JUDGMENT 1. This is an application by the Liquidator on behalf of the Cooch Behar Bank Ltd. in liquidation for appointment of a Receiver to collect compensation money awarded in favour of the respondents in respect of certain properties mentioned in the petition and also for an injunction restraining the respondents, their servants and agents from withdrawing a sum of Rs. 12,250-54 n. p. or any portion thereof as may be awarded as compensation, ad-interim or otherwise. The facts which have given rise to this application are shortly as follows: the petitioner company (Cooch Behar Bank Ltd.) had instituted a title suit No. 14 of 1951 in the court of the District Judge, cooch Behar for enforcement of a mortgage executed by the respondents in respect of certain zamindary properties mentioned in paragraph 3 of the petition known as Folimari Jote in the District of Cooch Behar in consideration of a loan of Rs. 19,000/- which was advanced by the petitioner company to the respondents. A preliminary mortgage decree was passed in the said suit on the 2nd of April, 1952 by which it was declared that a sum of Rs. 20,069/2/-was due to the petitioner company an the date of the Saiddiara. On 25th August, 1952 the petitioner company was directed to be wound up by this Court. Thereafter on obtaining information that the mortgaged properties had been acquired by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, the Court Liquidator addressed a letter to the Deputy Commissioner of Cooch Behar on the 22nd February, 1955, requesting him to pay all compensation money in relation to the mortgaged properties to the petitioner bank as the holder of the said mortgage decree. Thereafter further correspondence passed between the Liquidator and the District Compensation Officer and ultimately on the 7th of July, 1958 the Court Liquidator received a letter from the District Compensation Officer dated the 3rd July, 1958 in which it was stated that a sum of Rs. 12,250, and 54 n P. had been determined as the amount which was payable as compensation to the respondents in respect of the properties mentioned in paragraph 3 of the petition and enquiring whether any order of attachment had been obtained by the petitioner company in respect of the said compensation money. 12,250, and 54 n P. had been determined as the amount which was payable as compensation to the respondents in respect of the properties mentioned in paragraph 3 of the petition and enquiring whether any order of attachment had been obtained by the petitioner company in respect of the said compensation money. The petitioner has therefore made this application for the relief's which have already been mentioned in an earlier part of this judgment, 2. On behalf of the respondents it has teen argued that Sec. 26 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 imposes a disability on holders of decrees to proceed in execution against the amount payable as compensation to an intermediary as defined in Sec. 2 (i) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, (W. B. Act I of 1954) in respect of acquisition of his land under the provisions of this Act except to the extent of 50 per cent. of the total amount of compensation payable, and if any ad-interim payment is made under the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of Sec. 12 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 such payment is also immune from attachment and no execution can be levied in respect of the amount which is paid by way of interim compensation. Section 26 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 is as follows: "extent of recovery of compensation money by attachment (1) Save as otherwise provided in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7, no portion of the compensation payable to any intermediary in terms of any Compensation Assessment Roll finally published under section 21, in excess of fifty per centum thereof shall (a) be liable to be deducted under an order of a Collector made under section 7, or (b) be liable to attachment at any one time in execution of decrees including decrees for arrears of rent. (2) Where there are several orders of attachment and the aggregate of the sums to be attached under such orders exceeds the limit referred to in sub-section (1), the orders shall be enforceable to the extent of such limit and the priority amongst them shall be decided, as far as practicable, in accordance with the principles laid down in section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908): provided that any sum which is required to be deducted under the order of a Collector under Section 7 shall have priority before any order of attachment (3) Except (a) in a case covered by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7, or (b) when the entire amount of compensation is payable in cash, all sums to be deducted under Section 7 or recoverable under an order of attachment under sub-section (1) shall be deducted from the amount of compensation payable in non-negotiable bonds under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 23" This section has been amended by section 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1957. The said amending Act was passed after obtaining the assent of the President on 8th January, 1958. Section 5 may be set out hereunder. In sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the said Act, after the words "sub-section (2) of Section 23" the words, "and no such sum shall be deducted from the amounts