JUDGMENT B.R. James, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of Prohibition to the Regional Transport Authority of Kanpur, (R. T. A. for short) has arisen in the following circumstances. 2. The petitioner Madan Mohan Singh, one Shiva Ram and six other persons, hold permits under the Motor Vehicles Act for plying stage carriages on the Kalpi Hamirpur via Kadaura route. The petitioner and Shiva Ram have further been granted contracts by the Superintendent of Post Offices, Jhansi, to carry mail between Kalpi and Hamirpur. The question arose of fixing a time-table for the buses of the eight operators on this route. On the 8th November, 1955 the Regional Transport Officer (who is the Secretary of the R. T. A.), after hearing both the mail contractors and the non-mail operators, decided that the first bus to leave Kalpi would be of a non-mail operator starting at 6 a.m. while the second would be that of one of the two mail contractors starting at 8-15 a.m., and these timings were adhered to for some time. The mail contractors were however anxious for their buses to start at 7-15 a.m. instead of 8-15 a.m., and made representations accordingly. The Regional Transport Officer made enquiries from the postal authorities, who recommended the starting of the mail bus at 7-15 a.m. Thereupon that Officer on the 10th December 1955 ordered the first mail bus to start at 7-15 a.m. each day. All the operators on the route were duly intimated of this change in order to enable them to lodge objections, if any, before the R. T. A. The R. T. A. held a meeting on the 21st January, 1956, and after considering the various objections and recommendations, approved of 7-15 a.m. as the starting time of the first mail bus. Timings of other stage carriages were fixed accordingly. This time-table is still in force. 3. It appears that the non-mail operators were dissatisfied with this time-table, and consequently filed objections for the resumption of the old timing of 8-15 a.m. for the first mail bus. Madan Mohan Singh and Shiva Ram filed counter-objections. The R. T. A. thereupon decided to hold a meeting on the 25th October, 1956 for consideration of this matter. 4. But before the meeting could be held Madan Mohan Singh filed the present petition. Madan Mohan Singh and Shiva Ram filed counter-objections. The R. T. A. thereupon decided to hold a meeting on the 25th October, 1956 for consideration of this matter. 4. But before the meeting could be held Madan Mohan Singh filed the present petition. His contentions are that the R. T. A. is a quasi-judicial body, that its decision at the meeting of the 21st January 1956 refixing the time-table has become final, and that it has no jurisdiction to re-open the matter at another meeting. Accordingly the petitioner prays that a writ of Prohibition should be issued to the R. T. A. to prevent it from making any alterations in the time table. Of course, the date of the proposed meeting, the 25th October, 1956, has passed long since, but it is urged that the R. T. A. proposes to consider the matter at another meeting as soon as a decision on this writ petition has been given. 5. Here I should like to mention that although in this dispute the rights of Shiva Ram and the non-mail operators are involved to the same extent as the rights of the petitioner, none of them has been made a party to this petition: only the R. T. A. and its Secretary have been arrayed as respondents. 6. The main question before me is whether or not the R. T. A. is invested with the power to alter a time-table which has once been fixed. The subject does not appear to be covered by authority, hence it has been debated before me at length. 7. 6. The main question before me is whether or not the R. T. A. is invested with the power to alter a time-table which has once been fixed. The subject does not appear to be covered by authority, hence it has been debated before me at length. 7. I should like to observe at the outset that the burden lies on the petitioner to establish absence of jurisdiction on the part of the R. T. A. Further, if the defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the proceedings, then only can the order of Prohibition go as of right; where the defect is not apparent, the discretion lies with the Court to grant or not grant the relief sought see R. v. Comptroller-General of Patents, 1953 (1) QBD 862 Now, it can scarcely be doubted that if the adherence to a time-table is one of the conditions of the permit held by the petitioner, the R. T. A. has full authority to vary it, as Rule 69 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules empowers it to vary the conditions of the permit at any time at its discretion. But, strangely enough, the parties before me are not clear whether the time-table is one of the conditions of the petitioner's permit. 8. Hence I propose to examine the question on the footing that no such condition attaches to the permit. For doing so reference to relevant provisions of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act becomes necessary. 9. The Indian Motor Vehicles Act (Act IV of 1939) was amended by Act 100 of 1956. Sec. 48(3) of the amended Act contains two sub-clauses, (iv) and (xxi), which are material to the present controversy; the former provides that "the service shall be operated within such margins of deviation from the approved time-table as the Regional Transport Authority may from time to time specify," while the latter lays down that the R. T. A. may, after giving notice of not less than one month, vary the condition of the permits or attach to the permits further conditions. Accordingly there is little room for doubt that under these new provisions the R. T. A. has full authority to vary the time-table, and to vary it as and when it likes. 