JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the legality of an order of the learned Munsif (West) Allahabad directing that certain proceedings initiated by the petitioner against his landlord under Sec. 7-E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act be consigned. In the affidavit supporting the petition it is stated that the petitioner is a tenant of the major portion of the house no. 12 Sheocharan Lal Road, Allahabad. Its owner was at one time Bulaqi Lal Jaiswal, respondent no. 3, who sold it during the pendency of the proceedings under S. 7-E to Sri Behari Lal Arora, respondent no. 3. It is alleged that the accommodation under the tenancy of the petitioner was badly in need of necessary repairs. The petitioner made an application under Sec. 7-E of the Act praying that Bulaqi Lal Jaiswal be directed to carry out the repairs detailed in the application, and that, on the landlord's failure to do so, the petitioner be permitted to complete the repairs himself and to recover the costs from the landlord. The details of the required repairs are given in the affidavit. It is further stated that the learned Munsif (West) Allahabad issued notice to Sri Bulaqi Lal Jaiswal, who filed an objection on or about the 12th September, 1955. A Commissioner was appointed for making a local inspection. He submitted his report, to which both the petitioner and his landlord filed objections. On 23rd April, 1956, the petitioner made an urgent application alleging that the back door of the house was unsafe and in urgent need of repairs, and praying for the Court's permission to replace the door during the pendency of the case and to recover the cost of replacement from the landlord, respondent no. 2. This application was allowed by the learned Munsif. 2. Meanwhile the case was listed for disposal on 11-8-1956. During this interval Sri Bulaqi Lal Jaiswal, the landlord sold the house to Sri Behari Lal Arora, respondent no. 2. Thereupon on 12-7-1956 the petitioner made an application before the learned Munsif praying for permission to implead the purchaser of the house as respondent no. 3 in his application under Sec. 7-E. He also made another application for permission to make certain repairs to the electric wiring of the house, which had become severely damaged and needed repairs urgently. 2. Thereupon on 12-7-1956 the petitioner made an application before the learned Munsif praying for permission to implead the purchaser of the house as respondent no. 3 in his application under Sec. 7-E. He also made another application for permission to make certain repairs to the electric wiring of the house, which had become severely damaged and needed repairs urgently. On 28th July, 1956, the learned Munsif allowed both the applications. He also directed the case to be put up for disposal on 22-9-1956. 3. On that date the caste was placed before the learned Munsif but neither the counsel nor the parties were present. There upon the court passed the following order: "Consign the proceedings now" 4. After this order had been passed, the learned counsel for the petitioner appeared before the court and submitted that the case had not been disposed of on merits and could not be consigned to the record room. The learned Munsif observed that he would only entertain a formal application. Consequently a written application was made before him on 24-9-56. On that date the learned Munsif rejected the application in the following words: "Rejected. The question of liability to be continued in fresh proceedings and not in this." Sd./D.N. Raina 5. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has filed the present petition on the ground that his application under Sec. 7-E has not been disposed of according to law. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Munsif was under a duty to pass suitable orders in accordance with Sec. 7-E of the Act. He further contends that the petitioner has been gravely prejudiced by the failure of the learned Munsif to dispose off this case, as he has effected some repairs but has not been able to recover the cost from the landlord, which he can only do on obtaining an order from the Court. Learned counsel also contends that the order dated 24-9-1955 observing that the question of liability should be determined in fresh proceeding is not intelligible and as such, is liable to be quashed. I have some difficulty in understanding the course of the proceedings before the learned Munsif from day to day. The affidavit does not give a clear picture of the proceedings before the learned Munsif. I have some difficulty in understanding the course of the proceedings before the learned Munsif from day to day. The affidavit does not give a clear picture of the proceedings before the learned Munsif. It has also left me with a feeling that it does not state candidly what happened on 22-9-1956, when he directed the file to be consigned. Neither the petitioner's application under Sec. 7-E nor the landlord's objections have been filed as annexures to the affidavit. The order sheet of the Munsif has not been filed. In the circumstances it is not possible to understand what the learned Munsif meant by consigning the proceedings on 22-9-1956 or observing, in his order dated 24-9-1956, that the question of liability should be determined in fresh proceedings. I think it was the petitioner's duty to file a fuller affidavit and not to leave the Court guessing as to what exactly happened in Court on 22-9-56. The learned Munsif is likely to have made some oral remarks when the petitioner and his counsel turned up later in the day and requested the Court to recall its order consigning the proceedings. These remarks would have thrown some light on the meaning of this order or why it was passed. I cannot help feeling that the petitioner has not related everything that happened between himself and the court on that day. It is the duty of a petitioner who seeks relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to be very frank and candid in his relation to facts and to keep back no facts which would throw light on any material point. But the petitioner's narration of the proceedings in Court in paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 24 of his affidavit does not give full details of what happened on that day. It is likely that on 22-9-1956 when the parties failed to appear the court meant to reject the application under Sec. 7-E for want of prosecution. Even this cannot be said with any degree of certainty. 