JUDGMENT A.N. Mulla, J. - This is an application of criminal revision filed on behalf of Jagpal Singh, Balbhaddra Singh, Bansu Singh and Lallu. The applicants are being prosecuted under Sec. 188, I. P. Code for disobeying the express direction given to them by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maharajganj, to abstain from interfering with the possession of Mohan Pasi over plot No. 667|2B in village Osah, pargana Hardoi, Tahsil Maharajganj, district Rae Bareli. 2. It may be mentioned that Mohan Pasi had filed an application under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maharajganj, with respect to the said plot and on the 26th of February, 1952, the Magistrate passed an order under Sec. 145 (6), Cr. P. Code declaring that Mohan Pasi was in possession should not be disturbed by the applicants till he is evicted by an order of the civil court. It appears that inspite of his order the applicants took wrongful possession of the disputed plot and so they were prosecuted under Sec. 188, I. P. Code as mentioned above. 3. The only ground pressed before me by the counsel for the applicants is that Sec. 188, I. P. Code does not apply to an order passed by a Magistrate under Sec. 145 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Reliance was placed on a Bench decision of this Court in Dalganjan Koeri v. State, A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 630 My attention was drawn to the observations of the learned Judges to the effect that the orders passed in judicial proceedings by civil, revenue or criminal courts are not governed by Sec. 188, I. P. Code. It was contended that in view of these observations a prosecution under Sec. 188, I. P. Code is not maintainable in this case. 4. In my opinion the contention advanced has no substance. Even in the above noted case the learned Judges observed (at page 631):- "The matter was finally decided on the facts of that case State v. Sm. Tugla, A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 423 and the opinion of the majority of the Judges was that an order under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. was an order the breach of which was punishable under Sec. 188, I. P. C. as to the parties to that order but this decision did not deal with the question of orders passed in judicial proceedings by civil, revenue or criminal courts." 5. P. C. was an order the breach of which was punishable under Sec. 188, I. P. C. as to the parties to that order but this decision did not deal with the question of orders passed in judicial proceedings by civil, revenue or criminal courts." 5. It is apparent from the observations quoted above that when the learned Judges observed that judicial proceedings of criminal courts are not governed by Sec. 188, I. P. Code, they were excluding an order passed under Sec. 145 (6), Cr. P. Code. This decision, therefore, instead of supporting the applicants is against them. 6. There are also two other Bench decisions of this Court in which it has been clearly held that Sec. 188, I. Pt Code applies to a disobedience of an order passed under Sec. 145, Cr. P. Code. These cases are State. v. Sm. Tugla, A.I.R. 1955 All.423 cited above, and Ejaz Ahmad v. Kunwar Maheshwar Bakhsh Singh, 1953 Cr. L.J. 623 It seems to me that Ejaz Ahmad's case escaped the attention of the learned Judges who heard Sm. Tugla's case, for there is no reference to this decision in that case. It was observed by Beg, J. in Ejaj Ahmad's case:- "We are of opinion that the delivery of the judgment in the case under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. would constitute promulgation within the meaning of Sec. 188, Penal Code. It is significant to note in this connection that whereas Sec. 145 has prescribed a mode of promulgation for the preliminary order, it has prescribed no such mode for the final order Sub-Sec. (6) of the said Section." 7. In my opinion the line of reasoning mentioned above is unanswerable. It is obvious that the final order passed in Sec. 145 proceedings under sub-sec. (6) is a promulgation atleast as far as the parties to that proceedings are concerned. The word 'promulgation' in essence, means that the contents of the order which is promulgated should be known to the person against whom proceedings are taken under Sec. 188, I. P. Code. Sec. 188, I. P. Code includes in its ambit both executive orders and judicial orders. The executive authorities cannot make their orders known to the public at large without adopting some form of promulgation. They do not pass any orders in a case in which they pronounce a judgment. Sec. 188, I. P. Code includes in its ambit both executive orders and judicial orders. The executive authorities cannot make their orders known to the public at large without adopting some form of promulgation. They do not pass any orders in a case in which they pronounce a judgment. It was perhaps for this reason that the word 'promulgated' was used in Sec. 188, I. P. Code. On the other hand the pronouncement of a judgment in open court is a promulgation to the parties to that case. As Sec. 188, I. P. Code is enacted to ensure public tranquility, health, safety and convenience, it is obvious that the order of any public servant whether on the executive or on the judicial side which is made for this purpose is governed by Sec. 188, I. P. Code. A judgment or an order passed in open court constitutes a formal declaration to the public of the decision of the court in the case in which the order is given or the judgment is passed. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Sec. 188, I, P. Code includes in its ambit the orders passed under Sec. 144, Cr. P. C. as well Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. The first kind of orders would be passed by the executive authorities and the second kind of orders would be passed by the judicial officers. It cannot be contended that while the breach of an executive order is punishable under Sec. 188, I. P. Code, the breach of a judicial order is not so punishable. The test in my opinion is whether the order is for the purpose of maintaining public tranquility, health, safety or convenience or not. If the order fulfills this requirement, its breach would be punishable under Sec. 188, I. P. Code. 8. It cannot be doubted that an order under Sec. 145, Cr. P. C. is to maintain public peace and, therefore, it is included in the purpose for which Sec. 188 I. P. Code is enacted. Where the primary purpose of the order is to prevent a breach of the public peace, the applicability of Sec. 188 I. P. Code against any breach of such order cannot be questioned. An order under Sec. 145 (6), Cr. Where the primary purpose of the order is to prevent a breach of the public peace, the applicability of Sec. 188 I. P. Code against any breach of such order cannot be questioned. An order under Sec. 145 (6), Cr. P. Code is primarily passed to prevent a breach of the peace and it is only an incidental consequence that a party is put in possession over some disputed property. 9. The case law on this point has been fully discussed in the decisions cited above. The cases of Smt. Tugla and Dalganjan Koeril are not in conflict, but supplement each other. In those orders whether they be of civil, revenue or criminal court where the order affects only the parties concerned and does not affect the public tranquility, health, safety or convenience, the application of Sec. 188 I. P. Code is not permissible. Normally the orders of these courts affect only the parties and not the public at large. It is, therefore, right that orders passed in judicial proceedings are normally not governed by Sec. 188, I. P. Code. An order under Sec. 145, Cr. P. Code is, however, amongst the exceptions. It is passed in the interest of maintaining public peace and, therefore, its breach is punishable under Sec. 188 I. P. Code. I, therefore, see no force in this application of revision and dismiss it. The order dated 6-6-1958 staying delivery of judgment is vacated.