Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against a conviction for murder and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life therefor passed by the Sessions Judge of Kottayam. 2. The prosecution case against the appellant, who will hereafter be referred to in this judgment as the accused, was that at about 8 P. M. on 20-4-1957 he stabbed one Mathai Sebastian alias Devasia of Koramala Veedu with a malappuram knife while the latter was going along the road near Pw. 1's house at Thevarpadam in Malampara kara, Meenachil taluk, and thereby caused his death. In the Sessions Court the accused pleaded not guilty, putting forward a plea of self-defence. According to him, the deceased Devasia happened to meet him while he was standing in the road and Devasia then asked him to go with him to a toddy shop, and on his refusal Devasia caught him by the hand and tried to drag him along and a scuffle ensued, and during the course of the scuffle he somehow managed to get himself free from Devasia's clutches. The learned Sessions Judge refused to accept this plea, and finding that the prosecution case was true, the learned judge convicted the accused under S.302, Indian Penal Code. 3. On behalf of the accused it was contended before us that barring the dying declaration, Ex. P6, made by the deceased the Prosecution has no reliable evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, that the dying declaration should not be acted upon as it has not been corroborated in material particulars by other evidence, and that even if the dying declaration is accepted it is not inconsistent with the defence case of self defence, and so, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. There was also a contention that the dying declaration itself was inadmissible as it had not been satisfactorily proved that the deceased person was in a fit condition to make it. 4. According to the prosecution, at about 7 P.M. on 20-4-1957 Devasia went to Pw. 3's shop for buying some beedies and some candle and he left the shop after baying the articles. A little later, the accused also went there, purchased some beedies, and after ascertaining whether Devasia had come there and in which direction he had gone the accused left the place. 3's shop for buying some beedies and some candle and he left the shop after baying the articles. A little later, the accused also went there, purchased some beedies, and after ascertaining whether Devasia had come there and in which direction he had gone the accused left the place. At about 8 p.m. while Pw.1 was in his house he heard a cry from the road. Taking up an electric torch he went to the road and found Devasia lying there with a stab injury. Pw. 1's evidence is that Devasia then told him that the accused had stabbed him and also requested him to fetch a priest for administering the last rites to him. According to Pw. 1, he fetched the priest and subsequently Pws.1 and 2 took Devasia in a car to the Palai Government Hospital. One of the medical officers of that hospital, Pw. 7, saw Devasia at 12.15 in the night. He had then an oblique penetrating incised wound on the left side of the chest. In spite of the treatment given to Devasia in the hospital he died of this injury at about 5.45 A. M. on 21-4-1957. 5. The fact that Devasia died on account of the penetrating injury found on the left side of his chest by Pw. 7 was not disputed before us. It has also been amply proved by the evidence of Pw. 7 and the wound and post-mortem certificates Exts. P3 and P8. The only dispute before us was as to how Devasia came to sustain the injury. 6. In Ext. P6 the dying declaration made by Devasia to the Sub-Magistrate at Palai, Pw. 8, be said that while he was going to his house he happened to meet accused on the road and when he asked the accused why he was standing there the latter stabbed him with the knife which he was secretly carrying with him. Asked why the accused should have done this, Devasia said that there was some previous enmity between them and that he did not know what was the immediate provocation. In Ext. P9, the first information statement which Devasia gave to the Police while he was under treatment in the hospital, he conformed to the statement in Ext. P6 and also clarified what he had referred to as previous enmity in the dying declaration. According to the statement made in Ext. In Ext. P9, the first information statement which Devasia gave to the Police while he was under treatment in the hospital, he conformed to the statement in Ext. P6 and also clarified what he had referred to as previous enmity in the dying declaration. According to the statement made in Ext. P9, the previous enmity was due to a beating which Devasia had given to the accused 3 or 4 days before the date of the occurrence. If this dying declaration can be accepted there can be no doubt of the guilt of the accused. 7. The accused's first objection to the dying declaration was about its admissibility. The learned counsel who appeared on his behalf pointed oat that the medical officer who had certified that Devasia was in a fit condition to make a statement at the time it was recorded by the Magistrate has not been examined, and he contended that on account of the non-examination of the medical officer the dying declaration should be held to be inadmissible on the ground that there was no legal evidence to prove Devasia's capacity to make it. The Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration has deposed that Devasia was in a fit condition to make it, and he has also proved the certificate made by the doctor at the foot of Ext. P6. The doctor, according to the Magistrate, was present throughout the time he was recording the statement This evidence, in our opinion, amply proves Devasia's capacity to make the statement. We therefore, hold that the dying declaration was rightly admitted in evidence. 