JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner in this case is Gayadin Ram, carrying on business under the name and style of Hindusthan Iron and Steel Co. In a reference made by Government to the Fourth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal the petitioner has been described as a 'company' and an industrial dispute between Messrs. Hindusthan Iron and Steel Co. referred to as the 'company' and their workmen represented by Hindusthan Iron and Steel Co. Workers' Union was referred to the Fourth Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of three disputes. The issues were as follows:- (1) Whether the dismissal of Shri Subodh Guha was justified ? What relief is he entitled to ? (2) Bonus for 1956. (3) Whether refusal of employment to the workers named in the list attached to the order of reference was justified ? What relief were they entitled to ? 2. THE Fourth Industrial Tribunal made its award on the 12th of March, 1958. With regard to issue No. 1it was held that the dismissal of Shri Subodh Guha was not justified and there was an order reinstating him in service. The case for the petitioner is that Guha was provocation and inciting the workers in the factory and trying to create disruption between the management and labour and he was also guilty of attempted sabotage of machinery by putting several pieces of copper in the fittings of the machinery. Thereupon he was suspended with effect from the 13th June, 1957 and called upon to show cause why his services should not be dispensed with on charges of indiscipline and attempt to create dissatisfaction amongst the workers and to interfere with the production of the factory. It is said that a criminal prosecution was commenced against Guha under Sec. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the Court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Barrackpore, and it is claimed that because of this criminal proceedings the departmental enquiry was shelved. It is alleged that Guha was never dismissed from service and since the criminal proceedings are still pending, be continues to be under suspension. As against that, Guha's case is that ho was in fact discharged and that there never has been any criminal prosecution against him. It appears that there is a criminal prosecution against one Subodh Gupta and not Subodh Guha. As against that, Guha's case is that ho was in fact discharged and that there never has been any criminal prosecution against him. It appears that there is a criminal prosecution against one Subodh Gupta and not Subodh Guha. This point was gone into by the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that the evidence given before the Tribunal by Guha to the effect that he was discharged, stood uncontradicted. The Tribunal however held that suspension for an indefinite period, in the facts and circumstances of this case, amounted to termination of service. Mr. Chaudhuri appearing on behalf of the petitioner has said that a general proposition of this kind was untenable. If it had no reference to the facts of this case, then I would have been inclined to agree with him. But, if suspension is for an indefinite period and is merely dismissal in the guise of suspension, then it can be called its real name and held to be dismissal. In certain circumstances however, suspension for an indefinite period may be justified and will not necessarily amount to dismissal. However, the learned Tribunal came to that conclusion only in reference to the facts of this particular case. There was definite evidence before him that Guha was discharged and that evidence was uncontradicted. He has come to the conclusion that Guha had been dismissed and he should be reinstated. Since it is a finding on a question of fact and this is not a Court of Appeal on facts, the decision on issue No, 1 cannot be disturbed, and so far as that issue is concerned, the application must fail. 3. I now come to issue No. 2. This is an issue relating to bonus for 1956. The Union claims three months' wages for bonus and the company stated that it had no available surplus and no bonus could be paid. It has now been held authoritatively that bonus can only be claimed where there is an available surplus, after calculations which have been formulated in what has been described as the 'full Bench Formula. ' According to that Formula, various calculations have to be made. Provisions have to be made for depreciation, reserve and return for paid-up capital and working capital, and then the available surplus is to be calculated. It is quite clear that this calculation cannot be made without having facts and figures. ' According to that Formula, various calculations have to be made. Provisions have to be made for depreciation, reserve and return for paid-up capital and working capital, and then the available surplus is to be calculated. It is quite clear that this calculation cannot be made without having facts and figures. I have held in National Carbon Co., Ltd. v. M. N. Gan, A. I. R. (1957) Cal. 500 that the calculation of bonus based on the available surplus, must be made from facts and figures, and that the onus of proving the fact that there was an available surplus is on the workers who claim bonus. In a recent Supreme Court case Ganesh Flour Mills Co., Ltd. v. Employees of Ganesh Flour Mitts Co., Ltd., A. I. R. (1958) S. C. 382 this proposition has been confirmed and it has been held that in dwelling with the question of bonus the employers should be shown to be in possession of a surplus which is actually available for distribution. In this particular case, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that two months' bonus should be given, but this finding is based on no available documents or figures that could be gathered from the books of the audited accounts of the firm. It appears that at one point of time the workmen asked for the issue of summons for the production of the books and the firm said that