Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.- There are two connected appeals. A.S. No. 774 of 1954, is a pauper appeal filed by minor Velu Niranjan, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 2 of 1953, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Madurai, against the judgment and decree in that pauper suit in so far as it went against him. A.S. No. 65 of 1955 has been filed by Alagammal and Nagappa Konar, defendants 3 and 4 in O.S. No. 2 of 1953, in so far as they considered the judgment and decree as going against their interests. The facts were briefly these: Minor Velu Niranjan, the plaintiff, was the son of one Sundari Ammal, the second defendant. He claimed that his mother, Sundari Ammal was married by Rajagopal Konar or Periakaruppan Konar as his second wife, his first wife being one Alagammal, the first defendant. According to him, Alagammal, the first defendant did not have any child for four or five years after the marriage and Rajagopal, her husband, despaired of her having issue, took upto himself Sundari Ammal, the second defendant, as his second wife, and that he lived with Sundari Ammal for some two months in his family house and for six years in a separate house as the two wives did not get along amicably, and that Sundari Ammal, who was for six and odd years exclusively under the protection of Rajagopal, delivered to him two children, not only the plaintiff, Velu Niranjan, but also a daughter Velammal, the fifth defendant. The fourth defendant, one Nagappa Konar, brother of Rajagopal, was added as he has a house of Rajagopal othied to him, under Exhibit B-1 dated 7th October, 1945, for one thousand rupees. The plaintiff claimed to be the legitimate son of Rajagopal Konar, who died on 7th February, 1946. He claimed for his legitimate share in the agricultural and non-agricultural properties left behind by Rajagopal. He attacked the trust deed, Exhibit A-7, dated 3rd July, 1940, executed by Rajagopal in respect of the plaint A Schedule properties for the performance of Puja to his family deities, Kannabiran and Karuppanaswami on Krishna Jayanti and Sivaratri days, as illusory, and as not binding on him; those properties constitute the major portion of the properties of Rajagopal, and yield an income of about Rs. 400 per year, and the first defendant Alagammal was made under the trust deed the sole trustee for her life to be succeeded thereafter by Rajagopal’s heirs. He also claimed that he was entitled to the entire agricultural properties covered by items 1 to 6 of the C Schedule, on the grounds that Madras Act XXVI of 1947, giving women a right to a share in agricultural properties, had not come into operation till 26th November, 1946, and Rajagopal, had died and the succession had opened on 7th February, 1946. The suit was hotly contested by defendants 1, 3 and 4 who not only denied the marriage of the second defendant, Sundari Ammal, with Rajagopal Konar, but also denied that the plaintiff and defendant 5 were born to Rajagopal. In any event, they contended that Rajagopal had only had casual intercourse with Sundari Ammal, the second defendant, and that even if the plaintiff and defendant 5 were born to him by such intercourse, they would not be even illegitimate progeny of a Sudra, entitled to rights under the Hindu Law. The lower Court went elaborately into the evidence. Defendants 2 and 5 had remained ex parte. The learned Subordinate Judge, after discussing the entire evidence, held that the second defendant, Sundari Ammal, was not proved to have been validly married to Rajagopal Konar, but that she was proved to have been continuously kept as his concubine by Rajagopal for some six years, and that the plaintiff and the fifth defendant were born to Rajagopal, through the second defendant during such period of exclusively kept concubinage, and that, therefore, the plaintiff would be entitled to succeed to Rajagopal’s estate to the extent allowed to an illegitimate son of a Sudra under the Hindu Law. He held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the entire agricultural properties as claimed by him, but only to a half share in them, the widow, the first defendant, being entitled to the other half share, under Privy Council and other rulings. In the end, therefore, he gave the plaintiff a decree declaring him to be entitled to a ¼ share in the plaint B Schedule properties (othi properties) subject to the finding in A.S. No. 63 of 1953, on the file of the District Judge, Madurai. In the end, therefore, he gave the plaintiff a decree declaring him to be entitled to a ¼ share in the plaint B Schedule properties (othi properties) subject