JUDGMENT G.P. Bhutt, J. 1. This is an appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh (defendant) against the decree for Rs. 10500/- out of a claim of Rs. 15000/- , passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Balaghat, in civil suit No. 11-B of 1953, in favour of the plaintiff Yakinuddin. The plaintiff has filed a cross-objection for the balance of Rs. 4500-. 2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The plaintiff took the trees detailed in the Schedule attached to the plaint for certain purposes from the proprietors Krishnarao and Khanderao on 29-3-1941 for a period of 10 years ending on 31-7-1952. This period was extended on 29-7-1943 upto 31-7-1955. The transactions were evidenced by 2 deeds which were duly registered. On the coming into force of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (1 of 1951), on 31-3-1951, the State of Madhya Pradesh took possession of the trees. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit for recovery of Rs. 15000/- as damages on account of the loss of income for the period 1-4-1951 to 31-3-1953 The grants were made, inter alia, for propagation and collection of lac, and it was the loss of income from this source that was claimed in the suit. The Court of trial, relying upon Firm C.J. Patel& Company vs M.P. State A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 108, held that the grants were binding upon the State and accordingly it awarded to the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 10500/- as damages. The rest of the claim was disallowed. 3. The only point that was urged before us was that in view of the subsequent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shantabai vs. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 532, the decree cannot be maintained. 4. The question whether the transactions in suit were leases or licences with profits-a-prendre is not material for purposes of this appeal because whatever their nature, they have been effected by registered documents and are, therefore, valid. Whether or not the contention should succeed, therefore, depends upon the question whether the rights created in favour of the plaintiff have vested in the State under Act I of 1951. Whether or not the contention should succeed, therefore, depends upon the question whether the rights created in favour of the plaintiff have vested in the State under Act I of 1951. The relevant provision on this point is section 4 (1) (a) of the said Act It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or document or in any other law for the time being in force, all rights, title and interest vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor in the trees shall cease and be vested in the State for purposes of the State free of all encumbrances. The transferee from a proprietor must, therefore, under this provision, have acquired interest in the proprietary right before he can be held to be divested of his rights. The question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff acquired such an interest by virtue of the two transactions. 5. In Firm C.J. Patel & Company vs. M.P. State (supra), the following observations were made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in respect of the rights acquired by the petitioners in that case from contracts with the exproprietor in respect of collection of tendu leaves: There is nothing in the Act to affect the validity of the several contracts and agreements. The petitioners are neither proprietors within the meaning of the Act nor persons having any interest in the proprietary right through the proprietors. There is no provision in the Act which extinguishes their rights in favour of the State. What exactly is meant by a "proprietary right" under the revenue law has been pointed out at page 217 of Volume I of Baden-Powell's Land Systems of Britsh India, where he says: The first thing that will strike the student is the use of the term "proprietary right" in these pages and in Indian Revenue Books generally. It does not occur in text books on English law of jurisprudence. I presume that the use of such a phrase is due to the feeling that we rarely acknowledge anything like a complete unfettered right vested in any one person. It does not occur in text books on English law of jurisprudence. I presume that the use of such a phrase is due to the feeling that we rarely acknowledge anything like a complete unfettered right vested in any one person. The interest in the soil has come to be virtually shared between two or even more 'grades', the cause of which we just now diseased, It is true that, in many cases only one person is called 'landlord' or 'actual proprietor', but his right is limited; the rest of the right, so to speak, is in the hands of the other grades, even though they are called 'tenants' or by some vague title such as 'tenure holders'. In many cases, as we have seen, this division of right is accentuated by the use, of terms like 'sub-proprietor' or 'proprietor of his holding'. 'The proprietary right' seems then a natural expression for the interest held by the landlord, when that interest is not the entire 'bundle of rights' (which in the aggregate make up an absolute or complete estate) but only 'some' of them, the ramainder being enjoyed by other persons. The definitions given in the Act do not abrogate or vary this meaning. The respondent-State cannot invoke in its aid S. 3, sub-clause (1) of the Act which speaks of the vesting of proprietary lights free of all encumbrances, because the rights of the petitioners, whether as buyers, lessees or licensses are not incumbrances as ordinarily under stood The last part of cl. (a) of section 4 (1) indicates that mortgage debts and charges on the pro prietary right are meant by encumbrances. Although in that case their Lordships observed that the subject-matter of the grant was moveable property and this proposition does not find support from the subsequent decision in the case of Shantibai, the dictum quoted above has remained unaffected Similar view was held in The State of M.P. vs. Seth Narayandas and two others (1958 J.L.J. 734) by a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us Tare J. was a party. 6. A lease of immoveable property as defined in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property. The right of enjoyment means, in other words, the right of possession. 6. A lease of immoveable property as defined in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property. The right of enjoyment means, in other words, the right of possession. Doubtless, this is one of the bundle of rights constituting ownership, but that is not an interest in proprietary right since that right continues to vest in the owner. The same is the case with a licence coupled with profits-a-prendre. It was, however, urged that the Deputy Commissioner, in taking possession of the forest trees in question, acted in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 7 of Act I of 1951, and since he had acted in good faith, no suit lies, vide section 8, for any damage caused or injury suffered by the plaintiff by his action. Section 7, however, only enables the Deputy Commissioner to take charge of all interests vesting in the State under section 3. This does not mean that he can dispossess a person whose entry on the property had a lawful origin. Section 87 is not, therefore, attracted. Accordingly, the lower Court was right in holding that the plaintiff was entitled the loss of income suffered by him on account of the wrongful entry of the State on the trees demised to him. 7. The measure of damages was not contested before us on behalf of the State. So also the cross-objection was not pressed by the plaintiff. 8. The result is that the appeal and the cross-objection fail and are dismissed with costs as incurred. Appeal dismissed.