the balance-sheet for the year 1956 had not yet been prepared. But it does not appear from the record what happened to the summons in respect of the books of account. In any event, no books were produced and no balance-sheet. It seems that one of the officers of the firm gave evidence that five weeks' wages were paid in September, 1956 and this evidence was disbelieved by the Tribunal. Apart from this, there is no evidence at all to show what the profit was, and what deductions were to be made, and what was the actual available surplus. The Tribunal merely said that since the company had possession and custody of the books of account and had not produced them, therefore the Tribunal was entitled to presume that evidence on this point, which could be and was not produced, would, if produced, be unfavorable to the company. The Tribunal merely said that since the company had possession and custody of the books of account and had not produced them, therefore the Tribunal was entitled to presume that evidence on this point, which could be and was not produced, would, if produced, be unfavorable to the company. Thereafter, upon no figures whatever, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that bonus should be paid for two mouths' wages. This kind of order I have condemned in the case of National Carbon Co., Ltd. (supra ). In my opinion, the amount of bonus that can be allowed has not been properly calculated and therefore, the finding of the Tribunal an this issue must be quashed. The question is, what will happen now? In my opinion, the matter should go back to the Tribunal for the calculations to be made upon proper materials. As I have pointed out in the case of National Carbon, Co., Ltd. (supra), the law provides sufficient machinery for the Tribunal or the parties to have the necessary documents produced. The Tribunal could even appoint assessor's to ascertain any particular fact. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had never the means to arrive at the correct facts and to calculate bonus, and it should be calculated according to the directions contained in the 'full Bench Formula', and the observations of the Supreme Court made thereon. 4. I now come to issue No. 3. It appears that about 35 workmen complained that they went to the firm but were refused employment. So far as the petitioner is concerned, it is denied that they were turned back. It is said that they had voluntarily left, or did not join work at all. Now, the first point to be determined with regard to these workmen was their status, because without determination of the status it would not be possible to decide what relief could be given to them. The learned Tribunal went into evidence, but although most of the 35 workmen were present, only one person went into the box to give evidence. The evidence really was meager that the Tribunal found as follows :- "I am prepared to hold that some of these workmen are temporary but I cannot definitely find that none of them is other than temporary or casual." It is very difficult to find out what exactly this means. The evidence really was meager that the Tribunal found as follows :- "I am prepared to hold that some of these workmen are temporary but I cannot definitely find that none of them is other than temporary or casual." It is very difficult to find out what exactly this means. Analyzing it further, and giving due effect to its double negative, one must come to the conclusion that he was not prepared to hold that the workers were not casual workers. In other words they can all be taken to be casual workers. What is a casual worker has been considered in various decisions of the Labour Tribunals themselves. It has been held that they were workmen in respect of particular jobs which may even be a job for a particular day or for a particular item of manufacture. It has further been held that such casual workers ceased to be workmen after the work was finished or the period for which they were employed had run out, See Cooper Allen and Co. 1951 (II) L. L. J. 478, Took Tea Estate (1954) 1 A. C. 349. In this case, if we have to consider these workers as casual workers, that can only mean that they were inducted for a particular job. There is no finding whatever whether such jobs continued. In considering the particular line of business of this firm, it is highly improbable that a casual job which started in 1956 would continue up to 1958. Nevertheless, the learned Tribunal has decided that these workers should be provided with jobs which they previously used to do, on their offering themselves for it. That can only mean that they should be provided with the kind of jobs which they previously used to do. The only result of giving effect to this finding would be to transform casual workers into permanent workers. The decision of the learned Tribunal would entitle them at any time to go to the petitioner, and compel him to create jobs for them. That, I think, is beyond the scope of the reference and is a task which is impossible for the petitioner to carry out. Under the circumstances, this part of the decision can not be supported and must be quashed. The result will be as follows:- (1) The rule is discharged with regard to issue No. 1. That, I think, is beyond the scope of the reference and is a task which is impossible for the petitioner to carry out. Under the circumstances, this part of the decision can not be supported and must be quashed. The result will be as follows:- (1) The rule is discharged with regard to issue No. 1. (2) The rule is made absolute with regard to issues Nos. 2 and 3 and the findings are quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari. There will be writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Tribunal to decide issue No. 2 regarding bonus for 1956, in accordance with law and with due deference to my observations made herein. No order as to costs. Interim orders vacated. Let the order be drawn up expeditiously.