JUDGMENT 1. THE first question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether in the face of the provisions of section 46 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain this suit. If the answer to that question be in the affirmative, we have to consider another question namely, whether the decree of the trial court affirmed by the appeal count decreeing the plaintiff's suit and giving him a declaration that he has get tenancy right in the suit land under defendants Nos. 1 to 7 and 10 is liable to be set aside or modified in this second appeal. Section 46 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is in these words :- "where an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 39 directing the preparation or revision of a record-of-rights, no Civil Court shall, until after the final publication of the record-of-rights under sub-section (2) of section 44, entertain any suit or application for the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates, and if any such suit or application is pending before a Civil court on the date of such order it shall be stayed: provided that in computing the period of limitation prescribed by any law for the time being in force for any suit or application, the time during which such suit or application cannot be entertained or remains stayed under the provisions of this Act shall be excluded. Explanation-In this section suit includes an appeal. " 2. BEFORE us it is admitted and apparently it was admitted in the courts below that an order was made under sub-section (1) of section 39 directing the preparation or revision of the record-of-rights in respect of the district where the suit land lies, before the suit was instituted. In order then to determine whether the provisions of section 46 constitutes a bar to the entertainment of the suit by the Civil Court, we have to decide the further question whether the present suit is one "for the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates. " Turning to the plaint on which this suit was instituted, we find that the plaintiff averred that he had been in possession of the suit land as a tenant under the defendant since the year 1356, that a new settlement was proposed in 1359 whereby it was agreed that the defendant would grant a permanent lease but no permanent lease had actually been granted, that the defendant has been trying to oust the plaintiff forcibly though the plaintiff has valuable fish, cultivation, Golaghat, Tube-well etc. in the property, that the defendant wrote several letters to the plaintiff asking him to vacate the property on several dates and the plaintiff gave replies to those letters. In the prayer portion the relief prayed for is in these words: "plaintiff prays- (a) That plaintiff's tenancy right upon the property described in the schedule below may be declared and the defendants may be restrained by a decree for permanent injunction from interfering with the plaintiff's possession therein either by ousting him or in any other way. (b) That a decree for costs of this suit may be passed against the defendants. (c) That during the pendency of this suit the defendants may be temporarily restrained by an order of temporary injunction from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of suit property. (d) That the Court may be pleased to pass such other or any order as may be deemed fit. " There was an amendment of the plaint which is not of much importance for our present purpose. (d) That the Court may be pleased to pass such other or any order as may be deemed fit. " There was an amendment of the plaint which is not of much importance for our present purpose. The main defense taken in the written statement was that the property in suit was wholly a Jalkar and was settled by the landlords first to one Khagendra Nath Singh, and then with the plaintiff's father Dhirendra Nath Sapui for 1356 B. S. and again for 1357 B. S. as a Jalkar, that on the death of the plaintiff's father, it was settled with the plaintiff for 1358, 1359, 1360 and 1361 B. S. each time for one year only after the expiration of the settlement of the preceding year, for the purpose of rearing and catching fish without any right to soil or sub-soil, that the defendants had served on the plaintiff a notice asking him to vacate and leave the property in suit in complete khas possession of the defendants on the expiry of the settlement ending in Magh, 1361, B. S. There was also a denial of an agreement to grant permanent lease of the disputed Jalkar to the plaintiff. 3. BEFORE proceeding to the consideration of the question whether the provisions of section 46 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act which has been set out above apply to the present litigation, it is necessary to consider the two rival interpretations of the provisions of this section which have been urged before us. On behalf of the appellant Dr. Gupta has urged that the words, "any suit for the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates" would include all suits in which a question is raised as regards the determination of rent or the determination of the status of any tenant or as regards the determination of incidents of any tenancy, if without the decision of that question the suit cannot be properly decided. Against this it is contended by Mr. Mitter on behalf of the plaintiff respondent that these words mean only such suits in which the determination of the rent or the determination of the status of any tenant or the determination of the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates is in terms prayed for. 4. Against this it is contended by Mr. Mitter on behalf of the plaintiff respondent that these words mean only such suits in which the determination of the rent or the determination of the status of any tenant or the determination of the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates is in terms prayed for. 4. CONSIDERING this question as one free from authority. I would have no hesitation in rejecting the interpretation suggested on behalf of the plaintiff as arbitrary and unreasonable. For a proper decision of the question of interpretation it is necessary in the first place to consider the scheme of the legislation and the purpose for which this section 46 was embodied in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Chapter V in which this section appears, deals with the preparation of the record-of-rights for carrying out the purposes of this Act, the purpose being to provide