7. But this petition can be disposed off on the short point, that no right of the petitioner has been prejudiced by the order of the learned Munsif. In the absence of any contract between the parties a tenant has a right, under Sec. 7-E of the Rent Control and Eviction Act to demand only two categories of repairs from the landlord. In the absence of any contract between the parties a tenant has a right, under Sec. 7-E of the Rent Control and Eviction Act to demand only two categories of repairs from the landlord. First, the landlord is bound to keep the accommodation wind and water proof. Secondly, he must do annual white washing, recolouring and the periodical repairs. If the landlord neglects to make these two kinds of repairs, the tenant can make an application under Sec. 7-E and obtain an order of the court compelling him to do the repairs. 8. But if the tenant makes a further demand for repairs other than those specified above, he must set up and prove the existence of a contract or custom or law binding the landlord to effect those repairs. The Munsif has no power to compel a landlord to make repairs which are not specified in sub-secs, (i) and (ii) of Sec. 7-E nor covered by any contract or custom or law. 9. In this case the tenant demanded repairs to which he had no right. I have read the list of the repairs which the petitioner filed before the learned Munsif. They are enumerated in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the petition. The first item is repairs to or the replacement of the electric wiring of the house. Obviously this is not covered by sub-section (i) or (ii) of Section 7-E. The second is the repairing of wooden planks in the upper storey on the sides of the court yard which serves as a purdah. This again is not covered by the two sub-sections. The third item is the replacement of several doors and windows which are alleged to have become worn out. In my view the fact that doors and windows have become worn out does not mean that the landlord has neglected to keep the house wind and water proof. The fourth and the last item is repairs to two drain pipes, which are alleged to have become worn out and leapy at several places. Here again, it is not the statutory obligation of the landlord to replace drain pipes at his cost unless he has agreed by contract or is bound by custom to do so. 10. The fourth and the last item is repairs to two drain pipes, which are alleged to have become worn out and leapy at several places. Here again, it is not the statutory obligation of the landlord to replace drain pipes at his cost unless he has agreed by contract or is bound by custom to do so. 10. The petitioner has not alleged in his affidavit that the landlord was bound by contract or custom or any law to effect these repairs, nor has he filed a copy of the application under Sec. 7-E. He has not proved the existence of any right against the landlord which the learned Munsif is alleged to have omitted to examine or adjudicate upon. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that it was not necessary for the petitioner to prove the existence of any contract or custom before this court. 12. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner did allege in his application under Sec. 7-E before the learned Munsif that the landlord was bound by contract and custom to make the repairs. This was enough to give the learned Munsif jurisdiction to entertain the application. But apart from counsel's statement there is not a word about it in the petitioner's affidavit. No copy of the application under Sec. 7-E has been filed as annexure to the petitioner's affidavit. It is hard to believe that, in these days, any landlord will agree to take upon himself the responsibility of replacing or repairing electric wiring or doing the repairs specified in the petitioners list. It is not possible to hold, that the petitioner placed any material before the learned Munsif to make out even a prima-facie case under Sec. 7-E of the Act. 13. The petitioner cannot be given any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, unless he satisfies this court that some right of his has been violated. But he has not established even a prima facie case that he was entitled to compel the landlord to effect the repairs in dispute. I cannot hold that the learned Munsif failed to perform his statutory duty of considering the petitioner's application on merits, as I am not satisfied that his application deserved to be so considered. But he has not established even a prima facie case that he was entitled to compel the landlord to effect the repairs in dispute. I cannot hold that the learned Munsif failed to perform his statutory duty of considering the petitioner's application on merits, as I am not satisfied that his application deserved to be so considered. The list of repairs demanded by the petitioner shows, on the face of the record, that they are not covered by sub-sections (i) and (ii) of Sec. 7-E, nor has the petitioner alleged that existence of any contract or custom. Thus the petitioner has not been prejudiced by the alleged failure of the learned Munsif to consider an application which did not even disclose a prima-facie case. 14. Learned counsel then contended that the petitioner made an application, after the house had been sold, for permission to implead the purchaser as a respondent in the proceedings under Sec. 7-E. As this application was allowed by the learned Munsif, he should have disposed of the case on merits. I do not agree. 