JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the legality of an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, allotting a house belonging to the petitioner to a person other than a nominee of the petitioner. In his affidavit the petitioner states that he is the owner of a house situated in Mohalla Imamganj Babhanaiyan Tola, Mirzapur. He had a tenant by name Ramnath Pandey who defaulted in the payment of rent. The petitioner filed a suit for his ejectment which was decreed. He got possession of a portion of the house in the actual possession of the defaulting tenant. But one Mewalal continued in possession of another portion of the house which had been vacated by tenant Ramnath. On 1-6-56 the petitioner informed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that a portion of the house had fallen vacant and he also applied for permission to occupy it under Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. Subsequently, after the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had rejected the petitioner's application the petitioner wrote to that officer nominating one Kalka Prasad as his nominee under Rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules, It is an admitted fact that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not made any allotment within thirty days of receiving the petitioner's intimation of the vacancy of the house. Several persons applied for the allotment of the house. One of them Devi Prasad Misra, brought a recommendation from Sri J. N. Wilson, Member of Parliament. According to the petitioner he is a relation of Ramnath Pande, the petitioner's ex-tenant who was ejected. The petitioner on the 20th August 1956 made a representation before the Rent Control Officer objecting to the house being allotted to Ram Nath Pande or any of his relations. He alleged that Ramnath Pande was trying to get back into the house through his relation. There were other applicants also. 2. The Rent Control Officer directed all the rival applicants to file affidavits in respect of their respective claims. When this was done he referred the whole matter to the Housing Advisory Committee, Mirzapur for advice. After receiving the recommendation of this Committee the Rent Control Officer offered to allot the house to three persons in succession, none of whom accepted it. 3. When this was done he referred the whole matter to the Housing Advisory Committee, Mirzapur for advice. After receiving the recommendation of this Committee the Rent Control Officer offered to allot the house to three persons in succession, none of whom accepted it. 3. Meanwhile on the 5th October, 1956 the petitioner exercised his right under rule 4 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules and wrote to the Rent Control Officer demanding that the house should be allotted to his nominee Kalka Prasad. He pointed out that no allotment order had been made for over thirty days after the intimation of the vacancy of the house to the officer. 4. Instead of allotting the accommodation to the nominee Kalka Prasad or to any other persons of his own choice forthwith, the Rent Control Officer directed the Senior House Inspector to make inquiry in the matter. Five days later on the 10th October 1956, he passed an order allotting the house to Devi Prasad Misra. A certified copy of this order has been filed as an annexure to the petitioner's affidavit. The petitioner's nomination was rejected by the Rent Control Officer in these words: - "In the meantime the landlord had nominated Sri Kalka Prasad as his nominee for the allotment of the said house in exercise of his right under Rule 4 of the; the accommodation having remained unallotted for more than one month from the date of its falling vacant i.e. June 1, 1956. At the present time there are only 2 claimants for this house i.e. one is Sri Devi Prasad who had long been pressing for the allotment of this house since June 1950 and the other is Sri Kalka Prasad, the nominee of the landlord. The need of the nominee has not been found to be genuine. He lives in a double storyed house in Mohalla Kadamtar, which is big enough for his normal requirement. His claim for the allotment of the accommodation is, therefore, rejected. Hence Sri Devi Prasad remains the only claimant for this house. His need is genuine and the house is, therefore, allotted to him." 5. On the 12th October, 1956 the order of allotment was served on the petitioner as the landlord of the house. On the 15th October it was reported to the Rent Control Officer that the petitioner was not delivering possession to the allottee. His need is genuine and the house is, therefore, allotted to him." 5. On the 12th October, 1956 the order of allotment was served on the petitioner as the landlord of the house. On the 15th October it was reported to the Rent Control Officer that the petitioner was not delivering possession to the allottee. On the 17th October the Rent Control Officer passed an order directing the petitioner to comply with his order within three days. According to the petitioner this notice was never served on him as he was out of station. On 18th and 19th October Devi Prasad Misra forcibly entered into the house by breaking open the locks on the doors. The petitioner reported the matter to the police. On the 14th November, 1956 the Rent Control Officer issued a notice against the petitioner under section 8 of the Act asking him to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for wilful contravention of the orders of the officer. 6. Aggrieved by the order of allotment and subsequent proceedings culminating in the notice under section 8 the petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. The petitioner has attacked the order of allotment on several grounds, not all of which are tenable. He has complained that the allotment order was passed in favour of Devi Prasad Misra on the recommendation of influential persons including M. Ps. and members of the Legislative Assembly. I find no force in this contention. The Rent Control Officer is not prohibited by the Act from considering any recommendation before making an order of allotment. He does not function as a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority when making such an order. It is within his power to consider any recommendation from persons who are in a position to speak about the bonafide needs of a particular applicant. 8. Nor is there any force in the contention that the allotment order was made in disregard of the advice of the Housing Advisory Committee. The Rent Control Officer is not bound to follow its advice. The committee has been set up as a matter of administrative convenience and it has no locus standi under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The Rent Control Officer may or may not ask for its advice, which he may accept or reject at his discretion. 