JUDGMENT 1. THE appellants in this Court were defendants in the trial Court. The sole respondent had brought a suit for recovery of damages or mesne profits against the appellants on the basis of a decision made in a title suit in which the respondent was the plaintiff and the appellants were the defendants. The previous title suit was numbered as Title Suit No. 91 of 1942. There is some dispute in the present suit as to the quantity of the land which was the subject matter of that suit. I shall advert to that question later. Suffice it for the present purpose to say that the title of the plaintiff respondent in respect of one-third share was declared to the disputed lands of Title Suit No. 91 of 1942, and a decree for joint possession with the appellants of this appeal, who had the remaining two-thirds share, was also passed in that suit. That decree was passed on 23rd September, 1942. An appeal and a second appeal were preferred from the decree of the trial Court, but the decree of the trial Court stood ultimately confirmed, and the respondent of this appeal took delivery of possession of the decretal lands through Court on 13th September, 1948. 2. AFTER having taken delivery of possession of the disputed lands through Court, the present suit was instituted by the plaintiff respondent for recovery of damages or mesne profits for the years 1941 to 1948 on the allegation that he had been wrongfully kept out of possession for all these years in respect of his one-third share, and the defendants had remained in wrongful possession of the lands in sixteen annas share. The suit was contested by the defendants on various grounds, their main defence being that the disputed lands had been possessed by the plaintiff and not by the defendants during the years in suit, and the quantity of crops alleged by the plaintiff was excessive. Limitation was also pleaded on behalf of the defendants. 3. IN the trial Court the Munsif held that it was the plaintiff who was actually in possession of the disputed lands during the years in suit. The learned Munsif, however, held that the value of the produce in the one-third share of the plaintiff was Rs. 127-8 as. Limitation was also pleaded on behalf of the defendants. 3. IN the trial Court the Munsif held that it was the plaintiff who was actually in possession of the disputed lands during the years in suit. The learned Munsif, however, held that the value of the produce in the one-third share of the plaintiff was Rs. 127-8 as. for five years from 1944 to 1948, and this amount would have been decreed by him if the plaintiff could have established the possession of the defendants. The learned Munsif also held that article 120 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act applied to the facts of the case. In view of the finding that the defendants were not in possession of the disputed lands during the relevant years, the suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif. 4. AN appeal was preferred from the above judgment and decree of the trial Court by the plaintiff, and that court set aside the decree of the trial Court reversing the finding of that Court that the defendants were not in possession of the disputed lands during the years in suit. The Lower Appellate Court passed a decree for Rs. 127-8 as. in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have preferred this second appeal from the above judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court. Mr. Bose, appearing on behalf of the defendants appellants raised two contentions before me. He fairly conceded that the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the defendants were in possession of the disputed lands during the period in suit is purely a finding of fact, and as that finding is based upon evidence, it is not liable to be challenged in second appeal. His twofold contentions were, (1) that the amount decreed by way of mesne profits is excessive inasmuch as the decretal lands of the previous title suit measure only 44-1/3 decimals, whereas a decree for mesne profits has been passed in respect of 55 decimals, and (2) that if the plaintiff respondent is entitled to get a decree for mesne profits, it should be for a period of three years and not for five years inasmuch as article 109 and not article 120 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act applies to the facts of the present case. I shall dispose of both these contentions of Mr. Bose one after another. I shall dispose of both these contentions of Mr. Bose one after another. As regards the first contention advanced by Mr. Bose, regarding the: amount of mesne profits, I am of opinion that it is well founded, inasmuch as the contention gets support from the plaint of the present suit and the writ of delivery of possession which was executed in connection with the decree passed in the previous title suit. That writ of delivery of possession, exhibit 1, shows that the decretal lands measure only 44-1/3 decimals. In the plaint of the present suit the area of the lands in respect of which mesne profits have been claimed is given as 55 decimals. The lower Appellate Court has passed a decree on the footing that the area of the lands is 55 decimals. Clearly this is an error due to an oversight on the part of the lower Appellate Court. The amount of mesne profits was calculated in respect of an area of 55 decimals. As the real area of the disputed lands is 44-1/3 decimals, the decretal amount of Rs. 127-8 as. should be reduced to four fifths, that is, to Rs. 102/-, in case it is found that the other contention of the appellants is not sustainable. The first contention made on behalf of the appellants, therefore, succeeds. 