Order This is an application for excusing delay in depositing the initial charges for printing records in S.C.S.L.P. Crl. Nos. 557 to 560 of 1957 against Crl. R.C. No. 59 of 1957 and in which leave has been granted by the Supreme Court. Under Rule 17 of Order 21 of the Supreme Court Rules it is provided that the preceding orders of the Rules of the Supreme Court with reference to civil appeals with the necessary modifications and adaptations are to apply to criminal appeals also. Order 12, rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that when an appellant having obtained a certificate fails to furnish the security or make the deposit as required under Order 45, rule 7 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code the High Court may cancel the certificate or make such further or other order as the justice of the case may require. The time contemplated under Order 45, rule 7 (1), Civil Procedure Code, within which the deposit is required to be made under rule 7(1) (b) is ninety days or such further period not exceeding six weeks from the date of the decree complained of or within six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate whichever is the later date. The provision for time limit for making the printing deposit is mandatory and if the period is sought to be extended it should be on a petition for the purpose which has to be ordered by the Court. In this case leave was granted on 13th January, 1958 and the printing deposit has not been made within 150 days contemplated in the rules referred to above. Therefore the point which arises for consideration is whether this Court has got power to extend the period if sufficient cause is shown. The earliest decision of this Court is Ramayya v. Lakshmayya1, where a Full Bench of this Court has held that the Court has power under rule 9 of the Privy Council Rules to extend the period allowed for furnishing the security and the making of the deposit required by Order 45, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure beyond the periods mentioned therein but the power should not be exercised without cogent reason. The effect of the amendment of Order 45, rule 7 of the Code is to limit the discretion of the Court in granting further time to a maximum period of sixty days beyond ninety days which the applicant has of right and if that provision stood alone the Court would have no discretion to grant time beyond the further period of sixty days. But rule 9 of the Privy Council Rules leaves a discretion in the Court to extend the time and by reason of section 112 of the Code that rule must prevail over Order 45, rule 7 of the Code. In Pitchaiah v. Narasimhacharyulu1, a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held: “The provisions of Order 45, rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, are only directory and not mandatory. They do not provide for a penalty for failure to comply with the requirements laid down therein. It is only rule 9 of the Privy Council Rules (now rule 3 of Order 12 of the Supreme Court Rules) which while providing for the consequences of default also enables the Court at the same time to pass such further or other orders as the justice of the case requires.” The Orissa High Court has held in Pitamhari Dibya v. Chandrasekhar2, thus: “A rule of procedure fixing time should ordinarily be held to be obligatory and cannot without strong reasons be deemed to be directory unless the power of extending the time is given to the Courts. It would, therefore, appear that the Court has no discretion to extend the time beyond 150 days prescribed under Order 45, rule 7. But the Court is bound to give effect to the rule of the Supreme Court in preference to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code when a conflict between the two arises. Therefore the Court has power to extend time by virtue of the express provision in rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules. But this power should be exercised with great caution only where there are cogent reasons for doing so.” The Nagpur High Court has held in Gulam Hussain v. Mansurbeg3, that “the time for furnishing security for costs can be extended beyond that which is prescribed in the second part of rule 7 of Order 45 but that a sufficiently strong case will have to be made out before this indulgence can be granted. Ordinarily the position in rule 7 must be adhered to; very cogent reasons will have to be given before the Court will enlarge the time prescribed by the Code.” In Gunavathi Devi v. Bihar State4, it was held thus:- “It is true that the time for depositing security under Order 45, rule 7, would expire in this case on the 1st of February, 1957, but we have a discretion in a proper case to extend the time even beyond the limit provided by Order 45, rule 7, because of the provisions of Order 12, rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, read with section 112 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That is the view expressed by a Division Bench of this High Court in S.C.A. No. 61 of 1952 in its order dated the 29th January, 1954 and also by another Division Bench of this High Court in S.C.A. No. 29 of 1952 in its order, dated the 27th July, 1953.” The learned Additional Government Pleader invites my attention to an unreported decision of this Court of similar import by Krishnaswami Nayudu and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., in S.A. Nos. 2038 and 2039 of 1950. In these circumstances I hold that I have got power to extend the time provided strong and convincing grounds are put forward for granting extension of time asked for. The learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam points out that till now though the High Court office had no obligation to do so by courtesy a memo was being sent to the advocates concerned calling for deposit of printing charges. The practice is said to have become so common that the advocate awaited the receipt of memos for depositing printing charges. The office note also refers to the fact that there has been such a practice. In other words the learned advocate has made out that it was due to no wilful default on the part of his client that the printing charges have not been deposited in time. I need not point out the general rule that no man can be prejudiced by any act of Court the maxim being actu scuraiae, neminem grav abit. It is the duty of the Court in such cases to help the petitioner as to avoid the cancellation of the certificate granted to him and for which he has not in any way wilfully contributed. It is the duty of the Court in such cases to help the petitioner as to avoid the cancellation of the certificate granted to him and for which he has not in any way wilfully contributed. Therefore I excuse the delay and give one week’s time to deposit the printing charges. R.M. ----- Petition allowed.