ORDER R.S. Shukla, J. In this case the revisional order of the Commissioner, Raipur Division, setting aside the sale of Khasra No. 85/7 (0.04 acre) in village Fafadih, tahsil and district Raipur has been challenged by the auction-purchaser (applicant) on a number of grounds. The learned counsel for the applicant, however, restricted his arguments to the following grounds only. (1) Revision application before the Commissioner was time-barred. He did not pass a specific order condoning the delay. It would not therefore, be proper to infer such condonation by implication. (2) The Commissioner should not have directly revised the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer as the Collector had already disposed of the order of the Sub-Divi3ional Officer in revision. (3) Para. 33, Schedule II, M. P. Land Revenue Code bars the remedy by way of revision before the Commissioner. In case no application is made under rule 29 ibid the only remedy left for an aggrieved party is to go to the civil Court. Before I deal with the grounds mentioned above the facts of the case may briefly be mentioned. The plot in question which was originally held by one Smt. Indira Prabha and passed on to one Jiwaram by a registered sale-deed dated 22-7-50. Jiwaram re-sold the land by registered deed to one Popatlal, the predecessor-in-title of the present non-applicants on 18-4-50 for a sum of Rs. 2,000. These changes were not mutated in revenue papers. The land revenue fell in arrears from 1951-52 onwards. Proceedings were started against Smt. Indira Prabha for the recovery of arrears by a sale of the aforesaid plot. The sale was knocked down in favour of the applicant on 12-7-56 and confirmed by the Sub-Divisional-Officer on 16-7-56. The sale proceedings were held invalid by the learned Commissioner for the following reasons: (i) Prohibitory order in Form C, as required by rules framed under section 135 (b) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code was not issued by the attaching officer. (ii) Full auction money was not paid by the auction-purchaser as laid down in rule 26, Schedule II, M. P. Code. (iii) Confirmation of sale was made by the Sub-Divisional Officer before the expiry of the period prescribed under rule 32 of Schedule II, M. P. Code. (ii) Full auction money was not paid by the auction-purchaser as laid down in rule 26, Schedule II, M. P. Code. (iii) Confirmation of sale was made by the Sub-Divisional Officer before the expiry of the period prescribed under rule 32 of Schedule II, M. P. Code. In consequence, the learned Commissioner directed the re-sale of the plot according to law with the proviso that the whole of the purchase-money be refunded to the auction-purchaser, now the applicant before me. In regard to ground No. (i) raised before me, it appears that the learned counsel for the applicant laboured under some misconception of facts. The learned Commissioner in para. 2 of his order, has discussed the circumstances under which he thought fit to admit the revision although the same was technically time-barred. The discretion in this respect rests with the Court provided it does not abuse it. In the circumstances of the case, I do not see any reason to question the discretion of the learned Commissioner. This contention has, therefore, no force. In regard to the second ground, which relates to the powers of the Commissioner under section 46, Madhya Pradesh Code, it may be pointed out that the powers available to him under section 46 of the Code are very wide and he has committed no illegality in interfering with the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was the real and effective order pertaining to the disposal of the plot in dispute. Section 46 ibid does not limit the revisional powers of the Commissioner to an order passed by the Collector as contended by the learned counsel. In law, he can interfere in revision against any order passed by any revenue officer subordinate to him. The Sub-Divisional Officer being one such revenue officer there was no contravention of the provisions of section 46 ibid. Lastly in regard to the interpretation of the provisions of rule 33 of Schedule II, Madhya Pradesh Code, I am afraid the view taken by the learned counsel for the applicant is not correct. The said provision is as follows: 33. If no application under rule 29 is made within the time allowed there for, all claims on the grounds of irregularity or mistake shall be barred. The said provision is as follows: 33. If no application under rule 29 is made within the time allowed there for, all claims on the grounds of irregularity or mistake shall be barred. Rule 29 provides for an application to be made within 30 days from the date of sale by any person whose interests are affected by such sale to get the sale set aside on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the sale. The contention of the applicant before me as also before the lower Court has been that since the applicant (auction-purchaser) had made no application under the provisions of rule 29, referred to above, the remedy in revenue Courts had been exhausted and the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to interfere in revision. In this connection we might usefully refer to the decision of the Board in Champalal v. Muniabai 1953 N L J 585. In that case it was contended on behalf of the auction-purchaser that in the absence of an application under section 