to the finding in A.S. No. 63 of 1953, on the file of the District Judge, Madurai. He was also declared to be entitled to a ¼ share in item 7 of the C Schedule properties and to a half share in items 1 to 6 of the C Schedule properties after the lifetime of the third defendant, the mother of Rajagopal, who was enjoying them for life towards her maintenance. He dismissed the plaintiff’s suit in other respects and directed the plaintiff to pay to the Government Rs. 419-6-0 towards Court-fees and stamps and allowed him to recover Rs. 100 therefrom from defendants 1 and 3. He directed defendants 1, 3 and 4 to pay the plaintiff Rs. 20-7-6 towards his proportionate costs, and directed the plaintiff to pay the first defendant Rs. 134-6-0 towards her proportionate costs on the portion of the suit dismissed, and to defendants 3 and 4 Rs. 55-9-3 as proportionate costs. The plaintiff has felt highly dissatisfied by not being declared the legitimate son of Rajagopal and regarding some other matters, and has filed A.S. No. 774 of 1954. Defendants 3 and 4 have felt highly dissatisfied with the second defendant, Sundari Ammal, being declared the exclusively kept concubine of Rajagopal for six years, and the plaintiff and Velammal to be children born of Rajagopal through defendant 2 during such period of exclusively kept concubinage and have filed A.S. No. 65 of 1955. We have perused the records, and heard the learned counsel on all sides. Mr. X. V. Srinivasa Iyer, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, Messrs. P.S. Balakrishna Iyer and P.S. Ramachandran, the learned counsel for the first defendantrespondent, and Mr. Gopalaswamy Iyengar, the learned counsel for defendants 3 and 4, have argued the case fully and fairly. Mr. Srinivasa Iyer raised several contentions. The first was that the lower Court should have held defendant 2 to be the lawfully wedded wife of Rajagopal, and the plaintiff and defendant 5 to be the legitimate children of Rajagopal, through defendant 2, instead of holding them to be illegitimate children of a permanently kept concubine. Mr. Srinivasa Iyer raised several contentions. The first was that the lower Court should have held defendant 2 to be the lawfully wedded wife of Rajagopal, and the plaintiff and defendant 5 to be the legitimate children of Rajagopal, through defendant 2, instead of holding them to be illegitimate children of a permanently kept concubine. The learned counsel for defendants 1, 3 and 4 urged that the lower Court should not have held defendant 2 to be the permanently kept concubine of Rajagopal, and the plaintiff and defendant 5 to be the children born to her through Rajagopal during such period of exclusively kept concubinage, and should have held that Rajagopal had nothing to do with defendant 2, or at the most, had but casual intercourse with her, and the several other persons had access to her at the same time, and especially during the periods when the plaintiff and defendant 5 could have been conceived and that, therefore, the lower Court should have held that the plaintiff and defendant 5 were not even illegitimate children of a Sudra as defined in the Hindu Law entitled to a share and other rights. We are unable to agree with either of these extreme contentions. Before we discuss this point we shall dispose of a preliminary objection raised by Mr. Srinivasa Iyer against the maintainability of A.S. No. 65 of 1955. He urged that defendants 3 and 4 had no right whatever to file that appeal, as they were not interested in the lower Court’s judgment and decree. The argument is unsustainable for two reasons. First of all, they were the mother and brother of Rajagopal, and were defendants 3 and 4 in the suit, and were vitally interested in seeing that no unconnected bastards were foisted on family, either as legitimate children of Rajagopal, or as illegitimate children of Rajagopal through Sundari Ammal with the rights given under the Hindu Law. It is obvious, and is not disputed, that casual children of Sudras by casual intercourse will not get the share and other rights of illegitimate children under the Hindu Law. Secondly, defendants 3 and 4 had certain rights in the properties involved in the suit, defendant 4, being an othidar, and defendant 3 being to enjoy items 1 to 6 of the C Schedule, the lands, for her maintenance during her lifetime. Secondly, defendants 3 and 4 had certain rights in the properties involved in the suit, defendant 4, being an othidar, and defendant 3 being to enjoy items 1 to 6 of the C Schedule, the lands, for her maintenance during her lifetime. So, they had a right to see that unconnected persons did not claim