for the State acquisition of estates, of rights of intermediaries therein and of certain rights of raiyats and under-raiyats. It is easy to see the urgent necessity of the preparation of a correct record-of-rights up to date for carrying out that purpose. In section 39 of the Act which is the first section of Chapter V the legislature provides that the State Government may make an order directing that a record-of-rights be prepared in respect of any district or part of a district or that the record-of-rights in respect of any district that had already been published under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 be revised. Section 43 provides that all rents determined under this Chapter, and entered in the record-of-rights shall be deemed to have been correctly determined and to be fair and equitable for the purposes of this Act. Section 44 of the Act provides for the final publication of the record-of-rights after decision of objections of the draft records and further provides in its subsection (4) that every entry in the record-of-rights finally published under sub-section (2) shall, subject to any modifications by any order on appeal under sub-section (3), be presumed to be correct. By an amendment the words, "until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect" have been added to this sub-section. It is in this background that we have to consider the purpose of section 46. By an amendment the words, "until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect" have been added to this sub-section. It is in this background that we have to consider the purpose of section 46. It seems obvious that if questions like the determination of rent or determination of the status of a tenant or the determination of the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates could be allowed to be raised and decided in Civil Courts when an order has already been made for the preparation of the record-of-rights, but before the preparation is; complete, difficult, anomalous and inconvenient positions would arise. On the one hand, if the entry has already been finally published before the Civil Court can come to a decision, the Civil Court would be bound to accept that as correct unless the contrary is proved. At the same time if the Civil Court acts quickly and comes to a conclusion as regards any of these matters before the final publication, the Revenue Officers would be bound to follow the Civil Court's decision. If a Revenue Officer is informed, as he is often likely to be, that a suit is already pending in a Civil Court for determination of one or more of these things, it might be reasonable for him to await the decision of the Civil Court before coming to a decision himself. That may mean delays of not months but years. It was with a view to prevent such an inconvenient and unjust position emerging from the process of preparation of the record-of-rights that the legislature enacted section 46. It is easy to see that this will not prevent parties from taking their disputes as regards these paints about rate of rent, status of the tenant or incidents of any tenancy to the Civil Court if and when they are not satisfied with the decision of the Revenue Authorities. For that purpose a proviso has been added under which the period during which the suit could not be entertained or remain stayed will be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The entry already made will undoubtedly enjoy the presumption of correctness but the Civil Court on proper evidence can find that that has been rebutted. For that purpose a proviso has been added under which the period during which the suit could not be entertained or remain stayed will be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The entry already made will undoubtedly enjoy the presumption of correctness but the Civil Court on proper evidence can find that that has been rebutted. The sensible thing in these state of affairs would be to stay the hands of the Civil Court till the Revenue Officer has accomplished his task and that is what has been done under section 46. When this is properly understood and taken into consideration it becomes clear that the intention of the legislature could not have been only to prevent the Civil Court from taking actions in these matters where the relief in terms asked for the determination of rent or status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy. To do so would be accomplishing only part of the purpose. For the full accomplishment of the purpose the legislature could not but have intended that all suits, the proper decision of which requires the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates, will be stayed. Where the notification has been published, the Civil Court will not entertain such a suit, but where the suit has already been instituted when the notification is published, the Civil Court will stay the hearing of the suit and will recommence the hearing of the suit after final publication. 5. MY conclusion, therefore, is, treating the matter as one free from authority, that the provisions of section 46 apply to all suits where any of the questions mentioned above has to be determined for a proper decision of the suit. The question is, however, fully covered by authority. There are at least two Bench decisions of this Court which are binding on us and which have taken the view I have indicated above. 6. IN Lala Gangaram v. Krishna Gopal Jhunjhunwalla (1) 59 C. W. N. 1006 it was in terms laid down that in all suits where such questions were raised the provisions will apply. In Kishori Mondal and others v. Sk. Bhutu Gayen (2) a decision which has not been reported (Civil Revision Case No. 3449 of 1955) the same view was taken. In Kishori Mondal and others v. Sk. Bhutu Gayen (2) a decision which has not been reported (Civil Revision Case No. 3449 of 1955) the same view was taken. The facts of that case were that the suit as originally framed asked for the declaration of plaintiff's occupancy raiyati right to the lands and for confirmation of possession but if it was found that he had been dispossessed, for delivery of possession. There was an alternative prayer for declaration of his permanent under-raiyati right. The plaintiff ultimately amended his plaint by canceling the alternative prayer altogether and by substituting the prayer for declaration of occupancy raiyati right by the prayer for a declaration of merely tenancy right. The question was raised whether in view of this