145 or 146 of the Land Revenue Act it was obligatory to confirm the sale and that the revenue officer had no other option under section 148 ibid. The procedure for sale of immovable property as laid down under sections 146 and 148 of the Land Revenue Act has, almost in terms, been adopted in rules 29 to 32 of Schedule II which prescribes the procedure for the sale of immovable property under the new Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. I use the word 'almost' because a new provision has been added in the Code which authorises the Deputy Commissioner to set aside the sale irrespective of the expiry of the period of 30 days and irrespective of the fact whether an application to set aside the sale on grounds of irregularity etc. was made or not. But for this proviso, the procedure for the sale of immovable property so far as it was contained in those two sections, viz., 145 and 148 of the Land Revenue Act has remained unchanged. Champalal's case, therefore, applies to the issue before us. was made or not. But for this proviso, the procedure for the sale of immovable property so far as it was contained in those two sections, viz., 145 and 148 of the Land Revenue Act has remained unchanged. Champalal's case, therefore, applies to the issue before us. In that case it was held that such sales were voidable i. e. sales that would become void only in the event of a successful application under section 145 or 146, but where the sale is void ab-initio i. e. where, in law, no sale has taken place, no question could arise of making an application to have it set aside. It was further held that 'the fact that the transferees (in that case) did not take steps to get the property mutated in their name could not operate against them in recovery proceedings'. In the same case it was also argued, just as has been done before me, that the only remedy to the non-applicants is by way of civil suit under para. 33 (2), Schedule II, Madhya Pradesh Code. The Board relied on the observations of the High Court in Wasudeo Ramchandra v. Namdeo 1950 NLJ 441 : A I R 1951 Nag. 155. which were to the following effect : The revenue officers concerned were charged with a duty to administer the Berar Land Revenue Code and sell the property of the defaulter in accordance with that law. The sale thus made would be a judicial sale though not a sale made by a Court. The Revenue officer can have no jurisdiction to sell the property of a person who does not figure as a defaulter in proceedings before him. Such a sale is a nullity and need not be set aside under section 157 (2) of the Code. Section 142 (2) of the Berar Code corresponds to section 149 (2) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, the latter, in turn, corresponding to rule 33, Schedule II of the Madhya Pradesh Code reproduced above. In the end, the Board observed that there was no reason that "an important principle laid down by the High Court bearing on proceedings for recovery of land revenue arrears should not be followed by revenue Courts and that the latter could only refer to the aggrieved party to a civil Court. That seems to be neither good law nor effective justice". That seems to be neither good law nor effective justice". I respectfully agree with the observations made in Champalal's case. It would be seen in the above context that there is no force in the contention that the learned Commissioner could not interfere in revision at the stage that he did and that the only course open to the non-applicants was to seek remedy in a civil Court. The only point that now remains to be considered is whether the learned Commissioner was justified in holding that the sale was not in accordance with the law. If the S3le was void ab initio it must be set aside irrespective of the fact whether an application to set it aside was or was not made by the applicant at any stage. The reasons which led the learned Commissioner to hold the sale illegal are fully discussed in his order and I fully share them. The learned counsel said nothing to take a view different from the learned Commissioner. As observed in Champalal's case-"revenue Courts have a special responsibility in seeing that sales are held strictly according to law. Because unlike in civil Courts, the Revenue officer has a dual capacity that of the Court executing the decree and also that of the representative of the 'decree-holder' (namely the State)". If the Sub-Divisional Officer had issued a prohibitory order in Form C and a proclamation in Form G the non-applicants or their predecessor-in-title would have been made aware of the action that was contemplated to be taken in regard to the plot in question. Rules framed under section 135 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code are mandatory and their contravention is fatal to the proceedings. Similarly, the failure on the part of the Sub-Divisional Officer to refrain from confirming the sale till the expiry of 30 days from the date of sale was in complete violation of rule 32, Schedule II, Madhya Pradesh Code. In fact, this failure prevented the opposite party from making an application to set aside the sale even if it had thought fit to do so. Thus, in short, there can be little doubt that the sale was void ab-initio and cannot be sustained. I, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Commissioner. The revision application is dismissed accordingly. Application dismissed.