any right in the properties held by them. For both these reasons, A.S. No. 65 of 1955 was certainly maintainable, and we overrule this preliminary objection. Now we come to the question whether the plaintiff had proved that his mother Sundari Ammal, defendant 2, was validly married to Rajagopal, and whether the lower Court erred in holding to the contrary. We are of opinion that the lower Court was right in its conclusion that there was no valid marriage, and that the plaintiff and defendant 5 were not legitimate children of Rajagopal through defendant S2. First of all, Rajagopal belonged to the Yadhava community of Sudras, and the second defendant, Sundari Ammal, was said to belong to the Kshatriya caste. Kshatriyas and Sudras are major divisions of the Hindu community, and two among the four main castes named by Manu and the authors of the Dharma Sastras. The marriage of a Kshatriya woman with a Sudra man will be pratiloma and would not be held valid under the Sastras. The question then is whether the marriage was performed under any statute or custom. The marriage was not performed under any statute or custom. The marriage was not performed in a Registrar’s Office, or under the cover of any statute; nor was any custom set up and proved. The evidence simply showed that Rajagopal and Sundari Ammal went to the Tiruparankundram temple, six miles from Madura, and that Rajagopal tied a tali round the neck of Sundari Ammal without mantra or rituals, or ceremonies. Of course, if there was a custom that the mere tying of a tali would be valid in that particular community to complete the marriage, that might have sufficed, provided it was proved with all the rigours required of a custom. In Malabar, a present to the bride of a piece of cloth for wearing, and a bottle of cocoanut oil for bathing, in the presence of respectable men representing both the bride and bridegroom, would be sufficient to complete a sambandam marriage recognised by Law. In Malabar, a present to the bride of a piece of cloth for wearing, and a bottle of cocoanut oil for bathing, in the presence of respectable men representing both the bride and bridegroom, would be sufficient to complete a sambandam marriage recognised by Law. But there was no proof in this case that among the Yadhavas or the Kshatriyas to which communities these two people belonged, merely going into a temple and tying a tali round the bride’s neck by the bridegroom would be sufficient to complete a valid marriage. The whole matter has been discussed at length in a ruling of a Bench of this Court consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ., in Devayani Achi v. Chidambaram Chetty 1 . It has been held that some rites or ceremonies are essential unless there is a valid custom to the contrary. The authorities of Tiru-parankundram temple were not examined to prove any such custom, or the leaders or the Yadhava and Kshatriya castes. The difficulty is two-fold here. A custom is usually of a caste or community. (Kulachar) by its very nature could not belong to two combined castes. Such marriages between members of two castes are of recent origin. Of course, we agree if that such custom is proved to be certain, immemorial, etc., and not contrary to morals or public policy it may be valid. But no such custom was even set up, much less proved, here. So it is obvious that the lower Court was right in holding that there was no valid marriage. The reason given for Rajagopal to marry Sundari Ammal as his second wife also is not convincing. The man was 24, and his wife was 19. They were both in the prime of youth. There was no need for Rajagopal to think that defendant 1 would not have any issue. There was no evidence that defendant 1 was deceased or was certified by a doctor to be organically unfit to bear children. So the conclusion is that Rajagopal simply took Sundari Ammal as a concubine, and kept her as his exclusively kept concubine for six years and odd. The next question is whether she was his exclusively kept concubine, or whether it was a case of mere casual intercourse. So the conclusion is that Rajagopal simply took Sundari Ammal as a concubine, and kept her as his exclusively kept concubine for six years and odd. The next question is whether she was his exclusively kept concubine, or whether it was a case of mere casual intercourse. Here, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the lower Court that Sundari Ammal was the exclusively kept concubine of Rajagopal for six years. The evidence proves it. In some documents to which Rajagopal was a party, she has been described as his wife, though, in the othi deed she is described a