JUDGMENT V.R. Nevaskar, J. Only question involved in this second appeal is whether the licence of the Defendant had or had not become irrevocable in view of the provisions of Section 60 of the Indore Easement Act which is identical with the Indian Act on the subject. Facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: The Plaintiff held a Pattedari land in Mauza Dongargaon bearing Khasra No. 177 measuring 0.66 acres. At the time of filing of this suit on 16-8-1947 the land stood in Plaintiff's name in the revenue records. The Plaintiff, in order to protect himself from the acts of trespass of 'Banda Gavalis' of Mhow and their cattle upon his field resulting in damage and loss to his produce, introduced one Sadhu named Bhajan Guru who constructed a hut and developed a garden there on a piece of land measuring 0.2 acres as described in the plaint. After his death on 20-11-1938 the Plaintiff introduced the Defendant in that hut and permitted the Defendant to have the use of the adjoining well. The Defendant repaired the well and constructed two rooms of permanent character up to 1944-45. The Defendant got along well and did not assert his right. In that year he began to challenge Plaintiff's right to the property and claimed exclusive right in himself. The Plaintiff therefore moved the revenue department for securing his ejectment. There the Defendant put forward his possession under an agreement of sale. The Plaintiff thereupon gave him a notice to vacate revoking the licence and filed the present suit for ejectment. The Defendant in answer to the Plaintiff's claim, based on his own title and the position of the Defendant whose licence had been revoked, denied Plaintiff's title to the land and the property situated thereon including the cottage, well and garden. He asserted that he was in possession of the land as the chela of Bhajan Guru and was entitled to tack on his possession to that of his Guru. He pleaded adverse possession and bar of limitation and lastly he contended that he had spent about Rs. 3,000 in constructing certain rooms to the knowledge of the Plaintiff. He denied his status as a licensee and pleaded in the alternative that the licence had become irrevocable inasmuch as he had made improvements of permanent character worth Rs. 3,000. He pleaded adverse possession and bar of limitation and lastly he contended that he had spent about Rs. 3,000 in constructing certain rooms to the knowledge of the Plaintiff. He denied his status as a licensee and pleaded in the alternative that the licence had become irrevocable inasmuch as he had made improvements of permanent character worth Rs. 3,000. The trial Court found Plaintiff's title to the property established. It further found the Defendant to be a licensee who was neither in adverse possession of the property in suit nor was entitled to tack on his possession to that of Bhajan Guru. It was further held relying upon the decision in Gujrat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad v. Motilal Hirabhai Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad, AIR 1936 PC 77, that the Defendant was not entitled to assert Irrevocability of the licence in view of the provisions of Section 60 of the Easement Act. Repairing of the well and construction of rooms of permanent character at his own expense by the Defendant was held not established in view of the evidence on record to the effect that other people of Mhow contributed in this improvement. The trial Court in view of these findings decreed the Plaintiff's suit. On appeal the learned District Judge reversed the decision holding that although the Defendant had been rightly held to be a licensee the licence had become irrevocable due to his having acted upon the licence and executing works upon the property of permanent character. According to the learned Judge it made no difference whatever whether the Defendant spent his own money or spent money secured by him as contribution in charity from other people. He accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit with costs. This is a second appeal against that decision. Mr. Chitale, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, said that the only question in this case is whether the acts of improvements by constructing a building of permanent character and repairing and improving the well can be said to have been done by the Defendant acting upon the licence within the meaning of Section 60 of the Easement Act. The learned Counsel relied upon the observations of the Privy Council in Gujrat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. The learned Counsel relied upon the observations of the Privy Council in Gujrat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. v. Motilal Hirabhai Spinning and Manufacturing Co., AIR 1936 PC 77, wherein their Lordships refer to Section 52 of the Easement Act for the definition of the term 'licence' and contended that the expression 'acting upon the licence' means doing some act subsidiary to the purpose of the licence. According to him if a person is allowed to occupy land he could repair it. This would be a purpose subsidiary or incidental to the licence but that he could not construct a building on it. In this case, according to the learned Counsel, the Defendant was allowed to occupy and use the property in order to secure protection to his field from 'Banda Gavalis of Mhow' and their cattle and he could be taken to be acting upon the licence if he did some act subsidiary or incidental to this main purpose. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Section 60 of the Easement Act is as follows: A licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless: (a) .... (b) the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. In 63 Indian Appeals 140 (152) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellant the facts were that the Defendant cotton mill had incurred some expenses in the construction of that part of the railway siding which crossed their own land. The other portion of the railway siding passed through Plaintiff's land which was the subject-matter of the licence. The Plaintiff revoked the licence and sued for possession. The Defendant contested putting forward defence under Section 60(b) of the Easement Act. Their Lordships in this connection observed: But their Lordships are unable to see any ground for the further contention that those works were executed 'while acting upon the licence'. Those words must mean acting upon a right granted to do upon the land of the grantor something which would be unlawful in the absence of such right. A man does not 'act upon the licence' if he does works and incurs expense upon his own property. That he can do without any one's licence. Those words must mean acting upon a right granted to do upon the land of the grantor something which would be unlawful in the absence of such right. A man does not 'act upon the licence' if he does works and incurs expense upon his own property. That he can do without any one's licence. It was suggested that the sub-section might be construed to include an acting on the promise or the statements by an alleged licensor from which the expectation of a licence could reasonably be inferred. It may be observed that such words would require some explanation and qualification before they could properly find their way into a statute. Works done by the licensee on his own land may be done without the knowledge of the licensor, and it would be impossible to hold that the alleged, licensor's land was bound in perpetuity (subject to Section 62) as the result of some works done by the alleged licensee on his own property of which the former was unaware. Moreover the section is not dealing with the effect of an express contract between the parties, but with the consequences to follow from a certain conduct on the part of the licensee which if done on the land of the licensor might well give the licensee rights against him. It is clear from these observations that the irrevocability of the licence under Clause (b) arises by reason of a certain conduct on the part of the licensee with reference to the property which is the subject-matter of the licence and which gives him a certain right under that section. If a person were to go upon another person's land and attempt to build upon it that would amount to trespass and the act would be unlawful. But if he is a licensee upon the land and he constructs over it, the act does not per se become unlawful and the licensor if he wants to avoid the effect of his act ought to stop him from so doing. If he stands by and allows the licensee to incur expenses in carrying out works of permanent character it is but just that he should not be permitted to recall his licence. That is the principle under Section 60(b) of the Easement Act. If he stands by and allows the licensee to incur expenses in carrying out works of permanent character it is but just that he should not be permitted to recall his licence. That is the principle under Section 60(b) of the Easement Act. In the aforesaid Privy Council case the Plaintiff was allowed to succeed because the works constructed were not on the land belonging to the licensor but of the licensee himself. Their Lordships evidently read in Clause (b) 'upon the land of the grantor of the licence' in the section. Neither the aforesaid case nor the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council therein can be resorted to for supporting the case of revocability of the licence in the present case. In this case the Defendant built permanent structure and developed garden. He did all this openly and the Plaintiff raised no protest nor prevented this being done. The Defendant under the circumstances, though a licensee, acquired a right under Section 60(b) and the licence cannot be revoked. The decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Mt. Manbi v. Kodu, AIR 1929 Nag. 269, fully supports this view. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider the contentions raised by the learned Counsel regarding the effect of the land of the Plaintiff having been resumed by the Revenue authorities during the pendency of the action. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.