JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J This is an appeal under Section 23 of the Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act corresponding to Clause 10 of Letters Patent from the decision of the single Bench (Mr. Justice B.K. Chaturvedi) dismissing Defendant's (ex-tenant's) appeal against a decree of eviction from land leased out by him from the Plaintiff-Respondent, for a non-agricultural purpose, that is, for building a factory. The latter had in his own turn filed a cross-appeal in regard to the profits and compensation, but there is no certificate or special appeal on his behalf. The questions for decision are, firstly whether the single Bench is correct in holding that this decree is not affected by the subsequently enacted Section 12 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Accommodation Control Act) (Act 15 of 1950 Smt. 2006); more precisely whether the word ''tenant" in that Act, should be understood to include an ex-tenant who had, even before the commencement of that Act become one by sufferance, who is no better than a trespasser. Secondly, whether and to what effect at all the Appellants can be heard in the Special Appeal to urge that in view of the operation of the Zamindari Abolition Act, the Plaintiff lessor, has ceased to be the landlord, and so has no interest in pursuing the litigation for eviction of the lessee from this land. It may be noted even here that the second ground definitely bars the Appellant from asking for the benefit of Section 12 of the said Act, even if it is otherwise available to him. Because, a tenant who denies the title of the landlord is to be deemed unwilling to pay rent to him, which, in any view of the matter, is an essential condition for the application of Section 12 of the said Act. Assuming that the claim on the first issue is not neutralised by the stand on the second, the Appellant is to a considerable extent supported by the F.B. decision of the M.B. High Court in Bhagwan Dass and Ram Chandra (1954 MBLJ 616). Assuming that the claim on the first issue is not neutralised by the stand on the second, the Appellant is to a considerable extent supported by the F.B. decision of the M.B. High Court in Bhagwan Dass and Ram Chandra (1954 MBLJ 616). The single Judge who has certified this special appeal was also on the Full Bench and while agreeing with his brothers in that case has expressly stated that the principles governing the Full Bench decision were not in his view applicable to the present case, which he bad disposed of earlier, and which in fact was the reason why another single Judge thought fit to make a reference to a Full Bench. We have not made a reference to another Full Bench because we assume that a F.B. decision of the now defunct M.B. High Court is persuasive, and is to be given due consideration, but is not binding, and it is open in appropriate cases for a Divisional Bench of the new Madhya Pradesh High Court to differ from it. This view is accepted by counsel on both sides in this appeal. Nor, do we question in any manner the applicability of that ruling following (Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Satya Niranjan Shaw and Anr. AIR 1928 PC 227) to cases where the ex-tenant's tenancy was terminated by lapse of the time or otherwise, after the commencement of the Act. The relevant facts are undisputed. There is a spacious plot of land within the Municipal area of Morena, belonging to the Plaintiff-Respondent and used by him as well as the Defendant for building purposes. Whether originally it was agricultural or abidi is purposely left open. There is insufficient material for this, and an answer is unnecessary for the decision of this case, and proceedings in this regard are likely between Government and the ex-Zamindar. Part of it, about 3 local bighas, was leased out to the Defendant for a 12 years term by a deed dated 30-2-1933, for the purpose of fitting tip an oil mill; there is no controversy about the location, area and the rent, or about the express provision that on the termination of the lease, the lessee should remove all the materials and leave the land in its original condition. The lease itself commenced on the 10th April of 1933 and was determined by lapse of time on the 10th April 1945. The lease itself commenced on the 10th April of 1933 and was determined by lapse of time on the 10th April 1945. In July 1944 itself the then landlords (that is the sons of Ladli Prasad the original lessor) noticed the lessee that they did not intend to extend the term of the lease and called upon him to vacate the land and take away all the materials in time. Another notice was served later on repeating the request and demanding delivery of possession. When this too failed a suit was filed on 9-2-1947 for eviction and for damages and compensation. It is to be remembered that on the determination of the lease, the lessee became a tenant by sufferance, one for all purposes equivalent to a trespasser, nor was there any law at that time which could possibly give him rights to stay, or to arrest for the time the remedies open to the lessor. On various grounds, the Defendant managed to drag on the suit, till it was disposed of by a decree against him on 21st Jan. 1950. From this he appealed to the High Court on 9-2-1950; on grounds, which could not include either of the two grounds of the present special appeal. On that date Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Act 15 of 1950) came into force. It defines 'tenant' in the same terms as is usual in such enactments of restriction. Tenant means a person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be, payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying this accommodation as a sub-tenant". Clearly the liability to pay rent being the essence of the definition, it excludes a trespasser or tenant by sufferance. On the other hand, the difficulty experienced by those giving effect to restrictive statutes has been that on a strict interpretation of this word 'tenant' the very purpose of the enactment might to a considerable extent fail. Clearly the liability to pay rent being the essence of the definition, it excludes a trespasser or tenant by sufferance. On the other hand, the difficulty experienced by those giving effect to restrictive statutes has been that on a strict interpretation of this word 'tenant' the very purpose of the enactment might to a considerable extent fail. The single Bench was of the view that Appellant was not a tenant for the purpose of this enactment, and, therefore, should not claim the benefit of Section 12 which runs thus: Except for one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 4 of this Act no decree would be passed by any Court in any proceeding (vad) pending before any Court at the commencement of this Act in connection with the ejectment of a tenant. Determination by lapse of time is not one of the grounds in Section 4. The appeal itself came up for hearing on 3-12-1953. Between the filing of the appeal in 1950 and the hearing, the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act (No. 13 of 1951) had come into force on the 2nd October 1951. On that date the counsel for the Appellant filed a petition that he wanted to raise additional grounds, the first based on Sthan Niyantran Vidhan and the second on the Zamindari Abolition Act. The first was certainly argued out and as already mentioned dealt with in the judgment. The second, however, was as expressly stated by the single Bench to have been given up by the counsel for the Appellant. So there is no discussion or even mention of this ground in the judgment; possibly counsel was guided by the incompatibility between the two grounds. The appeal was dismissed. Soon after this judgment on 4-1-1954, a similar case came up before another single Judge (Mr. Justice Dixit) who felt that the decision in the present case notwithstanding, the question was a complicated one and that there should be an authoritative decision, as to whether the word 'tenant' in the definition of Sthan Niyantran Vidhan should not be given a special meaning so as not to nullify the obvious purpose of the enactment. Justice Dixit) who felt that the decision in the present case notwithstanding, the question was a complicated one and that there should be an authoritative decision, as to whether the word 'tenant' in the definition of Sthan Niyantran Vidhan should not be given a special meaning so as not to nullify the obvious purpose of the enactment. This led to a Full Bench ruling in which the 3 Judges have each recorded a separate judgment coming to the same conclusion but on different grounds; the single Judge who disposed of this appeal, making it clear at the same time, that this was not comparable to the case before the Full Bench. As was expected the Defendant applied for certificate, which was granted by the single Judge with reference to Section 12 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. As for the ground based on the Zamindari Abolition Act the single Judge remarks "the question of Zamindari Abolition was never pressed in argument by Mr. B.D. Gupta before me and a decision was given by him on those points that were argued." To be sure the same counsel Shri B.D. Gupta has now urged that he did argue about the Zamindari Abolition Act, and the single Judge has committed a mistake in recollection. We have allowed the argument on the basis of the Zamindari Abolition Act, which in the sheer absence of factual material has been rather vague and inconclusive. On the main ground the question is whether we could apply what I should call the majority view (i.e. of Dixit J. and Shinde C.J.) in the Full Bench ruling in regard to the applicability to this case of Section 12 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. I say "majority view" because Mr. Justice Chaturvedi has quite precisely recorded that what he was saying in regard to that case, had no application and could have had no application to the present one. This point has been argued with considerable learning and citations before us, but the real problem is comparatively simple. If one interprets the word "tenant" strictly then a trespasser or tenant by sufferance will not get the benefit of the restrictive enactment. In practice, the persons who would seek the benefit of the enactment would most often be exactly this class of ex-tenants. If one interprets the word "tenant" strictly then a trespasser or tenant by sufferance will not get the benefit of the restrictive enactment. In practice, the persons who would seek the benefit of the enactment would most often be exactly this class of ex-tenants. If the landlord is prepared to continue the relationship or if the ex-tenant is willing to walk out without argument or resistence, there would arise no occasion for the application of the enactment, and the arrest by statute of the landlord's enforcement of the remedy of ejectment. On the other hand, if every ex-tenant whenever his tenancy might have been determined by lapse of time, is allowed the benefit of an extended or liberalised interpretation of the term then, even those, who had already become trespassers or tenants by sufferance before the commencement of the Act, would defy the landlord and may not be evicted. In other words, we would not only be