bhogastree, a woman of pleasure and a dancing girl. Mr. Srinivasa Iyer urged that Rajagopal described Sundari Ammal like that in Exhibit B-1 simply to please his brother, the fourth defendant, who was not inclined to recognise the inter caste marriage as valid. But this is extravagant. No man will describe his wife as a concubine or as woman of pleasure or a dancing girl, to please his brother. Again it is found that in the report of the birth of the plaintiff, by the hospital authorities, Rajagopal is named as the father of the plaintiff, and the same thing is said to be the case on the report of birth of the fifth defendant Velammal. When two children are born like the plaintiff and the fifth defendant, at an interval of two years, to contend that Rajagopal had a casual intercourse with Sundari Ammal and got one child, and that, after some years, he had another casual intercourse with her again and got another child, sounds highly improbable. The reasonable inference is that Sundari Ammal was kept by Rajagopal as his permanently kept concubine for some six years. It may be that the story of Sundari Ammal that she was kept by Rajagopal in his family house for two months, along with defendant 1, is not correct. He might have attempted to take and keep her in his family house, but defendants 1 and 3 must have driven her out forthwith, and he must have therefore taken her to a lonely house, away from his family house, and kept her there as his exclusively kept concubine for six years. He might have attempted to take and keep her in his family house, but defendants 1 and 3 must have driven her out forthwith, and he must have therefore taken her to a lonely house, away from his family house, and kept her there as his exclusively kept concubine for six years. We have no doubt, therefore, that the lower Court was right in treating Sundari Ammal as the exclusively kept concubine of Rajagopal for six years, and in declaring the plaintiff to be the illegitimate son of Sundari Ammal entitled to a share and other rights vouchsafed by the Hindu Law. That will mean that A.S. No. 65 of 1955 will have to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs. Now we come to the other contentions in A.S. No. 774 of 1954. Mr. Srinivasa Iyer urged that the lower Court went wrong in giving the plaintiff, as am illegitimate son, only a half share in items 1 to 6 of the C Schedule, instead of the entire interest in those lands after the death of defendant 3, who was enjoying them for life towards her maintenance. He urged that defendant 1, the widow, did not have any rights given to her under the Madras Act of 1947 in agricultural lands till 26th November, 1946, and that, as Rajagopal had died on 7th February, 1946, the plaintiff/his illegitimate son, was the sole heir to his agricultural lands. This is overlooking the simple point that the object of Act XXVI of 1947 was to enlarge women’s rights in properties, and not to take away existing rights. Under the ordinary Hindu Law, the widow and illegitimate son of a Sudra would take half and half. So defendant 1’s right to take a half share in the agricultural lands under the ordinary Hindu Law was not taken away, but subsisted in full force, as remarked by the lower Court which has also quoted the Privy Council ruling in Kamulammal v. Visvanathaswami Naicker1, in support of this view, which is undoubtedly correct. On these being pointed out to him, Mr. Srinivasa Iyer was unable to urge any valid argument. Mr. Srinivasa Iyer then urged that the lower Court went wrong in not giving the plaintiff, the illegitimate son, a turn in the management of the trust properties. On these being pointed out to him, Mr. Srinivasa Iyer was unable to urge any valid argument. Mr. Srinivasa Iyer then urged that the lower Court went wrong in not giving the plaintiff, the illegitimate son, a turn in the management of the trust properties. But, as pointed out by the learned counsel for defendant 1, he has overlooked the express terms of the trust deed, Exhibit A-7, wherein defendant 1 is given the right to be the sole trustee for her lifetime. Of course after she dies, the plaintiff, as illegitimate son, may be the trustee. To that extent alone can he get a declaration regarding the trust properties, and this will be incorporated in the decree in this appeal. In the end, therefore, with the slight modification above regarding the declaration in respect of the trust properties, A.S. No. 774 of 1954 is also dismissed, and all the parties thereto are directed to bear their own costs. The appellant will pay the proper Court-fee due to Government in this pauper appeal. V.S. ------ Appeals dismissed.