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1958 DIGILAW 240 (ALL)

Lal Bahadur Singh v. Sub Divisional Officer

1958-09-17

B.R.JAMES

body1958
JUDGMENT B.R. James, J. - Lal Bahadur Singh and Roshan Lal Singh were the rival candidates for the office of the Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat of Kathula Ghauspur, Allahabad district, which consists of twenty members. At the election that took place eleven members voted for Lal Bahadur and nine for Roshan Lal, hence the former was declared duly elected. Roshan Lal thereupon brought an election petition challenging the validity of Lal Bahadur's election. After taking the evidence of the parties the Sub-Divisional Officer held that Lal Bahadur had been guilty of bringing one member and that three members who had voted for him were statutorily disqualified; consequently he set aside Lal Bahadur's election and declared Roshan Lal elected in his place. 2. Lal Bahadur has now brought this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and prays that the Election Tribunal's order be set aside and that his right to function as Sarpanch be not interfered with. 3. His learned counsel's principal contention is that there is no provision in the Panchayat Raj Act by which the election of a Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat can be set aside, and he argues that the only section in the Act, viz., Sec. 12-C which prescribes the grounds on which an election can be set aside has no application to Sarpanches inasmuch as there is no provision in the Act or in the Rules framed there-under making Sec. 12-C applicable to elections of Sarpanches, and he points out that although there is a section, Sec. 12-D, which is entitled "Disputes pertaining to the election of Up-Pradhan, Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch," it merely lays down that any dispute relating to the election of these functionaries shall be referred in the "manner prescribed" to the "prescribed authority," but is otherwise silent as to the grounds on which their election may be set aside. Accordingly learned counsel contends in the absence of any relevant law the election once made of a Sarpanch and indeed of an Up-Pradhan or Sahayak Sarpanch can not be challenged. 4. The contention raises point of considerable importance which does not appear to have been decided by this Court nither to hence arguments on it have been heard at length. 5. 4. The contention raises point of considerable importance which does not appear to have been decided by this Court nither to hence arguments on it have been heard at length. 5. Sec. 12-C is in terms confined to disputes resulting from the election of a person as Pradhan of Gaon Sabha or as a member of a Gaon Panchayat (including the election of a person who may be appointed as a Panch of a Nyaya Panchayat under Sec. 43). The general impression is that it also applies to election disputes of Sarpanches, Up-Pradhans, and Sahayak Sarpanches, and it is on this footing that Sub-Divisional Officers (the "prescribed authority") have been deciding such disputes. But the question is, is there anything in the Act or the Rules framed there-under which can justify this? 6. Sec. 12-D, to which reference has just been made, is of no help in deciding this question as it merely lays down that any dispute relating to the election of an Up Pradhan, Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch shall be referred in the "manner prescribed" to the "prescribed authority" (which by virtue of Schedule I of the Act is the Sub-Divisional Officer), but neither enacts the grounds on which the election of these functionaries may be set aside nor makes Sec. 12-C applicable. There being no other relevant provision in the Act. I turn to examine the Rules and ascertain if they have any assistance to offer. 7. Rule 83-B lays down that any dispute relating to the election of a person as Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch shall be decided in the manner provided in Rule 26 for the decision of the disputes relating to the election of an Up-Pradhan, while clause (3) of Rule 26 states that an application disputing the election of an Up-Pradhan shall be heard in accordance with the procedure of Rules 24 and 25 in so far as the same may be applicable. Thus 'Rules 24 and 25 apply to election disputes of Sarpanches and Sahayak Sarpanches also. Rule 24 deals with the form and presentation of the election petition, while Cl. (1) of Rule 25 prescribes the procedure which has to be adopted for hearing it. Thus 'Rules 24 and 25 apply to election disputes of Sarpanches and Sahayak Sarpanches also. Rule 24 deals with the form and presentation of the election petition, while Cl. (1) of Rule 25 prescribes the procedure which has to be adopted for hearing it. Clauses (2) and (3) of Rule 25 define the powers which the Sub-Divisional Officer, after hearing the petition, can exercise and the consequential orders that he can pass, the former clause applying when he finds that the election was valid, and the latter clause when he finds the contrary. 8. These are all the provisions that there are in the Rules which relate to a dispute pertaining to the election of a Sarpanch, as indeed to that of an Up Pradhan or Sahayak Sarpanch. Their examination discloses that a petition challenging the election of any of these functionaries must fulfil the condition laid down in Rule 24. If such a petition is found valid in form and presentation, the Sub-Divisional Officer must hear it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Rule 25 (1). After completing the hearing he is entitled to pass any of the orders prescribed by clauses (2) and (3) of Rule 25. But - and this is the point of supreme importance - there is nothing in these rules which makes Sec. 12-C applicable to an election dispute in respect of a Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Up-Pradhan, so that the Sub-Divisional Officer while hearing such a dispute is not bound by the conditions embodied in that section. 