10. Accordingly there is little room for doubt that under these new provisions the R. T. A. has full authority to vary the time-table, and to vary it as and when it likes. 10. But the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that Sec. 48 of the amended Act applies only to those permits which were issued after the amended Act came into force, and that since his own permit is an old one it continues to be governed by the unamended Act. Consequently, assuming, but not deciding, that this proposition of law is correct I proceed to examine the relevant provisions of that Act. 11. Sec. 46(c) of the unamended Act lays down that when a person makes an application for a permit for a stage carriage he shall mention the time-table (if any) of the service to be provided. Sec. 47(2) says that the R T. A. shall refuse to grant a permit if it appears from the time-table furnished that the provisions of the Act relating to the speed of the vehicle are likely to be contravened. Sec. 48(c) empowers the R. T. A. to "regulate timings of arrival or departure of stage carriages whether they belong to a single or more owners." Sec. 48 (d) (iii) further authorises it to attach to a stage carriage permit a condition that copies of the time-table shall be exhibited on the stage carriage. Sec. 59(3) enumerates the mandatory conditions of every permit, and it is highly significant that a time-table is not one of the conditions listed. 12. These are all the provisions that there are in the unamended Act which relate to timetables. For purposes of the instant case the most important of them is Sec. 48(c). A reading of it leaves no room for doubt in my mind that the R. T. A. has been invested with the power to "regulate" the timings of arrival and departure of carriages of all descriptions. To '"regulate" means not only that the timetable is formulated, but that it is varied from time to time at the discretion of the R. T. A. - the formulation or variation being done no doubt bona fide and after hearing the view points of the various parties concerned and considering the convenience of the public. To '"regulate" means not only that the timetable is formulated, but that it is varied from time to time at the discretion of the R. T. A. - the formulation or variation being done no doubt bona fide and after hearing the view points of the various parties concerned and considering the convenience of the public. It must therefore be held that the R. T. A. does possess the power of making modifications in the timetables of the stage carriages for which it is entitled to issue permits. 13. It is not disputed that the R. T. A. is a quasi-judicial body and in consequence has to act according to well-settled principles. But in the case in hand it should be emphasised that the R. T. A. is not deviating from these principles it has before it the representations of the various operators, including the petitioner and the other mail contractor, Shiva Ram; it has also the views of the postal authorities. Consequently, if it chooses to review the matter, after considering the various view points and also bearing in mind the paramount consideration of the convenience of the travelling public, it will be acting within its jurisdiction in making such changes in the time-table as it considers just and proper. 14. It must not be forgotten that in the transport trade a number of factors have to be taken into account in fixing a timetable. Moreover, when the carriage of mails is in question, matters like timings of mail-carrying trains and the views of the postal authorities assume added importance. Timings of stage carriages must also change inevitably with the seasons: whereas it would be quite sensible to start passenger bus at 5 a.m. in June it would be absurd to make it do so in December, in which month 6-30 or 7 a.m. would be more proper. Consequently I cannot persuade myself to subscribe to the view that the petitioner's time-table is something immutable or that he has a vested right of adherence to a fixed time, and I consider that so long as he is heard by the R. T. A., and so long as that body bears in mind the considerations referred to above, it can change a time-table at its discretion. 15. Two subsidiary points call for attention. 15. Two subsidiary points call for attention. First, as already stated, the petitioner has not made Shiva Ram and the non-mail operators parties to this petition although their rights are involved to the same extent as his; it would be against the rules of natural justice to grant the petitioner's prayer without hearing those persons. Second, the starting time of the petitioner's stage carriage was fixed on the 8th November, 1955 as 8-15 a.m., but was altered on the 21st January, 1956 to 7-15 a.m. If his contention that the R. T. A. has no jurisdiction to alter timings be well-founded, the alteration ordered on the 21st January, 1956 will be immediately rendered nugatory, so that the petitioner will be compelled to revert to the original timing of 8-15 a.m., which he so heartily dislikes. In bringing this petition he has evidently over-looked this aspect of the matter. 16. Even if the petitioner's contentions were otherwise sound, these two reasons would disentitle him to relief. But, as I have held above, the R. T. A. even under the un amended Motor Vehicles Act has jurisdiction to vary time-tables of stage carriages. Consequently this petition fails and is dismissed with costs.