doing violence to the literal meaning of the provisions just that the statute may serve a wide purpose, but so applying the liberalised or extended interpretation would be given a double retrospective effect; i.e. the first that the law could apply to tenancies created before its commencement but determined afterwards; and the second it would apply to those both created and determined even before its commencement, where the ex-ten ant has managed to squat in defiance of the landlord, till the new law commenced. I have studied all the 3 separate, and substantially concurrent judgments, and I find that what weighed with the Full Bench was the principle laid down in A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 227; which in its turn adapted it from 1921 K.B. 49. In the latter there is considerable discussion about the drafting of the statute concerned, but we can properly adapt the dictum, that a key definition may be widely interpreted (in violation of strict meaning), if that is necessary to enable the statute to work. The Privy Council ruling, however is more directly binding. In the Full Bench case, the Chief Justice of Madhya Bharat has in the end of his separate judgment observed: When a person remains in possession after the determination of the tenancy, by efflux of time, by the operation of Section 11 or Section 12 of the Sthan Niyantrana Vidhan, he is neither a trespasser nor a licensee. In the Full Bench case, the Chief Justice of Madhya Bharat has in the end of his separate judgment observed: When a person remains in possession after the determination of the tenancy, by efflux of time, by the operation of Section 11 or Section 12 of the Sthan Niyantrana Vidhan, he is neither a trespasser nor a licensee. He continues in possession of the accommodation by the operation of the Statute. As rent is payable by him he becomes a tenant even in the absence of an express or implied contract of tenancy as contemplated by the definition of the word "tenant". I have quoted this passage because this goes very near but unfortunately not quite to the crux of the question. This implies that on the date on which the ex-tenant becomes a trespasser or tenant by sufferance, there is a law in operation enabling him to continue in possession. The essential requirement is found only when he reaches this stage at any time after commencement of the law. But if it was determined before its commencement, then at the time of the determination of his tenancy no statute would be operative to enable him to continue in possession, the dissent of the landlord notwithstanding. If the Full Bench ruling was in regard to tenant whose tenancy was determined by efflux of time after the commencement of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, it would have conformed to the test laid down in the quotation from the judgment of the Chief Justice. But it does appear that the Bench lost sight of the fact, that in that case the tenancy was really determined in 1942. In such a case, there will also be no necessity for an enlarged interpretation in violation of the strict meaning of the words simply that the statute may serve its purpose. In the King's Bench judgment a tenant has been described as "one who by virtue of the provisions of the Act retains possession of any dwelling house to which this Act applies." This certainly meant that it was intended that some provision of the Act should entitle the tenant to retain possession, at the moment the tenancy actually terminated. Actually, there seems to have been some dispute about the date of the termination of the tenancy, and there was a view that it was one week before the commencement of the Act. Actually, there seems to have been some dispute about the date of the termination of the tenancy, and there was a view that it was one week before the commencement of the Act. At the same time, the actual wording of the statutory definition has been criticised. For our purposes a study of the P.C. decision is more directly to the point. The statute concerned was the Calcutta Rent Act of 1920, the ex-tenant had come on the premises in October 1920, which is not of much significance, and ceased to be tenant properly so called 3 years later; in other words well after the commencement of the Act. In the judgment it was laid down, that the purpose of the Act would be frustrated if one interpreted the word "tenant" strictly. In fact, they quoted the King's Bench Division Ruling. "If the tenant by agreement whose tenancy has expired was not within the definition, the whole purpose of the Act would have been defeated." The point to note is that the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920, was made to give protection to an ex-tenant, who but for its operation would have become a trespasser or tenant by sufferance. It is on this basis that it was considered proper by the P.C. to give a special meaning to the term tenant wider than the literal content of the definition. It would be unsafe to go much farther and to give the benefit of the extended definition to an ex-tenant, who had even before the commencement of the Act become a trespasser or tenant at sufferance. To do so would be to enable the Act to place the trespasser back into legal possession, and to make it legal during a term in which the Act itself did not operate. For these reasons I would hold that the extended interpretation of the word "tenant" for the purposes of the Vidhan should cover only those whose tenancy was determined after its commencement but not earlier. The second ground can be considered only on the basis that the landlord's right to receive rent is itself denied. It is derived from