payable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 12" shall be added and be deemed always to have been added. It is thus clear from the provisions of section 26 as amended by the West Bengal Act XXV of 1957 that subsection (1) of this Section exempts 50 p. c. of the compensation money from attachment in execution of any decree of any Court. In other words, the object of the framers of the Section was to place 50 p. c. of the compensation money beyond the reach of the creditors and to make it available to the intermediary who is being deprived of practically the whole of his zamindary properties by compulsory acquisition under the provisions of this Act. In other words, the object of the framers of the Section was to place 50 p. c. of the compensation money beyond the reach of the creditors and to make it available to the intermediary who is being deprived of practically the whole of his zamindary properties by compulsory acquisition under the provisions of this Act. The concluding four lines of sub-section (3) of Section 26 put a further limitation or restriction on the power of the decree-holders to realise the decretal dues by way of execution, by providing that all sums recoverable under an order of attachment shall be deducted from the amount of compensation payable in non-negotiable bonds under subsection (2) of Section 23. In other words, no execution can be levied on the amount of compensation which is paid or is payable in cash according to the table laid down in Section 23. It is also clear from the words which have been introduced at the end of subsection (3) of Section 23 of the Act by the amending Act of 1957 that ad-interim payments made under Sections 12 (1) and 12 (2) of the Act are also immune from attachment or process of execution. The letter of the District Compensation Officer, Cooch Behar which is annexed to the petition states that the sum which is immediately payable to the intermediary is an ad-interim payment as contemplated by Section 12 of the Act and the petitioner cannot therefore touch it nor can they leave any right to proceed against it by way of execution. It appears to me But that is the effect of the words introduced by the amendment made by Section 5 of the West Bengal Act XXV of 1957, and the contention raised in the letter of the compensation officer is correct. 3. Mr. T. Banerji, Solicitor, appearing for the Liquidator has argued that Section 73 (2) of the Transfer of Property Act covers this case and so the petitioner is entitled to payment of the entire compensation money in protanto satisfaction of the mortgage debt. 3. Mr. T. Banerji, Solicitor, appearing for the Liquidator has argued that Section 73 (2) of the Transfer of Property Act covers this case and so the petitioner is entitled to payment of the entire compensation money in protanto satisfaction of the mortgage debt. Section 73, sub-section (2) is as follows : "where a mortgaged property or any part thereof or any interest therein is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other enactment for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of immovable property the mortgagee shall be entitled to claim payment of the mortgage money in whole or in part out of the amount due to the mortgagor as compensation. " sub-Section (3) of Section 72 may also be set out hereunder. "such claim shall prevail against all others except those of prior encumbrances and may be enforced notwithstanding that the principal money has not become due. " 4. Now the effect of these sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 73 is that when mortgaged property is compulsorily acquired, the compensation payable by the acquiring authority becomes the substituted security in respect of the mortgage debt and there is a statutory charge created by the operation of sub section (2) of Section 73 on the compensation money in respect of the dues of the mortgagee. It has been argued by Mr. Banerji that the petitioner has not obtained any order for attachment of the compensation money in execution of any decree and the money that is due on the mortgage is not recoverable under order of attachment and consequently, the provisions of section 26 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, do not and cannot literally apply nor are they attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is pointed out that the claim of the petitioner is based on the statutory charge created by Sec. 73 (2) of the Transfer of Property Act and it is by virtue of this statutory charge which has accrued in favour of the petitioner upon the zamindary properties being acquired that the petitioner seeks to restrain the mortgagor from taking away the compensation money. My attention has been drawn by the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents to sec. My attention has been drawn by the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents to sec. 3 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 which is as follows: "act to over-ride other laws etc: The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or in any contract express or implied or in any instrument and notwithstanding any usage or custom to the contrary. " 5. It is clear from this section that the provisions of this Act over-ride all other laws which are contrary to the provisions of this Act. Now the question is whether there is anything in Sec. 73, sub-sec. (2) and sub-sec. (3) of the Transfer of Property Act which is contrary to the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. It