Judgment :- 1. The only question that arises for consideration in these revision petitions is, how far the court below was right in finding possession with the appellants in the two C. M. Appeals before it and so proceeding to cancel the temporary injection orders which the trial court had passed in favour of the plaintiffs as against them. 2. The courts below had been uniform in finding that the sambalachits executed by the respective 1st defendant in favour of the common 2nd plaintiff did not come within the scope of Act 1 of 1957 so as to confer on the executants a right of permanent occupancy, but on the other hand they occupied the position of salaried employees only, for the purpose of carrying on the cultivation. The point on which the courts below differed was in respect of the nature of the control, which those defendants had over the property concerned, at date of the suits after termination of the jural relationship constituted by the sambalachits. For, while the Munsiff was of the opinion that there was and could be no possession in the eye of the law so far as the defendants were concerned, the learned District Judge found it possible to say that the defendants were in legal possession of the property and indeed that such position had been conceded by the plaintiffs themselves in their plaints. Learned Advocate General appearing for the revision petitioners refutes this assumption of the learned District Judge and presses for the acceptance of the Munsiff's findings in the matter. 3. Now the passages in the plaint on which the learned judge founded himself, related to the averments in the one case that "the 1st defendant did not shift from the farm house as he had undertaken but had begun to carry on agricultural operations by himself against the wishes of the plaintiffs" and in the other case, that "in spite of the termination of employment, the 1st defendant was continuing the cultivation operations with the aid of the plaintiff's cattle, implements and paddy". These averments no doubt admitted a continuing control of the defendants notwithstanding the termination of their agencies, but did not imply that the plaintiffs acquiesced in such continuance even to the slightest extent or that the defendants were engaged in any operation by way of cultivation on their own behalf. These averments no doubt admitted a continuing control of the defendants notwithstanding the termination of their agencies, but did not imply that the plaintiffs acquiesced in such continuance even to the slightest extent or that the defendants were engaged in any operation by way of cultivation on their own behalf. Indeed it would appear from the defendants' replies themselves that they did not claim to have carried out any such operations. 4. But then the judge thought that the rule of constructive possession applies only so long as the agents continue as such and the possession claimed by them subsequent to the termination of their agency cannot but be regarded as hostile to the principals. The principle of law applicable is however different and is best stated by Mitra in his Tagore law lectures on Limitation, 6th Edn. Vol. I at page 147: "The possession of a thing through our servant, bailiff, or other representative is our possession, not fictitiously or constructively, but really and directly; for we may at any moment, supposing the representative is obedient to our commands, resume our physical control over the thing. The so-called possession of the representative is "detention", not "possession" in a legal or juridical sense. The conditions necessary to constitute possession through a representative are: (a) that the representative must have the physical control over the thing; (b) that the representative must determine that this physical control shall be exercised on behalf of the principal; and (c) that the principal must assent to its being so exercised. If the representative changes his mind and determines to hold the property on behalf of himself, strictly speaking, the possession of the principal is gone. But there the law interferes in favour of the principal, and holds that his possession continues, at least, until the denial of his right is brought to his knowledge. It has further been held that mere repudiation to the knowledge of the owner is not sufficient. The repudiation of the former capacity as manager or agent must be followed by some overt act of dealing with the property as his own. As observed by the Privy Council in Kodoth Ambu Nair v. Secretary of State, I.L.R- 47 Mad. 572, a licensee cannot claim title, from possession only however long, unless it is proved that the possession was adverse to that of the licensor to his knowledge and with his acquiescence". As observed by the Privy Council in Kodoth Ambu Nair v. Secretary of State, I.L.R- 47 Mad. 572, a licensee cannot claim title, from possession only however long, unless it is proved that the possession was adverse to that of the licensor to his knowledge and with his acquiescence". 5. It follows that the order of the lower court cannot stand. I therefore allow the revision petitions and set aside the order of the court below and restore that of the Munsiff. The respondents will pay the costs of the revision petitioner. Counsel's fee only one set.