terms of the tenancy had set up a work-shop in that portion of the premises and increased the number of points and plugs for the purpose of the work-shop. The objection to these allegations is regarding the Defendant's acting contrary to the terms of the tenancy and not regarding his having created state of things which were injurious. As regards the terms of tenancy there is no sufficient material to hold that the terms excluded the setting up of the business of armature winding and of setting up a machine for that purpose. Moreover second clause of Section 4 clearly provides that the use of any part of the premises for the purpose of not be taken to be a purpose contrary to the one for which he was made a tenant. The word is sufficiently wide in its scope to include at least a business such as the one involved in this case. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present case to see as to whether it would mean a factory or not. The word in Section 4 is no doubt very vague but one may say that it refers to injury either to the premises or to the other persons residing therein. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present case to see as to whether it would mean a factory or not. The word in Section 4 is no doubt very vague but one may say that it refers to injury either to the premises or to the other persons residing therein. The learned trial Court holds that the Defendant had no right to increase the number of points and plugs. He did so and this in itself created injurious state of things. Acting contrary to the right under the tenancy does not necessarily mean creation of injurious state of things under Section 4 and this finding of the learned trial Judge on that point is not correct. Mr. Chitale for the Appellant contended that it was injurious state of things because as referred to in notice dated 16-7-1951 there was the risk of the entire connection being cut off. There is no reference to this particular sort of injury in the pleadings in para. 5. It is also not disputed that prior to the Plaintiff's coming to Court the electric connection in the disputed premises has been disconnected by the Plaintiff. As regards the question of costs it is clear that there was no proper justification for the lower appellate Court to deprive a successful Plaintiff of his costs. He did not refer to specific ground but merely referred to the circumstances of the case as the ground for disallowing the costs. The circumstances were that a valid ground had been established for granting a decree in favour of the Plaintiff and a decree for ejectment had accordingly been granted. Mere existence of a possibility of the Defendant being able to take the premises on lease under Section 15(2) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan is not a sufficient ground for depriving a successful Plaintiff of his costs. The Defendant has contested the Plaintiff's action for ejectment. The order directing the parties to bear their costs is therefore not correct. The decree of the lower appellate Court is modified. The portion referring to the declaration of the right under Section 15 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan shall not form part of the decree. The Plaintiff-Appellant moreover will be entitled to his costs from the Defendant throughout. The decree may accordingly be framed.