JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution impugning the legality of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, dated 25-7-1956, allotting a house belonging to the Petitioner to Sri S.M. Goyal, Respondent No. 1, and of the proceedings initiated by that officer u/s 7-A(l) by his notice to the Petitioner dated 31-7-1956. The Petitioner's allegations are these. She is the owner of the house No. 25, Ashok Marg (Outram Road) Lucknow. This house was allotted to Sri Ram Surat Singh, Addl. Director of Agriculture, on 9-12-1955. On 20-5-1956, he informed the Petitioner's son of his intention to vacate it and actually did so on 24/25-5-1956. The Petitioner sent an intimation in writing to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, on that very date. But the house remained un-allotted till 3-7-1956. On that date an allotment order was passed in favour of Sri Bhaskaranand, Assistant Commr., Sales Tax, UP. That Officer refused to take that house, which continued vacant. The Petitioner waited till 25-7-1956, and on that date she sent an intimation to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of her decision to occupy the house for her own use. The Petitioner did occupy the house with the purpose shifting part of her family to Lucknow. The Petitioner has alleged that she wanted to educate her two sons in the University of Lucknow and also to obtain treatment for her heart trouble in that city. The Petitioner's application was delivered to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by her son on 25-7-1956. On that very date an application for the inspection of the file relating to this house was also made. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application for inspection. The petirioner's allegation is that he felt annoyed because she had asserted her needs. The Petitioner also states that the Officer made no enquiry into the genuineness of her personal need and rejected her application dated 25-7-1956, on the very date. Simultaneously an order of allotment was passed in favour of Sri S. M. Goyal Respondent No. 2. This is also dated 25-7-1956. 2. The Petitioner also states that the Officer made no enquiry into the genuineness of her personal need and rejected her application dated 25-7-1956, on the very date. Simultaneously an order of allotment was passed in favour of Sri S. M. Goyal Respondent No. 2. This is also dated 25-7-1956. 2. On 31-7-1956, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer issued a notice against the Petitioner u/s 7-A (1) of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act asking her to show cause why the allottee should not be put in possession of the house as the Petitioner had failed to deliver possession to him. This letter is dated 31-7-1956, and was sent by registered post, acknowledgment due, to her at Allahabad. The notice required that the Petitioner's reply must reach the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by 1-8-1956. The notice was received by the Petitioner at Allahabad on 2-8-1956, when the date for the filing of reply at Lucknow had already expired. However, on 4-8-1956, the Petitioner sent her reply by registered post. 3. Meanwhile, on 5-8-1956, Sri S. M. Goyal, the allottee, was put in possession of the house after the Petitioner's lock had been broken open and her movables inside the house removed. These consisted of a few beds, steel trunks, fans, stove and cooking, utensils. On 9-8-1956 the Petitioner received a reply from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that her objection dated 4-8-1956, had been considered and rejected by him. 4. On these facts the Petitioner contends that the allotment order as well as the proceedings u/s 7-A (1) are illegal and without jurisdiction. She prays for the quashing of the allotment order and the proceedings u/s 7-A (i), and for a writ of mandamus directing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to restore the status quo by disposing Sri S. M. Goyal, Respondent No. 1, iid(sic) restoring possession to the Petitioner. The petition is opposed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. An affidavit has been filed on his behalf. It is sworn not by the Respondent No. 1 but by one S. Jafar Raza Khan, who described himself as the Chief Inspector, Rent Control Office, Lucknow. 5. The petition is opposed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. An affidavit has been filed on his behalf. It is sworn not by the Respondent No. 1 but by one S. Jafar Raza Khan, who described himself as the Chief Inspector, Rent Control Office, Lucknow. 5. I am constrained to observe that it was not proper for the Respondent No. 1, against whom allegations of personal bias has been made, to keep himself back and put forward a subordinate for the purpose of swearing a counter affidavit. The Petitioner had complained that, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, whose name is Sri A. N. Bhargava, felt annoyed with the Petitioner for having dared to advance her claim to occupy her own house. As proof of this, she mentions the fact that Sri A. N. Bhargava issued a notice u/s 7-A(l) on 31st July commanding her to send a reply to reach Sri Bhargava by 1-8-1956. The Petitioner was residing at Allahabad and Sri Bhargava was aware of this fact, as the notice was sent by registered post to her Allahabad address. It is beyond comprehension how Sri Bhargava's demand that he must get a reply by the 1st August could possibly be satisfied by the Petitioner. I have examined the file of this case which was summoned from Lucknow by the order of this Court. It appears that the draft of the notice u/s 7-A (i) dated 31-7-1956 was made in pencil by Sri Bhargava