9. The Rent Control Officer is not bound to follow its advice. The committee has been set up as a matter of administrative convenience and it has no locus standi under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The Rent Control Officer may or may not ask for its advice, which he may accept or reject at his discretion. 9. I shall now proceed to consider the main arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in his attack on the legality of the allotment order. He argued that after the expiry of thirty days from the receipt of the landlord's notice nominating a tenant the provisions of rule 4 come into operation. Under this rule after the expiry of this period the power of the Rent Control Officer to allot the house in disregard of the landlord's nomination must be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions of this rule. Ordinarily he must allot the accommodation to the landlord's nominee. If, however, he elects to reject the landlord's choice he must record his reason for doing so in writing and forthwith, allot the accommodation to another person. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner rested his case on the meaning of the word "forthwith". He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Keshav Neelkanth Joglekar v. Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, A.I.R. 1957 SC 28. In that case the legality of an order of detention passed under section 3 of the Prevention Detention Act was under consideration. Sub-section 3 of that section placed a duty on the Commissioner of Police Bombay to report the fact of the detention to the State Government "forthwith". The order of detention had been passed on the 13th January 1956 but the Commissioner did not make his report till the 21st January. It was argued on behalf of the detenue that the Commission had acted in contravention of the constitution and the detention was therefore illegal. This raised the question as to what the word "forthwith" in section 7 (3) of the Act signified and whether or not the report was made "forthwith" within the meaning of that word. Their Lordships examined in detail the various authorities, American and English, in which the word "forthwith" and "immediately" have been interpreted. This raised the question as to what the word "forthwith" in section 7 (3) of the Act signified and whether or not the report was made "forthwith" within the meaning of that word. Their Lordships examined in detail the various authorities, American and English, in which the word "forthwith" and "immediately" have been interpreted. After examining them they came to the conclusion that what has to be done forthwith must be held to be so done when it is done with all reasonable dispatch without a voidable delay. Their lordships also observed that there was authority for the proposition that when an act is done after an interval of time and no explanation is forthcoming it cannot be held to have been done forthwith. They quoted with approval the following passage from the judgement of Sri Wilfred Greene, Master of the Rolls, in the case of In re. Muscovitch, (1939) 1 All E. R. P. 135 at P. 139. "Having regard to the construction which was put upon the word 'forthwith' which is peremptory and admits of no interval of time between the entry of the appeal and the sending of the notice save such as may be imposed by circumstances which cannot be avoided, I find it impossible in the present case to say that the notice was sent forthwith within the meaning of the rule." (In that case Rule 32 of the Bankruptcy Rules provided that "Upon entering an appeal, a copy of the notice shall forthwith be sent by the appellant to the Registrar of the Court appealed from." An appeal was filed with time on 25-10-1938, but notice was served on 28-10-1938 gap of three days only. The court held that there was "no satisfactory reason or no reason at all why there was any delay in the matter".) The Supreme Court also held that the word forthwith in section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act and the phrase "as soon as may be" do not mean the same thing, and that the former is more peremptory than the latter. They held that as the phrase "as soon as may be" imports that the act might be performed within a reasonable time, but the word 'forthwith', is more peremptory and must be construed as excluding that notion. 11. They held that as the phrase "as soon as may be" imports that the act might be performed within a reasonable time, but the word 'forthwith', is more peremptory and must be construed as excluding that notion. 11. In the light of the principles laid down by their Lordships they examined the facts of the particular case before them. The Commissioner of Police had filed an affidavit sworn by himself in which he stated that it was not possible for him to send the report earlier as the situation in the city of Greater Bombay was tense and pregnant with danger on the 13th of January 1956 and continued to be so on the 15th January 1956, and actual rioting occurred during that night and these riots continued up to the 22nd January 1956. He further swears in his affidavit that he and his staff were kept busy throughout in maintaining law and order and simultaneously taking steps in rounding up miscreants. In this situation he stated it was not possible for him to make the report earlier than the day on which it was made. The Supreme Court accepted this explanation which they held to be due to causes not of his making, but causes to which the activities of the petitioner (the detenues) in that case very largely contributed. They accepted the affidavit and held that the delay in sending the report could not have been avoided by the petitioner and that when they were sent by him they were sent within the meaning of Sec. 3 (3) of the Act. 12. Applying the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, I have to consider whether the allotment made by the Rent Control Officer on rejecting the petitioner's nomination was made forthwith within the meaning of Rule 4 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. 13. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Rent Control Officer no explanation whatsoever has been given for the five day's delay in making the allotment order. Learned counsel for the State relies on paragraph 8 and contends that this amounts to a sufficient explanation. This paragraph reads as follows: "That on receipt of the letter dated 5th October, 1956 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer sent the same to the Inspector for inquiry and report. Learned counsel for the State relies on paragraph 8 and contends that this amounts to a sufficient explanation. This paragraph reads as follows: "That on receipt of the letter dated 5th October, 1956 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer sent the same to the Inspector for inquiry and report. He submitted his report on 9th October 1956 and after considering the entire circumstances, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for the reasons recorded by him in his order dated 10-10-1956 allotted the disputed house to Devi Prasad." 14. This paragraph merely states that on receipt of the landlord's letter nominating Kalka Prasad the Rent Control Officer forwarded this letter to the Inspector for inquiry and report. It is not explained why an enquiry was necessary and what was being enquired into. The landlord had already nominated a tenant, and the Rent Control Officer was under the obligation either to accept this nomination or allot the accommodation to another person forthwith. There is no provision in the rule for an enquiry after the receipt of the landlord's nomination. The time spent in an enquiry which is not contemplated under rule 4 cannot be taken into account in considering whether the allotment was made forthwith as required under Rule 4. 15. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer instituted an inquiry into the respective merits of the two claimants. He assumed that even after the landlord had nominated a tenant he still retained the authority to make a choice. But the only authority left in him was of a negative character to disagree with the landlord's choice and to state his reasons in writing. This is the clear implication of the words "he shall allot the accommodation to his nominee unless......." They imply that the choice has already been made by the landlord and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer must ordinarily respect it. But he can exercise a right of veto, provided he states his reasons in writing, and provided further that he allots the premises forthwith to another person. The two essential conditions for the exercise of this veto are (1) the statement of reasons in writing, and (2) allotment forthwith to another person. The allotment order in favour of that other person may contain the reasons why the landlord's choice has been rejected but it must be passed forthwith that is, immediately after the receipt of the landlord's nomination. 16. The allotment order in favour of that other person may contain the reasons why the landlord's choice has been rejected but it must be passed forthwith that is, immediately after the receipt of the landlord's nomination. 16. The distinction between making one's selection and vetoing that of the landlord is somewhat fine, but it is real. The word 'veto' has not been used in rule 4. But the language of that rule shows that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer must ordinarily accept the landlord's choice unless he decides to veto it forthwith. This is obvious from the words, "the District Magistrate shall allot the accommodation to the landlord's nominee unless.". 17. In the present case, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer considered what he called the 'claim' of Kalka Prasad and held that he was already sufficiently provided, as he lived in a double storeyed house. The question is whether this is a legitimate exercise of the power of veto. The point is not free from difficulty. The general trend of the order indicates that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer decided between the respective claims of Kalka Prasad the landlord's nominee and the rival applicant Devi Prasad. This is clear from the sentence "his (Kalka Prasad's) claim for the allotment of the accommodation is therefore rejected." 18. But he was not required to consider Kalka Prasad's claim. In fact there was no such 'claim' before him. He was required to consider the landlord's nomination, and in case he wanted to reject it, to state his reasons. Instead he proceeded as if he had to consider the claim of Kalka Prasad. This appears to me to be a wrong approach to the matter before him. However it is not necessary for me to decide this point as the petition is being allowed for another reason. 19. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is vitiated by another defect which is absolutely fatal. It was passed five days after the receipt of the landlord's letter nominating Kalka Prasad as his tenant. But Rule 4 enjoins that the allotment in favour of a person other than the landlord's nominee must be made "forthwith". The delay of five days has not been explained. Learned Counsel for the State relied upon paragraph 8 of the Affidavit of the Rent Control Clerk for an explanation of this delay. But Rule 4 enjoins that the allotment in favour of a person other than the landlord's nominee must be made "forthwith". The delay of five days has not been explained. Learned Counsel for the State relied upon paragraph 8 of the Affidavit of the Rent Control Clerk for an explanation of this delay. But this paragraph merely states that the Rent Control Officer forwarded the landlord's nomination to the Rent Control Inspector for inquiry and report, and that the latter sent his report on the 9th and that the Officer passed the allotment order on the 10th. This paragraph does not help the respondents case. On the contrary, it shows that the authorities appear to have proceeded in a leisurely manner even after the receipt of the landlord's nomination. It has not been explained why the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not pass the order on the 9th when he received the report of the Inspector. In the English case mentioned above, a delay of three days was held to amount to non-compliance with the word "forthwith". In the present case there is an unexplained delay for five days. 20. I therefore hold that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not make the allotment forthwith as required by rule 4. That being so, his authority to make an allotment of his own choice was exhausted and he had no alternative but to make an allotment to the nominee of the landlord. There is no discretion left in him. In my view this is a fit case for the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to do his statutory duty under rule 4. I, therefore direct the issue of an order directing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mirzapur to allot the premises in dispute to Kalka Prasad the nominee of the landlord. The allotment order in favour of Devi Prasad Misra respondent no. 2 and the subsequent proceedings under sections 7A and 8 against the petitioner are quashed as being without jurisdiction. The petition is allowed with costs.