5. I now come to the question of limitation raised in this appeal. Mr. Bose contended on behalf of the appellants that article 109 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is the proper article, and the plaintiff respondent is entitled to get mesne profits only for three years prior to the date of the suit as provided in that article. That article lays down that the period of limitation for a suit for recovery of the profits of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant is three years from the date when the profits are received. Mr. Bose contends that in view of this article, the plaintiff respondent is entitled to get mesne profits for three years prior to the institution of the suit and not for five years, as decreed by the lower Appellate Court. The lower Appellate Court has held that article 120 is the proper article which would govern this case. Mr. Bose contends that in view of this article, the plaintiff respondent is entitled to get mesne profits for three years prior to the institution of the suit and not for five years, as decreed by the lower Appellate Court. The lower Appellate Court has held that article 120 is the proper article which would govern this case. It may be incidentally mentioned that the lower Appellate Court has decreed the respondent's claim for mesne profits for five years and not for six years, because according to the respondent's own averment, there was a complete failure of crops for two years prior to the period of five years immediately preceding the institution of the suit. The question which requires my determination is which of the two articles mentioned above would govern the present suit. 6. THE lower Appellate Court held that article 109 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act has no application to the facts of the present case, because the appellants had come into possession of the disputed lands by virtue of an order of the Court passed in a proceeding under Order XXI, rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure which had taken place between these parties prior to the title suit in which the respondent got the decree. In the opinion of the lower Appellate Court, the possession of the defendants, which was the result of an order of the Court, was not unlawful or wrongful, and therefore article 109 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the facts of the present case. In support of this view, the lower Appellate Court relied on a case reported in 3 C. L. J. 182, F. H. Holloway v. Guneshwar Singh (1 ). In my opinion, the above case, the authority of which has been subsequently doubted in a case reported in 22 C. W. N. 263, Saraj Ranjan Choudhury v. Premchand Choudhury (2), has no application to the facts of the present case. In the present case the possession or the defendants appellants certainly became unlawful from the date when the plaintiff respondent got a decree in respect of one-third share of the disputed lands. Mr. Acharjya who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff respondent does not also rely on the case reported in 3 C. L. J. 182 (1) in support of the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court. Mr. Acharjya who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff respondent does not also rely on the case reported in 3 C. L. J. 182 (1) in support of the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court. I shall presently note what arguments were advanced by Mr. Acharjya in support of the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court. Mr. Acharjya contended, in the first place, that admittedly the parties are cosharers in respect of the disputed lands, the appellants having two-third shares and the respondent having one-third share. It has also been found by the lower Appellate Court that the appellants were in exclusive possession of the disputed lands until at least the date when delivery of possession was taken through court by the plaintiff respondent on 13th September, 1948. Mr. Acharjya argued that since the appellants were in exclusive possession of the disputed lands and since they were cosharers, the respondent can claim only compensation from them for such exclusive user of the lands and not mesne profits for unlawful possession. He further contended that such a suit brought by a cosharer who is not in possession is governed by article 120 of the Limitation Act. In support of this argument Mr Acharjya relied on the case of Robert Watson and Co. v. Ramchand Dutt (3) reported in I. L. R. 23 Calcutta 799. In my opinion that case does not support Mr. Acharjya's contention, because that case, which was one for recovery of compensation by some cosharers from other cosharers, was the off-shoot of a previous suit between the parties in which it had been held that the plaintiffs who claimed compensation in the subsequent suit, were not entitled to get joint possession with the defendants against whom compensation was claimed. In the present case, however, a decree for joint possession was passed in favour of the plaintiff respondent. Therefore, the present case would not be covered by the authority of the case which I have just now mentioned. 7. MR. Acharjya made a further contention on behalf of the plaintiff respondent that article 109 of the limitation Act has no application to a case in which one cosharer claims damages on account of profits received by another cosharer for the whole property. In my opinion, this contention of Mr. Acharjya must be given effect to having regard to the words used in Article 109. In my opinion, this contention of Mr. Acharjya must be given effect to having regard to the words used in Article 109. That article lays dawn that the property in respect of which mesne profits are claimed by a plaintiff must belong to the plaintiff. If the defendant is a cosharer in that property, it cannot be said that the property belongs to the plaintiff, because until partition, a defendant having a share in the property is entitled to possession of every inch of the property along with the plaintiff. This being the position, article 109 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act can have no application where one cosharer claims damages or mesne profits for the exclusive user of the property by another cosharer. This view is supported by a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in a case reported in A. I. R. 1935 Madras 731, (4) Pateel Siddalingana. v. Taiana Gowdra Bhimana. Accordingly, I am of opinion that the present suit is not governed by Article 109 of the Limitation Act, and there being no other article of the same Act which would expressly apply to this case, I am of opinion that the case should be governed by the residuary article 120 which prescribes a period of six years as the period of limitation. I, therefore hold that the plaintiff respondent is entitled to get a decree for mesne profits for five years preceding the institution of the suit as held by the lower Appellate Court. The second contention urged on behalf of the appellants fails. 8. HAVING regard to the decisions of the two points raised in this appeal, I allow this appeal in part by reducing the decretal amount to Rs. 102/-. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and the decree of the lower Appellate Court is modified by a reduction of the decretal amount to Rs. 102/- from Rs. 127-8 as. The application filed on behalf of the respondent for reception of the additional evidence is rejected as not being pressed. In view of the result of this appeal, parties will bear their own costs in this Court.