amendment the provisions of section 46 were still applicable. This Court held that for proper decision of the case the Court will necessarily have to determine the status of the tenant and the incidents of the tenancy and it was therefore a suit within the class of suits mentioned in sec. 46 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Our attention has been drawn to two single Bench decisions in which a contrary view appears to have been taken. It is hardly necessary to say that in view of the Bench decisions which are binding on us, very little weight can be attached to these two decisions of single Judges. With great respect to the learned Judges, I am of opinion where they have expressed a view of law which is against the view taken in the Division Benches, that the view taken by them must be held to be incorrect. Particular emphasis was laid by Mr. Mitra on an observation in Beni Madhab Ghose and another v. Sm. With great respect to the learned Judges, I am of opinion where they have expressed a view of law which is against the view taken in the Division Benches, that the view taken by them must be held to be incorrect. Particular emphasis was laid by Mr. Mitra on an observation in Beni Madhab Ghose and another v. Sm. Anila Bala Ghose (3) 61 C. W. N. 349 where Renupada Mukherjee, J. made an observation in these words:- "even if it be necessary for the Court to determine the status of the tenant or the incidents of the tenancy for the purpose of determining the primary dispute, viz., the dispute relating to the land, such a suit taken in its totality must not be deemed to be a suit within the purview of section 46 of the Act and the Civil Court would have its ordinary jurisdiction to try the suit." It is to be noticed that in an earlier part of the judgment Renupada Mukherjee, J. considered the case of Kishori Mondal v. Bhutu Gayen (2) mentioned above and held that on the basis of that decision he would hold that the issue which he had to consider was not with respect either to the status of the tenant or the incidents of the tenancy. In view of this decision his further observation as set out above appears to me to be obiter. In Sripati Charan Panja v. Narendra Nath Roy Choudhury (4) 60 C. W. N. 1070, Bachawat, J. had to deal with a case in which the plaintiff had prayed for a declaration of his permanent occupancy right. He took the view that the provisions of section 46 did not apply. With great respect to the learned Judge, I am bound to say that in view of the decisions of the Division Benches mentioned above his view cannot be held to be right and is certainly not binding on us. 7. BETTER support might be said to be available to the view suggested by Mr. Mitra in a decision of this Court on the question of application of section 111 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 7. BETTER support might be said to be available to the view suggested by Mr. Mitra in a decision of this Court on the question of application of section 111 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. There a Bench of this Court (Rankin, C. J. and Costello, J.) held in Kshemananda Kumar v. Rashamaya Haldar (5) 32 C. W. N. 132 that the provisions of section 111 did not apply in a suit which was for ejectment where the plaintiff alleged that he was an under-raiyat and the notice had been given under section 49 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Rankin, C. J. observed that the section could not be held to mean that "in any case in which the defendant chooses to raise a question as to status the landlord is prevented from taking action under the ordinary law in such matters. " With very great respect which is due to any pronouncement of that eminent Judge, I am constrained to say that I find it difficult to understand how he came to that decision. If that had been an interpretation of section 46, I would have been bound to refer this case for decision to a Full Bench. That, however, is a decision not of section 46 but of another section, section 111 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the fact that the provisions of that section are analogous to section 46 does not in law make that decision binding on us in the present case. In view specially of the two Division Bench decisions already mentioned, I am of opinion that we are bound to decide on the view of law that found favour in those cases that in all suits in which questions as regards the rate of rent, the status of tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates have to be determined for a proper decision of a suit the section will apply. 8. IT remains now to apply the principle mentioned above to the facts of this case. It appears from the very letters to which the plaintiff has referred in his plaint that there was a dispute as regards the incidents of his tenancy. His case was that it was, as the trial court puts it, a Bemeadi. 8. IT remains now to apply the principle mentioned above to the facts of this case. It appears from the very letters to which the plaintiff has referred in his plaint that there was a dispute as regards the incidents of his tenancy. His case was that it was, as the trial court puts it, a Bemeadi. settlement whereas the defendant's case was that settlement used to be given from year to year and the settlement given for 1361 B. S. had already expired. I find it difficult to see how this case can be properly decided without a decision of the question on which the real dispute was based. To say that without saying anything about the tenancy, the Court might merely decree that there is a tenancy would be to shirk the issue. To try such a suit as a suit not for the determination of any incidents of the tenancy is to mistake the form for the substance. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions of section 46 apply to the present litigation and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 9. BOTH Dr. Gupta and Mr. Mitra have submitted to us that if our answer to the first question be in the affirmative they pray that we should not enter into the consideration of the merits of the case. I agree with them that it will not be proper to enter into the merits of the case in view of the finding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 10. I would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below and order that the plaint be rejected. The appellants will get costs here and below. The application for additional evidence is not pressed and no order is passed thereon.