8. The contention that there is no corroborative evidence as regards the statements in the dying declaration is also unacceptable. The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court about the evidentiary value of dying declaration is to the effect that in appropriate cases the dying declaration can be accepted and acted upon even without corroboration. 8. The contention that there is no corroborative evidence as regards the statements in the dying declaration is also unacceptable. The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court about the evidentiary value of dying declaration is to the effect that in appropriate cases the dying declaration can be accepted and acted upon even without corroboration. In Khushal Rao V. State of Bombay (AIR 1953 S. C. 22) it has been observed as follows: "It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying [declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. "In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. "In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration if, on the other hand, the court after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has Come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without Corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises riot from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities." The dying declaration in the present case would satisfy all the tests laid down in the above observations. 9. The declaration itself is a coherent statement made soon after the incident. At that time the deponent was fully alive of the perilous situation in which he was, and was also in a state of mind in which it is difficult to believe that he would have knowingly made a false statement. The evidence of Pw.1 is that when he came upon the deceased as he was lying injured on the road the latter wanted him to fetch a priest to administer the last rites to him and that he accordingly fetched the priest and had the last rites administered. A man who wanted to have this done was not likely to make a false statement immediately after it, especially in regard to the incident which was going to lead to his death. Pw.1 has also sworn that the deceased himself then told him that the accused had stabbed him. There is also the evidence of Pw. 3 that before the incident the accused was making enquiries about the movements of the deceased. The Prosecution has also the evidence of two other witnesses, Pws. 4 and 5. Pw. Pw.1 has also sworn that the deceased himself then told him that the accused had stabbed him. There is also the evidence of Pw. 3 that before the incident the accused was making enquiries about the movements of the deceased. The Prosecution has also the evidence of two other witnesses, Pws. 4 and 5. Pw. 4 is the accused's landlord, i. e , the person with whom he was living. According to Pw. 4, after the incident the accused went to him and told him that he had stabbed Devasia and requested for his help. Pw. 4 then took the accused to Pw. 5, an influential person in the locality. Pw. 5 says that the accused told him also that he had stabbed Devasia. Pw. 5, however, refused to render any help to the accused. The learned Sessions Judge believed the evidence of Pws. 4 and 5, and we also see no reason to disbelieve them. In the light of the evidence given by Pws. 1, 3, 4 and 5 we have absolutely no hesitation in accepting the dying declaration as containing a true statement as to how Devasia came to sustain the injury which caused his death. 10. The plea of self-defence put forward in the Sessions Court has no leg to stand upon. In the first place, the accused did not put forward this plea before the committing Magistrate although he was specifically asked by the Magistrate what he had to say about the incident. All that he said before the Magistrate was that he had not stabbed Devassia. In the Sessions Court the accused, of course, put forward the plea of self-defence. Here, it is contended by his learned counsel that the accused's statement in the Sessions Court is not inconsistent with the dying declaration and that it should therefore be accepted. We are unable to accept the argument that the accused's statement is not inconsistent with the dying declaration. If the version given in the dying declaration is true it cannot but be held that the version given in the accused's statement is false. As we have given both statements in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment we do not set down those statements here; and since we have already said that we believe the dying declaration to be true it follows that we do not believe the belated statement made by the accused. 11. As we have given both statements in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment we do not set down those statements here; and since we have already said that we believe the dying declaration to be true it follows that we do not believe the belated statement made by the accused. 11. The doctor's evidence proves, as has already been stated, that Devasia's death was caused by the injury found on his body; and since the dying declaration and the evidence of Pws. 1, 4 and 5 prove that injury was caused by the accused we hold that he has been rightly convicted under S.302, Indian Penal Code. From the nature of the injury and the circumstances in which it was inflicted it can be safely inferred that the accused must have stabbed Devasia with the intention to cause his death. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the conviction of the accused and the sentence passed upon him are hereby confirmed. Dismissed.