Judgment.- This appeal is preferred against the Decree and Judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Madurai, in A.S. No. 1 of 1955, confirming the decision on a preliminary point of the learned District Munsif of Madurai, in O.S. No. 7 of 1953. The facts leading to the preliminary issue are within a brief compass. In the town of Madurai there is a Kammala community or Viswa Brahmins. They call themselves Acharis. This community of Kammalas is called the Mettu Kammal Theru Kollu Thachu Vaguppu, that is to say, blacksmith-cum-carpenter group. This community collected some funds, by subscription from among the members of the sub-community. On a handsome sum of money being collected, they resolved to purchase a house and site and utilise the income out of it for the Annabhishekam ceremony of Sri Kamakshi Amman Temple, in South Masi Street, constituting their tutelary deity. The house and site have been purchased by the community in the names of the representatives of their group. But unfortunately, as happens in our State often, these Kammalas have fallen out and there are two factions, the plaintiffs and others on the one side and the defendants and others on the other side. The plaintiffs find themselves excluded from this Annabhishekam ceremony and in fact they are not even able to know whether the defendants have been properly managing the properties purchased and collecting the rents and utilising the same for this Annabhishekam ceremony. In fact it would appear that behind the backs of these people, the Endowments Board had been prevailed upon to change even this Annabhishekam ceremoney and divert the funds for the Navaratri festival. Therefore, the plaintiffs came to Court asking for accounts on the foot that there has been an invasion of their private rights and that the whole thing should be protected by means of a declaration and other appropriate reliefs. The case for the defendants was that they are under no obligation whatsoever to account to the plaintiffs, viz., the representatives of the community and offered also the gratuitous advice, which has been followed by the Courts below, that the remedy of the plaintiffs is to go to the Endowments Board under section 93 of Madras Act XIX of 1951. The case for the defendants was that they are under no obligation whatsoever to account to the plaintiffs, viz., the representatives of the community and offered also the gratuitous advice, which has been followed by the Courts below, that the remedy of the plaintiffs is to go to the Endowments Board under section 93 of Madras Act XIX of 1951. Both the Courts below have unfortunately accepted the abbreviated course suggested by the defendants and have on the preliminary issue decided that they had no jurisdiction and that this matter ought to be enquired into only by the Endowments Board. The point for consideration is whether both the Courts below were justified in holding that the suit is barred under section 93 of Act XIX of 1951, corresponding to section 73 of Madras Act II of 1937. The term “Administration or management” has been construed by Ramesam, Officiating C.J., in Vythilinga Pandara Sannathi v. Ranganatha Mudaliar1 . He points out at page 375 that the term “administration or management” of a religious institution can be construed in two ways, namely, in a strict sense and in a loose sense. The term construed strictly means nothing more than that the suits should be confined to obtaining a reform or change in the administration or management of a religious endowment. In the wider sense, it would take in all the powers which have been given to the Board or the Commissioners to enquire into matters exclusively and which will now be found narrated in section 57 of the new Act. In the wider sense, it would take in all the powers which have been given to the Board or the Commissioners to enquire into matters exclusively and which will now be found narrated in section 57 of the new Act. Section 57 lays down: “Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to inquire into and decide the following disputes and matters:- (a) whether an institution is a religious institution; (b) whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee: (c) whether any property or money is a religious endowment; (d) whether any property or money is a specific endowment; (e) whether any person is entitled, by custom or otherwise, to any honour, emolument or perquisite in any religious institution; and What the established usage of a religious institution is in regard to any other matter.” In this case, either interpreted by the wider connotation or the narrower connotation, this claim by the plaintiffs to participate along with the defendants in the Annabhishekam ceremony and also ask for accounts, to find out whether the terms of this community chest are being carried out, would not be an act for the administration or management. In the stricter sense, this claim by the plaintiff would nowhere be near the definition laid down by the Officiating Chief Justice. Turning to the wider connotation, this claim would not fall within clauses (a) to (e). In fact, a dispute of this nature between claimants seeking to ensure that this fund earmarked for the purpose of Annabhishekam is being managed properly, would not amount to a dispute respecting the right to succession to the hereditary office. Such claims would be outside the scope of section 57 (b): Sastri Ammal v. Pravalavarna Naicker 1. In other words, if the appellants are now directed to go before the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Commissioner, on the ground that this is not a matter cognizable by a civil Court, the Deputy Commissioner will turn round and ask the appellants under what provision of the Act they seek to have this matter enquired into and adjudicated by him. Therefore, if they follow the gratuitous advice given to them by the respondents, they would have taken upon themselves a wholly supererogatory task of going to a Commissioner who would feel himself absolutely incompetent to give the relief asked for. Therefore, if they follow the gratuitous advice given to them by the respondents, they would have taken upon themselves a wholly supererogatory task of going to a Commissioner who would feel himself absolutely incompetent to give the relief asked for. Therefore, beyond merely driving the plaintiffs from pillar to post, the defendants have also dragged them to the writ Court. I do not see any legality, propriety or utility in asking the plaintiffs to go to the Deputy Commissioner. In the result, the decrees and judgments of the Courts below are set aside and the trial Court is directed to restore the suit to file and expeditiously dispose of the same according to law. The costs of this appeal will abide by and be provided for in the revised decree and judgment of the trial Court. Court-fee paid in this Second Appeal will be refunded. P.R.N. ----- Appeal allowed.Decree set aside and the case remanded.