Judgment.- This is an appeal by one Ananthanarayanan, the petitioner in O.P. No. 1 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli, against the order dismissing his petition for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent, Meenamani Ammal, with costs. The facts were briefly these: The petitioner was a Brahmin aged 36 years at the time of the filing of the petition. He is now, of course, 43. He married the respondent, Meenamani Ammal, who was 29 or 30 years old at the time of the petition, on 10th July, 1936, when she was 15 years old. They lived fairly happily together till 6th July, 1943. But there was a feeling of inferiority in the husband. He was drawing Re. 1-6-0 per day as his pay in a workshop at Golden Rock, and came of a poor family, and his pay was hardly sufficient to make both ends meet. His wife came from a richer family, and her father, Venkatrama Ayyar. R.W. 1, was in far more affluent circumstances. The appellant, therefore, felt that he, as a poor man’s son, was inferior to his wife, a rich man’s daughter. He also found that his wife was physically stronger than himself, which grievance he has expressed in Exhibit B-1, his reply notice to her. So, he felt physically and financially inferior to her, and this worked within him a kind of sub-conscious dislike of her. According to her, he wanted her to get money and jewels from her rich father often, and ill-treated her whenever she did not succeed. The lower Court believed her story that, on many an occasion, she did get such money and jewels from her father on his demand and that he was apt to ill-treat her whenever she failed to get these things. But, as stated above, the married life was fairly happy till 1943. The main drawback, was that there was no child to cement the relationship between the couple. R.W. 1 said that the appellant asked him to give him in marriage as second wife the respondent’s younger sister and that he refused. Obviously, there were some tiffs between the husband and wife now and then. The lower Court calls this violent outbursts of temper on the part of the appellant. R.W. 1 said that the appellant asked him to give him in marriage as second wife the respondent’s younger sister and that he refused. Obviously, there were some tiffs between the husband and wife now and then. The lower Court calls this violent outbursts of temper on the part of the appellant. Probably, there were equally stinging retorts on the part of the wife Whatever it be, on 6th July, 1943, the respondent left the appellant’s house for her father’s house in a huff after a tiff. It must be remembered in this connection that such a leaving in anger was usual in orthodox India of old, when there was no remedy of divorce, and the husband was free to marry any number of wives, and to neglect or ill-treat her the wife’s only weapon was to leave him and make him realise her absence and usefulness and rush after her, begging her to go back to him. The fact remains that the respondent left the appellant on 6th July, 1943. He alleged that she had left a letter, Exhibit A-2, behind, telling him that she was leaving him for good and that he might marry again. This letter was denied by her; but it was taken by the lower Court to have been written by her, because P.Ws. 2 to 4 spoke to her writing it, and, she and her father had not given a detailed reply, as promised showing that she did not write it; and the contents of that letter were asked to be written by her, on dictation in Court, and the letter, Exhibit A-2, so written by her in Court, resembled closely the letter, Exhibit A-2. Whether she wrote that letter only in a huff and with a view to making her husband, the appellant, rush after her and entreat her to go back to him, or whether she meant really to desert him for good is a moot point; but there is no need to decide that point in this appeal, because, even her desertion, if any, was condoned by the husband cohabiting with her and having conjugal relations with her for some 50 days from August, 1952. The lower Court, having believed Exhibit A-2, and found that the respondent left the appellant on 6th July, 1943, with the animus deserendi, held that she had not deserted him without just cause for more than three years as required by section 5 (1) (c) of Act VI of 1949, because, before the three years elapsed from 6th July, 1943, the appellant took unto himself a second wife, on 8th April, 1945, Act XIX of 1946 came into operation on 23rd April, 1946, it gave a wife whose husband had married again a right to live separately and claim separate maintenance, and the appellant had, in his notice, Exhibit B-1, dated 5th January, 1948, in reply to her notice, Exhibit A-4, dated 20th December, 1947, claiming separate maintenance, offered to take her back and live with her amicably, but had not promised to give her separate residence, and she was, therefore, according to the lower Court, entitled to continue the desertion with just cause from 8th April, 1945, as Act