15. In my view, the court has no power, if the accommodation has been sold during the pendency of proceedings under Sec. 7-E, to implead the new landlord as a party in the proceedings which had been implicated against the old landlord. A tenant's right to move the court under Sec. 7-E arises out of the neglect of his landlord to carry out repairs. Unless the landlord is guilty of such neglect no order under Sec. 7-E can be passed against him. But the neglect of the old landlord cannot be imputed to the new, nor can it be made the basis of proceedings against the latter. Under Sec. 7-E (4), the Court acts in personaem. The tenant must make out a fresh case against the new landlord and allege that he has neglected to carry out repairs which he was bound to do. The obligation not to be negligent in making repairs is of a personal nature and is not like a charge or mortgage which runs with the land. The new landlord may make a fresh agreement with the tenant altering the obligation to make repairs. Again if there is an order sub-sec. The obligation not to be negligent in making repairs is of a personal nature and is not like a charge or mortgage which runs with the land. The new landlord may make a fresh agreement with the tenant altering the obligation to make repairs. Again if there is an order sub-sec. 6 authorising the tenant to carry out the repairs himself and recover the cost from the landlord as it were a debt due to him, the tenant can not recover it from the new landlord. It is a personal debt recoverable from the old landlord alone. The order of the learned Munsif impleading the new land lord as a party to the application against the old landlord was erroneous, and conferred no right on the petitioner to continue the proceeding against the new land lord. 16. Learned counsel then contended that the petitioner made an urgent application before the learned munsif for permission to complete the repairs to electrical wiring during the pendency of the petition. This was allowed by the learned Munsif. Learned counsel contended that he was bound to continue the proceedings to enable the petitioner to submit an estimate of costs, and get an order of the court entitling him to recover from the landlord. I do not agree. The court has no power under Section 7-E, without first deciding the question whether the landlord was under any obligation to do any particular kind of repairs, to authorise the tenant to carry out this item or repairs and recover the cost from the landlord. 17. The learned Munsif appears to have passed an interim order without deciding the question of the landlord's responsibility. He was probably misled by the analogy of an interim injunction granted during a suit for permanent injunction. 18. Interim injunctions are issued by the court under any specific power conferred by Order 39, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but section 7-E of U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act gives no power to the court to pass an interim order. The learned Munsif's interim order authorising the tenant to repair the electrical wiring is without jurisdiction. 19. Learned counsel further contended that the learned Munsif having permitted the petitioner to get the back door repaired during the pendency of the petition, was bound to continue the proceedings. The learned Munsif's interim order authorising the tenant to repair the electrical wiring is without jurisdiction. 19. Learned counsel further contended that the learned Munsif having permitted the petitioner to get the back door repaired during the pendency of the petition, was bound to continue the proceedings. Here again, the learned Munsif had no power to pass an order authorising the tenant to carry out these repairs at the cost of the landlord before deciding that there was any obligation on him to do these repairs. This order too is without Jurisdiction. 20. Lastly, learned counsel impugned the legality of the order of the learned Munsif dated 22nd September, 1956 virtually dismissing the application under Sec. 7-E when neither party was present before him. The order is not satisfactorily worded as it merely says "Consign the proceedings now." One has to guess its meaning. But it is likely that the learned Munsif dismissed the application under See. 7-E because no one appeared before him. This impression is strengthened by the fact that when an oral request was made later in the day for a hearing on merits, he insisted on a formal application being made to that effect. The petitioner admits that neither party nor counsel was present in court when the case was called. 21. When however the application was made he rejected it with the remark that the question of liability should be determined in fresh proceedings and not continued in the old. I think the learned Munsif was right in holding that any question of the liability of the new landlord could be determined by means of a fresh application under Sec. 7-E, containing an allegation that he had neglected to carry out the repairs. As stated by me he could not be made responsible for the neglect of the old landlord. The learned Munsif was therefore right in insisting that the petitioner should file a fresh application under Sec. 7-E against the new landlord. 22. Thus, I hold that the present petition does not disclose that the petitioner has been materially prejudiced in any way. He has not made out even a prima facie case that he was entitled to compel either the old or the new landlord to effect the type of repairs specified in the petition. 22. Thus, I hold that the present petition does not disclose that the petitioner has been materially prejudiced in any way. He has not made out even a prima facie case that he was entitled to compel either the old or the new landlord to effect the type of repairs specified in the petition. The interim orders of the learned Munsif authorising him to repair the electrical wirings and replace the back doors, were without jurisdiction and confer no rights on him. So is the order authorising him to implead the new landlord as a respondent in the proceedings initiated against the old landlord any obscurity or lack of clarity in the learned Munsif's order has caused him no real prejudice. 23. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.