Section 4 of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act under which: Save as otherwise provided in the Act all rights and interests of the landlord should vest in the Government. The second ground can be considered only on the basis that the landlord's right to receive rent is itself denied. It is derived from Section 4 of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act under which: Save as otherwise provided in the Act all rights and interests of the landlord should vest in the Government. The argument is that from the commencement of this Act that is 2-10-1951 the Plaintiff-decree-holder has ceased to be the lessor or landlord, and that right has vested in the Government. Since the State has not pursued the litigation it is contended that his appeal should be allowed. The argument is unacceptable for more than one reason. We do not have any factual evidence as to what class of land we are concerned with or as to whether this land comes under Section 5 or Section 6 of the Act. There is also a special provision under Section 39 of the Act under which any person who has taken land on lease from the proprietor for a non-agricultural purpose should apply within 6 months from the date of vesting for a new lease. The Defendant admits that he has not applied for a new lease under the Government; it is of course too late now. In other words, he has not become, not even sought to become the lessee of the Government. Still he is asserting that the right to receive rent has vested in the Government, and the Plaintiff has lost it; he cannot be heard to say this when he has not sought to become the lessee of the Government. This is a matter between the Plaintiff and the state, whether he succeeds in retaining this land or is compelled to make it over to Government. Mr. Kak appearing for the Plaintiff says that proceedings are pending between him and Government in this regard. As far as the Appellant is concerned, he has in the absence of an application under Section 39 of the Act, chosen to stand or sink with the person from whom he took the lease. Obviously, this is why this ground was mentioned late, not pressed in argument, and again sought to be revived solely as a device to enable the tenant to stay on after the decrees of the two Courts ordering his ejectment. Obviously, this is why this ground was mentioned late, not pressed in argument, and again sought to be revived solely as a device to enable the tenant to stay on after the decrees of the two Courts ordering his ejectment. Whether or not the Government will be justified in taking over this land also from the Plaintiff-landlord will depend on the applicability of Sections 5 and 6 of the Acts which at this stage it is unnecessary to answer in this case. In the result, the judgment of the single Bench is upheld and the special appeal dismissed. Costs payable by Defendant-Appellant on minimum contested scale. A.H. Khan, J. In the main the question for determination in this appeal is whether the Defendant-Appellant can be evicted from the premises or not? The Plaintiff had leased out his land to the Defendant on 30-2-1933 for 12 years. The relevant term of the lease with which we are concerned is that after the efflux of the period of 12 years, the lessee would remove all his material from the land and hand it back to the lessor in the condition in which he received it. The fact is admitted that the lease came to an end on 10th April 1945. Before the termination of the lease, the lessor had served a notice on the lessee, requiring him to vacate the premises on the determination of the lease. But the Defendant did not give up the possession, hence this suit was filed for eviction and recovery of damages for use and occupation. The Plaintiff's suit was decreed on January 21, 1950. The Defendant filed an appeal before the High Court on 9-2-50 and the learned single Judge of the Madhya Bharat High Court upheld the decision of the trial Court. After obtaining leave, the Defendant has filed this appeal under Section 23 of the Madhya Bharat High Court Act, which approximates to Letters Patent Appeal. The contention of the Defendant-Appellant raised for the first time in the appeal is that in view of Section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Act No. 15 of 1950) which is like Rent Control Act in other States, he is entitled to retain possession and cannot be evicted. The contention of the Defendant-Appellant raised for the first time in the appeal is that in view of Section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Act No. 15 of 1950) which is like Rent Control Act in other States, he is entitled to retain possession and cannot be evicted. There is no doubt that Section 4 of the Act protects the tenants and according to it a tenant is liable to be evicted not on the termination of his lease, but on the grounds mentioned in the section. The simple question, which the ingenuity of the laywers has made it look extremely complex, is whether the Act gives him the protection which he seeks. From the facts stated above, it would appear that the lease in question was admittedly determined on 30th April 1945. But in spite of a notice by the lessor, the lessee retained possession. In these circumstances the Defendant became what is known in English Law a tenant at sufferance i.e. a person who acquired possession under a lawful title, but continued in possession after the title to remain in possession had come to an end and this continued possession was against the consent of the landlord. In other words he was a person whose possession was rightful in its inception, but wrongful in its continuation after the determination