XIX of 1946 was retrospective in its effect and applied even to marriages performed before it came into operation. For that view, the learned Subordinate Judge relied on some rulings which have now been overruled by a Full Bench of this Court in Palaniswami Gounder v. Devanai Ammal1 . The Full Bench has held that Act XIX of 1946 would apply only to cases where the husband marries again after the coming into operation of Act XIX of 1946. So, the lower Court’s view has now been overruled and cannot be a justification for the respondent to continue her desertion or to make it a desertion for just a cause from 8th April, 1945. The second wife of the appellant died in 1950, and the appellant wants to marry her sister as third wife. Hence his petition for dissolution. Mr. V. C. Viraraghavan, the learned counsel for the respondent, urged that the respondent never deserted the appellant and that the view of the lower Court that she deserted him was wrong. His case was that she simply left the husband in a huff with the intention of making him rush after her and entreat her to go back to him. V. C. Viraraghavan, the learned counsel for the respondent, urged that the respondent never deserted the appellant and that the view of the lower Court that she deserted him was wrong. His case was that she simply left the husband in a huff with the intention of making him rush after her and entreat her to go back to him. He pointed out that she had left some clothes, jewels and vessels behind and that it was significant in this connection that the appellant had stated in his petition that he had made several efforts to get the respondent back to him, but had failed. This, he stated in his evidence, was not true. He admitted that he had made no efforts to take her back. Again, it is found that, in Exhibit B-1, dated 5th January, 1948, his reply notice to her Vakil, he has expressly stated "I have always been desirous of living with her. My doors are always open to her" I bear no ill-will to her. . . . May I request you, Sir, to use your influence to make my wife see reason and come and live with me. By doing so’ both of us can salvage some happiness out of our shattered lives. Otherwise, she may have maintenance, but not happiness.‘" In the whole of that notice, he has not treated her as having finally deserted him, though he refers to the letter, Exhibit B-2, incidentally, to show her contempt of him and her leaving him in consequence. Again, Mr. Viraraghavan urged that it was very unlikely that a Brahmin woman, like the respondent, with no chance in those days of divorce or remarriage, would have deserted her husband for good especially as nothing has been alleged against her character. She has always been insisting in Court that she wanted to go back and live with the appellant. Indeed, she said that she did not press the police complaint she had lodged against her husband, the appellant, regarding his beating her, because she did not want her husband to be punished, as that would spoil the chances of her living with him again. So, there is a great deal of doubt whether she had the animus deserendi when she left her husband on 6th July, 1943. So, there is a great deal of doubt whether she had the animus deserendi when she left her husband on 6th July, 1943. It is quite possible that she left him only, as many Hindu wives of little sense did in the olden days, in a huff for her father’s house in order to make the husband run after her and beg her to go back to him. It is significant that no aspersion has been made on her character by the appellant. The lower Court held that the appellant had condoned her desertion by having conjugal relations with her during the 50 days from August, 1952, when they lived together again in the same house alone. The facts are rather interesting. This petition came on for enquiry on 9th August, 1952, before the learned Subordinate Judge. The respondent expressed her desire to go back and live with the appellant and denied that she ever wanted to desert him. So, the learned Subordinate Judge, as is usual with Courts, which try their best not to break marriages, advised the husband and wife to live together amicably. The husband and wife took the advice and went to the husband’s house and lived there for 50 days together alone. There were two adjournments of the O.P. during the period. They attended the Court together. The appellant said nothing to the Court about the failure of the experiment. The wife swore that she and her husband had sexual intercourse several times during that interval of 50 days. The appellant denied it, but the lower Court disbelieved his denial and believed the statement of the wife. It had ample reasons to do so. There are three strong reasons in favour of its view. The first is that a young man and a young woman like the appellant and respondent do not remain alone in a room, night after night, to pray, as a learned Judge in England remarked. They must have had sexual intercourse as the law