JUDGMENT 1. This Second Appeal by the defendants arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiffs for recovery of arrears of rent from September, 1947, to October, 1949 in respect of certain premises in Calcutta. There is no dispute about the material facts which are as follows. The owner of the premises let it out to P. C. Sarkar as a monthly tenant who in his turn let it out to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs again let it out to the defendants at a monthly rent. After service on P. C. Sarkar of a notice to quit, the owner brought an ejectment suit against him and got a decree on 27.8.47 but it was only on 28.10.49 that he could get khas possession of the premises by evicting the tenant and all the subtenants. 2. The only point in controversy between the parties in the present suit is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover arrears of rent from the defendants for the period subsequent to the ejectment decree up to the date when defendants actually vacated the premises. Both the Courts below have held that the plaintiffs are so entitled and decreed the suit accordingly inasmuch as in their view the relationship of landlord and tenant during the period in suit subsisted between the parties. The contention on behalf of the defendants appellants is that the above view of the lower Courts is erroneous. It is argued on their behalf that since at leas; the date of the ejectment decree obtained by the owner of the premises against the lessee (P. C. Sarkar) there was an automatic extinction of the entire series of sub-leases dependent upon that lease with the necessary result that with effect from that date the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the plaintiffs and defendants also ceased to exist thereby disentitling the former from claiming any rent from the latter after that date. It is argued that after the ejectment decree the plaintiffs had no estate and there could, therefore, be no privity of estate or contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants from that date and the Courts below were wrong in holding to the contrary. That being the position, it is argued, the necessary consequence is that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any rent from the defendants for the period in suit. 3. That being the position, it is argued, the necessary consequence is that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any rent from the defendants for the period in suit. 3. It is no doubt true as a general proposition of law that a valid notice Ho quit determines not only the original demise but any under-lease which the tenant might have made. It follows that after the owner of the premises had served a notice to quit and obtained an ejectment decree against his tenant, the right not only of the present plaintiffs but also of the present defendants to remain on the suit premises come to an end. But the fact remains that even after the cessation of that right, the defendants continued to occupy the premises till 28. 10. 49, when khas possession was obtained by the owner decree-holder in execution of the ejectment decree obtained by him on 27.8.47. In the present case the light of the original lessee (viz. P. C. Sarkar) was terminated by the notice to quit and not by surrender so that it cannot be said that he had prejudiced the right of his sub-tenants by unilateral action on his part. The defendants have not acquired any title independently of their own landlords (viz. the plaintiffs) which they can set up against the latter. During the period in claim they did not quit against their will or surrender possession of the disputed premises in favour of the plaintiffs or any of the superior landlords nor did they offer to do so. A tenant in possession cannot even after the expiration of his lease deny his landlord's title without actually and openly surrendering possession tot him. The defendants sub-tenants did not attorn to the paramount title oil the owner thereby changing the title under which they were holding under the plaintiffs nor did they (i. e. the defendants) give notice to their landlords (viz. the plaintiffs) that they were claiming under a valid title nor did they claim that they had acquired a title adverse to their landlords. It is not the case that the defendants had been called upon to pay rent to the paramount title holder or any person holding a title superior to that of their own landlords (viz., the plaintiffs) for the period in suit. It is not the case that the defendants had been called upon to pay rent to the paramount title holder or any person holding a title superior to that of their own landlords (viz., the plaintiffs) for the period in suit. Till the defendants ultimately vacated the premises on 28.10.49, they apparently continued to enjoy the same benefits as before when they held under the plaintiffs prior to the ejectment decree and, as regards payment of rent to the plaintiffs for the period in suit, how did it concern the defendants that the title of the plaintiffs had ceased after the decree? 4. I am of opinion, therefore, that neither in law nor in equity the defendants can resist the claim of the plaintiffs for rent for the period in suit. On behalf of the respondents it was also argued that in view of the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1948 the definition of a tenant includes a person who continues in possession after the termination of tenancy in his favour and, therefore, so long as he continues in possession and it has not been recovered by the landlord from him he has an interest in the property which entitles him to realise rents from his sub-tenant up to the date of delivery of possession. The same principle, it was argued, would be applicable according to the Rent Control Act of 1950. In support of this contention reliance was placed upon certain recent decisions of this Court. So far as this contention is concerned, it will suffice to say that it is founded upon the definition of the term, tenant, according to Rent Control Acts and not for other Acts. The present suit is a money suit for rent governed by the Transfer of Property Act and, accordingly considerations based upon the peculiar definition of the term tenant in Rent Control Acts are out of place in the present suit. The defendants are not, however, entitled to succeed for reasons set forth already. The appeal is dismissed accordingly with costs.