appears to me that Sec. 73 (2) is contrary to the scheme and provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act of 1953, in certain respects. Sec. 26 provides that only 50 p. c. of the compensation money is available to a creditor for satisfaction of his debts. It makes no distinction between a mortgagee debt or any other debt but Sec. 73 (2) provides that the mortgagee becomes entitled to the whole of the compensation money payable in respect of the mortgaged property for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act or any other enactment providing for compulsory acquisition of land. So to this extent Section 73 (2) comes into conflict with the provisions of Sec. 26 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. It is, however, well known that unlike the case of a money decree it is not normally necessary in the case of a mortgage decree to attach the property in execution but it can be brought to sale without attachment. But it is to be pointed out that when a property is acquired under compulsory powers vested in the Government and compensation becomes payable by reason of such acquisition, it is only against the money or fund which represents the compensation money that the creditor can proceed against for the satisfaction of his debt and as the attachment is the only process by which such fund can be touched, the framers of sec. 26 of the Act thought that the provisions made for exemption of fifty per cent of the compensation money from attachment in execution would afford adequate safeguard against execution to be levied by the creditors in respect of the compensation money which becomes payable under the provisions of this Act. There is no doubt that in the present case also there can be no question of bringing the mortgaged property to sale after a final decree is passed in this suit inasmuch as the mortgaged property is now vested in the Government and the mortgagor has lost all interest in it by reason of the acquisition. The mortgagor's interest has shifted to the compensation money. 6. The petitioner is asking in this application for the appointment of a receiver or an order for injunction in respect of the compensation money. This is virtually asking for an order for attachment of the compensation money. So, in my view, the present case falls within the ambit of Sec. 26 of the west Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. It is also worthy of notice that in sub-clause (b) of sub-sec. 2 of sec. 17 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 it is only the case of a usufructuary mortgage which is separately and specifically dealt with and there is provision for apportionment of the compensation between the intermediary and the usufructuary mortgagee in such proportion as the Compensation Officer may consider to be just and fair. So except in the case of a usufructuary mortgage where the apportionment of compensation is left to the discretion of the Compensation Officer, a fixed rule of 50 per cent of the compensation money being available for the creditors is laid down in Sec. 26 (1) of the Act. I hold, therefore, that the petitioner has the right to attach or to proceed against only fifty per cent of the compensation money. 7. It has been also argued that as the suit on the mortgage is pending in the Cooch Behar Court, this application is not maintainable in this court and this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application. The answer to this contention is, however, furnished by Sec. 45 (B) and Sec. 45 (C) of the Banking Companies Amendment Act, 1953. It has been also argued that as the suit on the mortgage is pending in the Cooch Behar Court, this application is not maintainable in this court and this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application. The answer to this contention is, however, furnished by Sec. 45 (B) and Sec. 45 (C) of the Banking Companies Amendment Act, 1953. Sec. 45b confers exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court to decide any question whatsoever whether of law or of fact arising out of the winding up or relating to the winding up of a banking company. The language is comprehensive enough to cover a case of the description which is before me now. The provisions of Sec. 45c however provide that if a suit or other legal proceeding is pending in any other court, such suit or proceeding shall not be proceeded with "except in the manner hereinafter provided". The succeeding such sections provide that in respect of such pending suits or proceedings the liquidator will have to submit a report containing a list of all pending proceedings and the particulars thereof to the High. Court and the High Court, upon receipt of such report, may order transfer of all or any of such proceeding to the High Court after giving the parties an opportunity to show cause why the proceedings should not be so transferred. If the High Court orders a transfer of any of the proceedings, then such proceeding will be disposed of by the High Court as indicated in sub-sec. 3 of Sec. 45c. But if the High Court does not make any order for transfer, then such proceeding shall be continued in the court in which the proceeding was pending. 