allowed it, and it was natural to do so. Secondly, this young man cannot be said to be free from the sex impulse. Indeed, the sex impulse was strong in him. He has married twice and wants to marry a third time. They must have had sexual intercourse as the law allowed it, and it was natural to do so. Secondly, this young man cannot be said to be free from the sex impulse. Indeed, the sex impulse was strong in him. He has married twice and wants to marry a third time. In Exhibit B-1, he speaks of his need for a wife and stresses the importance of sending the respondent to him, and asks her Vakil, Mr. Subramania Ayyar. who issued the notice, Exhibit A-4, to him, to send her back to him by using his influence. He also swore in Court that he was kind to her during the 50 days. Now, part of the kindness of a husband to a wife has been held in all civilised countries to be having conjugal relations with her. Thirdly, if he had simply lived with the respondent in the house, just to talk over the possibility of settlement, he would not have lived with her alone for 50 days and nights in that house and gone together with her to Court twice. The lower Court was therefore right in holding that, even if there was desertion on her part on 6th July, 1943 (which I doubt), the resumption of conjugal relations by the appellant with the respondent in August, 1952, for 50 days, would amount to condonation of the desertion under the rulings in Maslin v. Maslin1, Germany v. Germany" and Everitt v. Everitt3 . The last two cases related to adultery. Even then, it was held that resumption of sexual relations by the husband after the Act of adultery by the wife would amount to condonation. Mr. T.R. Ramachandran, the learned counsel for the appellant, urged that the above rulings would not apply to this case,and that the ruling which would apply to the facts of this case is that in Bartram v. Bartram1. I cannot agree. In the ruling relied on by Mr. Ramachandran, the. husband and wife had merely talks about reconcilation, there was no sexual intercourse by the husband with the wife during the period of the talks as to whether reconciliation was possible or divorce inevitable. There is a vast difference between couples who talk at arms apart, and couples who have sexual intercourse during the reconciliation talks. Ramachandran, the. husband and wife had merely talks about reconcilation, there was no sexual intercourse by the husband with the wife during the period of the talks as to whether reconciliation was possible or divorce inevitable. There is a vast difference between couples who talk at arms apart, and couples who have sexual intercourse during the reconciliation talks. It has been held in Maslin v. Maslin2, that such sexual intercourse between husband and wife would amount to condonation even if the husband did not have sexual intercourse with the express object of effecting a reconciliation, but only to explore the possibilities of reconciliation. So that argument too will not avail the appellant. Then Mr. T.R. Ramachandran urged that the appellant did not take the respondent in this case willingly to his house, to have sexual intercourse with her, but that he took the wife to his house only on the advice of the learned Subordinate Judge. But, this too will make no difference. Usually, when husband and wife quarrel, it is some neighbour or friend or good Samaritan who asks them to patch up their differences and live amicably once more. Such advice by such people will not take away the effect of the sexual intercourse which ensues later on with the consent of both and acts as condonation. It was not alleged that the appellant had sexual intercourse with the respondent against his will and that could not be the case as it took place several times during the 50 days. It would, therefore, be clear that the lower Court was perfectly right in holding that even if there was desertion by the respondent on 6th July, 1943, (which fact too has not, in my opinion, been proved) it was condoned by resumption of conjugal relations in August, 1952, for 50 days. It was not alleged that the learned Subordinate Judge compelled the parties to go and live together, much less to have sexual intercourse, when alone the order of Court may be said to have acted as intimidation and coercion and vitiated the condonation. So the dismissal of the O.P. was correct but it need not have been in the circumstances, dismissed with costs. So the dismissal of the O.P. was correct but it need not have been in the circumstances, dismissed with costs. In the end, therefore, all that is necessary is to take out the direction in the lower Court’s order making the appellant pay the respondent’s costs in the O.P. I take out that direction, and direct all the parties to bear their own costs, but confirm the order of the lower Court dismissing the petition for dissolution of marriage. In this appeal also, all the parties will bear their own costs. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.