himself It was subsequently copied out by his office, signed by him and despatched by registered post to the Petitioner. Thus the idea of sending a registered letter on 31st July to Allahabad and expecting a reply by the 1st of August was Sri Bhargava's own. This gives some clue to the state of mind of Sri Bhargava at the time and lends colour to the Petitioner's allegation that Sri Bhargava was feeling annoyed with the Petitioner for having dared to assert her rights as an owner of the house. In these circumstances this Court expected Sri Bhargava to clear his conduct by swearing an affidavit himself and denying or explaining the accusations made against him. Instead of doing this, he has asked a subordinate serving under him to swear an affidavit. In these circumstances this Court expected Sri Bhargava to clear his conduct by swearing an affidavit himself and denying or explaining the accusations made against him. Instead of doing this, he has asked a subordinate serving under him to swear an affidavit. this Court has emphasised again and again that it expects an officer of the Govt, against whom allegations of a personal nature have been made, to come forward and clear his position by an affidavit sowrn by himself. 6. The counter affidavit sworn by the Chief Inspector of the Rent Control Officer is not satisfactory. For example, in reply to the Petitioner's allegation that on 5-8-1956, Sri S. M. Goyal was put in possession of the house after breaking open the locks and removing the Petitioner's goods, he says, "The contents of para 18 of the affidavit are denied. Sri S. M. Goyal obtained peaceful possession without the intervention of the RC and EO or the Police." But this para. is verified as "based on a perusal of the record of the case file No. AIX-915/56." I summoned the file and have psrused it from beginning to end. There is nothing in this file containing a particle of evidence that Sri Goyal obtained peaceful possession without the intervention of the R. C. & E O. or the Police. I asked the Learned Counsel for the State whether there was any document on the record which could corroborate the positive statement made on oath that Sri Goyal obtained peaceful possession. He was not able to point out any, but argued that the Chief Inspector probably drew an inference from the order of Sri Bhargava dated 7-8-1956, which contains the sentence "the allottee has already taken its possession." I regret to say that the Respondent No. 1 has not cleared his conduct beyond suspicion. 7. But, now that the record of the case is before me, I have to decide whether the Petitioner has made out a case for the intervention of this Court u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. I find that on the vacation of the house by Sri Surat Singh on 28 5-1956 an allotment order was in fact made on 26-5-1956 in favour of one R. P. Bondre, who did not occupy the house. The second allotment order was made on 26-6-56, in favour of one Sri Bhaskaranand. He too did not occupy it. I find that on the vacation of the house by Sri Surat Singh on 28 5-1956 an allotment order was in fact made on 26-5-1956 in favour of one R. P. Bondre, who did not occupy the house. The second allotment order was made on 26-6-56, in favour of one Sri Bhaskaranand. He too did not occupy it. Thereupon a third allotment order was made in favour of Sri S. M. Goyal on 23-7-1956. Therefore, the Petitioner's allegation that no allotment order was made within one month of the receipt by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of the landlord's intimation does not appear to be correct. I, therefore, hold that she acquired no right u/R. 4 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules to nominate a tenant. 8. The Petitioner has contended that she acquired, u/R. 4. the right to occupy the house herself on the failure of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to make an allotment within 30 days of her intimation. I do not agree. U/R. 4, the landlord gets the right to nominate a tenant on the failure of the authorities to do so, but not the right to occupy the house herself and thus take it out of circulation, so to speak. The purpose of R. 4 is to safeguard the landlord against any loss of rent as a result of the neglect of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to make an allotment within a reasonable time. Under the Act the landlord must give notice of a vacancy to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. He must wait till he receives an allotment order from that Officer. He had no power, prior to 1952, to let out the accommodation and save himself from loss. He had to go on waiting till the Rent Control and Eviction Officer made the allotment. The position was considered very unfair to the landlord and R. 4 was made by the Govt, by its notification dated 12-1-1952. But the right to nominate a tenant does not include the right to assert that the accommodation is released from the operation of the Act itself. The landlord's right to assert his personal needs is dealt with in R. 6 and not R. 4. But the right to nominate a tenant does not include the right to assert that the accommodation is released from the operation of the Act itself. The landlord's right to assert his personal needs is dealt with in R. 6 and not R. 4. However, it is not necessary for me to discuss this point any further in view of the fact that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did make an allotment within one month of receiving intimation from the landlord. 9. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then contended that the proceedings u/s 7-A (i) are without jurisdiction as the notice dated 31-7-1956 required the Petitioner to send her reply by 1-8-1956. This was an impossible demand which vitiates all subsequent proceedings under that notice. I agree that it was silly on the part of Mr. Bhargava to expect that he could receive a reply by 1st August to a notice sent from his office on 31st July by registered post to a person living at Allahabad. But the record shows that Mr. Bhargava passed no order until the Petitioner's reply reached him. His final order was passed after he had considered the Petitioner's written objection sent from Allahabad. He applied his mind to the contents of the Petitioner's objections and held that her need to occupy the house was not genuine. 10. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that Mr. Bhargava should have held an enquiry before deciding that the Petitioner's need was not genuine. He relies on some observations of a Division Bench of this Court made in the case of Lal Triloki Nath v. S.D. Varma 1956 AWR (H.C.) 134. On p. 133(sic)-136, Agarwala, J. observed "when it is brought to the notice of the District Magistrate that an accommodation which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant is required by the landlord for his personal occupation, it is the duty of the District Magistrate to satisfy himself whether such is really the case; or in other words, whether the landlord does bonafide require the accommodation for his own occupation." This is the statement of law laid down by the Division Bench with which I most respectfully agree. Then the learned Judges proceeded to consider the particular facts of the case before them and observed, "before he made the allotment order in favour of opposite party No. 1 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer ought to have considered the notice of the Appellant. He should have entered into an enquiry whether the accommodation was bonafide needed by the Appellant for himself." Learned Counsel asked me to interpret these observations to mean that there must be an actual enquiry in the sense of hearing both sides, taking evidence and so on. I am afraid such a wide interpretation of R. 6 is not borne out by the observation of the Division Bench or by the language of the Rule itself. "Entering into an enquiry" does not necessarily mean following the procedure of physically hearing both sides or taking evidence. It really means applying an enquiring mind to the claim of the landlord. There may be cases where a detailed enquiry is required and even evidence may have to be taken. Each case must be disposed of according to its own nature. But in the present case it was not necessary for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to adopt that procedure. The Petitioner's application for the release of the house in her favour contained only one ground in support of her needs. She alleged that her sons were about to be admitted in the University of Lucknow and therefore she would need the house for her personal use and occupation. In her application dated 25-7-1956, no other reason has been given. In her objection dated 4-8-1956, sent from Allahabad, she merely stated that she needed the house for her personal use and occupation and that her need was genuine. She referred to her previous application of 25th July for the release of the house in her favour. She prayed for a re-consideration of her need. In his order dated 7-8-1956, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did consider this matter. He observed, inter alia, that the Petitioner's children had not been admitted in the University. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has informed me that this statement is correct and that the Petitioner's sons and daughter have not been able to secure admission in Lucknow. Therefore, by 7-8-1956, the very foundation for the Petitioner's need had disappeared. He observed, inter alia, that the Petitioner's children had not been admitted in the University. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has informed me that this statement is correct and that the Petitioner's sons and daughter have not been able to secure admission in Lucknow. Therefore, by 7-8-1956, the very foundation for the Petitioner's need had disappeared. No useful purpose would have been served by asking the Petitioner to appeear at Lucknow. 11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that if the proceedings u/s 7-A (i) are quashed the Petitioner will have the right to press her needs once again and add any new grounds in support of her personal needs. I do not agree. Even if the proceedings were to be quashed, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could only be called upon to consider on merits the Petitioner's application dated 25-7-1956. In that application the only ground alleged is the necessity of educating her children in Lucknow. As staled above, it is conceded on behalf of the Petitioner that that ground no longer exists. In these circumstances any order asking the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider an application, which has become infructuous would be futile. If the Petitioner has any other and fresh grounds in support of her personal needs, it is open to her to make an application to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. If she could satisfy him, it would be for that officer to direct that the premises be released in her favour after they have been vacated by the present allottee. But, on the present material before me, it is impossible to hold that, in spite of the erratic conduct of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the Petitioner has been materially prejudiced in any way. 12. The petition fails and is rejected. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.