of the lease. Such a man has been described by various names. In Deo d. Patrick v. Beaufort (Duke) (1851) 6 Exch. 498 a tenant who holds over against the landlord's consent has been treated as a trespasser. At other places, he has been described as a person not better than a trespasser. But the fact to be remembered is that a tenancy at sufferance does not create, nor for the matter of that maintains the relationship of landlord and tenant, because a person holding against his landlord's consent after the termination of the lease is a trespasser and like a trespasser he is not entitled to notice to quit, (See I.L.R. 24 Bom 504 : 3 IC 566 ). This being the position of law at the time when the present tenancy came to an end in 1945, the Defendant holding over was no better than a trespasser and no relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. This being the position of law at the time when the present tenancy came to an end in 1945, the Defendant holding over was no better than a trespasser and no relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Now about 5 years after this position (when there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties) the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (Act No. 15 of 1950) on which the Defendant now takes his stand, came into force. This Act undoubtedly protected a tenant from ejectment on the termination of the lease and the tenant could only be evicted on the grounds mentioned in Section 4 of the Act. But was the Defendant at the time when the Act made its appearance a "tenant"? Because the Act protected a tenant and tenant only. I have discussed the point earlier that the Defendant in 1945, after the termination of the lease ceased to be tenant, and was a mere trespasser, between whom and the Plaintiff there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. Thus it is clear that Act of 1950, whose protection the Defendant seeks, does not protect him, because at the time of its coming into force he was not a tenant. It would have been quite different if his tenancy had come to an end after the Act came into force. But as it is, the present case does not attract the application of Section 4 of the Act. Mr. Bliagwan Das Gupta learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant has tried to befog the issue by referring to Section 12 of the Act and contending that the Act is retrospective in its scope. But the fallacy in the argument is again too obvious. The Act protects tenants against whom a decree of eviction is sought. But here again it is a "tenant" who is protected. The Defendant is a trespasser and the decree of eviction is not against a tenant but against a person no better than a trespasser. In the course of the argument, I asked the learned Counsel whether the Act applied to a case if during its existence, a person took possession of a house against the consent of a landlord. His answer was in the negative. But why? Because he would be a trespasser. In the course of the argument, I asked the learned Counsel whether the Act applied to a case if during its existence, a person took possession of a house against the consent of a landlord. His answer was in the negative. But why? Because he would be a trespasser. On analysing this answer, it is clear that even during the continuance of the Act, a trespasser has no protection and there is no doubt that the Act is not designed to help trespassers. During the preparation of this judgment, Mr. Bhagwan Das Gupta placed before us a decision of the Supreme Court published in the October issue of the A.I.R. (A.I.R. 1958 S.C.789) and contended that it throws light on the appeal before us. But I am afraid it does not help the Appellant. If anything it supports the view I have taken. The short facts of the Supreme Court case are that a registered lease expired on May 22, 1948. But before its expiration, the Bombay Control Act (Act No. 57 of 1947) came into force. In this connection their Lordships observed that the period of lease having expired and the Respondent having being given notice to quit, the Respondent was bound to vacate the demised premises unless he was protected by provisions of Act No. 57 of 1947. In this case their Lordships held that because the lease terminated after the coming into force of the Act of 1947, the lessee became a statutory tenant and was therefore protected from eviction. But in the case before us, the lease terminated 5 years before the Act No. 15 of 1950, whose protection the Defendant seeks. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court granted protection when the lease terminated after coming of the Rent Control Act. From this it follows that where the lease expired first and the Control Act came into being afterwards, the Defendant is not entitled to any protection. The Defendant cannot by any stretch of imagination be called a statutory tenant and therefore the statute (Act No. 15 of 1950) does not afford him any protection. I, therefore, hold that because on the termination of the lease in 1945 the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased to exist between the parties, the Defendant five years after the termination of the lease, cannot resurrect that relationship and being a trespasser, the Defendant is liable to be evicted. I, therefore, hold that because on the termination of the lease in 1945 the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased to exist between the parties, the Defendant five years after the termination of the lease, cannot resurrect that relationship and being a trespasser, the Defendant is liable to be evicted. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.