9. But if he is not so bound the question arises as to what substantive law he is to apply when hearing an election dispute of a Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Up-Pradhan. The petitioner's learned counsel argues that since the provisions of Sec. 12-C are not attracted and since the Act or the Rules do not provide any substantive law, the Sub-Divisional Officer has no power to set aside an election like that of the petitioner. I cannot persuade myself to accept this position. The law, as laid down in the Rules referred to above, unequivocally contemplates the hearing of election disputes of a Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Up-Pradhan; it lays down the procedure for the hearing of such dispute; it confers specific powers on the Sub-Divisional Officer to pass appropriate orders both when he finds the election valid and when he finds it invalid. Consequently it becomes inconceivable that the legislature or the Rule-makers did not intend the election of the afore mentioned functionaries to remain unchallenged. But since the grounds on which their election can be set aside are found omitted from the Act or the Rules, what principles is the Sub-Divisional Officer to follow? I have little difficulty in giving the answer that he must apply the rules of justice, equity and good conscience; or, to put it differently, he should enforce the rules of natural justice. This implies that he is vested with a wide discretion in the matter. Of course his discretion has to be used judiciously and not arbitrarily or capriciously. 10. One result of this would be that he becomes entitled to set aside the election of a Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Up-Pradhan on grounds much wider than those prescribed by Sec. 12-C. 11. Another result would be that, whereas by virtue of sub-clause (vi) of Rule 25 (1) the District Magistrate is authorised to transfer to another Sub-Divisional Officer an election petition in the case of a Pradhan or a member of a Gaon Panchayat (Including that of a person who may be appointed as a Panch of a Nyaya Panchayat) since such a petition is made under Sec. 12 C (1), he has no power to order a similar transfer in the case of the election petition of a Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Up-Pradhan inasmuch as such a petition is not made under Sec. 12-C (1). 12. I turn now to the case in hand and decide whether or not the Sub-Divisional Officer was justified in reversing the petitioner's election. His first reason for doing so was that he found that the petitioner had bribed one of the members. Were Sec. 12-C to apply, the petitioner's election could not be set aside, for under clause (1) (a) of that section the bribery has to be extensive, and an isolated case of it cannot vitiate the election. But the position becomes different when, as held by me, the rules of natural justice apply. The petitioner desires the office of Sarpanch, and as such to preside over the judicial tribunal of his locality enjoying wide powers. When such a man is found to be himself offering a bribe, there will be an ever present danger of his accepting bribes in the performance of his official duties. The petitioner desires the office of Sarpanch, and as such to preside over the judicial tribunal of his locality enjoying wide powers. When such a man is found to be himself offering a bribe, there will be an ever present danger of his accepting bribes in the performance of his official duties. Such a man would be patently unfit to hold the office of Sarpanch. 13. The Sub-Divisional Officer's second ground was that there disqualified members voted for the petitioner. On the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Durga Shankar v. Raghuraj Singh, A.I.R. 1954 SC 520 it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Election Tribunal on the evidence before it is always entitled to come to a finding that a voter was constitutionally or statutorily not qualified to vote at all. This is precisely what was held by the Sub-Divisional Officer with regard to the three members aforesaid. If their votes are rejected the petitioner is left with eight votes only, whereas the number of votes secured by Roshan Lal was nine. In consequence Roshan Lal must be held to have been rightly declared elected. Incidentally, it was open to the petitioner at the hearing of the election petition to show that the disqualification of the three members aforesaid had been removed, but he made no attempt to discharge that burden. 14. His learned counsel has also argued that Roshan Lal's election petition contravened Rule 24 (which admittedly applies) inasmuch as it did not contain a summary of the circumstances which he was alleging. It is sufficient to note that this point was never raised at the hearing of the election petition nor was the Sub-Divisional Officer asked to frame any issue on it. The point cannot therefore be permitted to be raised in the writ proceedings before me. 15. For the reasons given above the Sub-Divisional Officer must be held to have rightly set aside the petitioner's election on both the grounds. His order cannot be held to have been vitiated by any error. Consequently the present petition fails and is dismissed with costs to Roshan Lal, which I fix at Rs. 100/-. The stay order dated 29-1-1958 is vacated. 16. His order cannot be held to have been vitiated by any error. Consequently the present petition fails and is dismissed with costs to Roshan Lal, which I fix at Rs. 100/-. The stay order dated 29-1-1958 is vacated. 16. Before parting with this case I should like to observe that I have a strong feeling that although the intendment of the legislature and the Rule-Makers was to make the provisions of Sec. 12-C of the Act applicable to disputes over the elections of Sarpanches, Sahayak Sarpanches and Up-Pradhans also, it was an unconscious omission not to introduce a provision in the Act or the Rules making that section applicable to these functionaries also. Such a provision would have made the task of sub-Divisional Officer easier for they would have before them a specific law to enforce, whereas in the view of the existing law that I have been constrained to take, viz., that the rules of natural justice apply in the case of those officials, there would be constant risk of uncertainty and lack of precision in the administration of election law. It seems to me incongruous that election disputes of certain village functionaries should be governed by Sec. 12-C of the Act, and of others by the rules of natural justice, and I feel that it is desirable for there to be a uniform law governing all village functionaries. Accordingly I direct a copy of this judgment to be transmitted to the State Government for considering over the matter.