8. It has been stated before the Court by Mr. T. Banerji that the Liquidator has already submitted a report in respect of the suit to which this application relates and has made an application to the Court for transfer of this suit to the High Court and the said application is returnable on the 15th of this month. In the circumstances, it appears to me that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application. Until the application for transfer is finally decided and the High Court refused to transfer the suit to this Court the High Court does not lose its jurisdiction to dispose of the suit. In the circumstances, it appears to me that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application. Until the application for transfer is finally decided and the High Court refused to transfer the suit to this Court the High Court does not lose its jurisdiction to dispose of the suit. Moreover, this application which is now made before this Court cannot be said to be a proceeding which was pending in the Cooch Behar Court. So under Sec. 45b of the Banking Companies Act, this High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the questions of law and fact which have been raised in this application. The next point that has been argued is that the application being one for execution of a decree it should have been made by way of tabular statement. It is to be pointed out however that only a preliminary decree has been passed in this suit on the 2nd April, 1952. A preliminary decree is not by itself executable. So this application can be said to be an application in execution. It is an application which is made for the purpose of preservation of the compensation money which is lying in the hands of the District Compensation Officer pending the final disposal of this suit by the passing of a final decree. It is true that in the present case no question will arise of selling the mortgaged property inasmuch as, as I have pointed out already, the property has vested in the Government and the mortgagor has no further interest in the same. But by the final decree that will be passed in the said suit, the Court will have to give directions with regard to the disposal of this compensation money which is really the substituted security in respect of the mortgage debt. So, in my blew, the application cannot be said to be one which is made in execution and therefore, it is not necessary that it should have been made by a tabular statement. 9. The further point that has been argued on behalf of the respondents is that as the application for final decree is barred by limitation, no relief should be given to the petitioner as asked for in this application. It appears to me that this contention is without substance. The preliminary decree was passed on the 2nd of April, 1952. 9. The further point that has been argued on behalf of the respondents is that as the application for final decree is barred by limitation, no relief should be given to the petitioner as asked for in this application. It appears to me that this contention is without substance. The preliminary decree was passed on the 2nd of April, 1952. So under the provisions of Art. 181 of the Limitation Act the period of limitation for final decree is three years from when the right to apply accrues. So the application for final decree would ordinarily have become barred in 1955 but before the period of limitation had expired, the Banking Companies Amendment Act 1953 which has introduced Sec. 45 (O) in the Banking Companies Act, came into force and as I have pointed out already, the order for winding up was made on the 25th of August, 1952. Therefore, under the provisions of Sec. 45 (O) which is applicable to the present case, the period of limitation remains suspended from the date of the presentation of the winding up petition. The application for final decree has not yet been made but when tit is made, it will be governed by the provisions of sec. 45 (O) of the Amending Act, 1953. The fact that the mortgage suit was instituted in the Cooch Bihar Court and the preliminary mortgage decree was passed by the said Court before the Banking Companies Amendment Act of 1953 came into force is of no consequence and does not attract the principles of propositions which have been laid down by Bachawat, J. in the case reported in (1) 58 C. W. N. 676. 10. In my view, the application for final decree, if and when made, will not be barred by limitation. I therefore, issue an order of injunction restraining the respondents from withdrawing fifty per cent. of the compensation money which is payable by the Government to the respondents in respect of the acquisition in question. The respondents, however, will be at liberty to withdraw the sum of Rs. 1,250/- which has been adjudged by the Compensation Officer payable to them as ad interim payment. The Liquidator will retain his costs of this application out of the assets in his hand. The respondents, however, will be at liberty to withdraw the sum of Rs. 1,250/- which has been adjudged by the Compensation Officer payable to them as ad interim payment. The Liquidator will retain his costs of this application out of the assets in his hand. This order is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties as to whether the Bengal Money Lenders Act applies to this case. It has been stated on behalf of the respondents that the respondents contemplate making an application for reliefs under the provisions of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. If and when the application is made, the rights and contentions of the parties on the question whether the Bengal. Money Lenders Act is applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case will be decided in such application. Certificate under rule 252 of the Company Rules granted to Mr. T. Banerjee.