ORDER M. Hidayatullah, C.J. In this appeal, the Appellant Jasani impugns an order passed by Choudhari J. in Miscellaneous Petition No. 250 of 1956 on 26th September 1957. The facts of the case are as follows: The Appellant Jasani was a Lighting Inspector in the employ of the Corporation of the City of Jabalpur. It is admitted that he was at the time of the enquiry made against him a probationer. By an order passed by the Chief Executive Officer his services were terminated. He filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue, which took a different view of the matter and reversed the decision of the Chief Executive Officer. In deciding the case the Board of Revenue did not pass any order reinstating the Appellant but remanded the case for disposal after fresh enquiry on the lines indicated by the President. When the appeal was taken by Jasani to the Board of Revenue a preliminary objection was raised by non-applicant No. 1 that the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Board of Revenue pointed out that by Notification No. 2434-4153-M-XIII of the 29th May 1951 the powers of the State Government under Section 415(3) of the City of Jabalpur Corporation Act, 1948 (hereinafter the Act) were delegated to the Board of Revenue. In so far as Section 415(3) is concerned, the Board of Revenue could hear appeals contemplated under that Sub-section. The point raised before the Board of Revenue--which was rejected and was once again raised before the learned single Judge, who accepted it--was that the Corporation not having framed bye-laws under Section 443, Sub-section (3)(c) of the Act, the rules framed under Section 25(6) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act would apply to the case. Under the latter rules, a right of appeal is barred against an order of removal of a servant of the municipality who is a probationer. If the rules applied, there is no doubt whatever that the right of appeal would be taken away. Under Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, rules and bye-laws framed under the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act are preserved unless they are inconsistent with the Act. If the rules applied, there is no doubt whatever that the right of appeal would be taken away. Under Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, rules and bye-laws framed under the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act are preserved unless they are inconsistent with the Act. The contention of the Appellant is--and was before the learned single Judge--that the rules framed under Section 25(6) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act cannot be read in this context because they are inconsistent with Section 415(3) of the Act, We are of opinion that if a right of appeal was conferred by the Act it could not be taken away by a side wind such as is suggested. The rules framed cannot override the Act, and a right of appeal if given by the Act cannot be negatived by any rules made by either the municipality or the Corporation. Section 415 deals with different types of appeal. Some appeals are within the Corporation itself and some are against the orders of the Chief Executive Officer and lie to the State Government. It is clear that under Section 443, Sub-section (3)(c), rules and bye-laws can be made to control the right of appeal within the Corporation itself, but the Corporation can have no say in the matter of an appeal to an outside tribunal such as the State Government under the third Sub-section of Section 415. In our opinion, Section 415(3) is inconsistent with the rules framed under Section 25(6) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act and vice versa, and the rules cannot be read to abrogate the right of appeal granted by Section 415(3) of the Act. It is contended by Shri Dabir on behalf of the Corporation that the right of appeal contemplated by that section is against orders made under the Act for purposes other than the regulation of service of Corporation employees. We do not agree. The words of the third sub-section of Section 415 of the Act are extremely general, and we find ourselves in entire agreement with what the President of the Board of Revenue has stated on the point. We accordingly hold that the order of the learned single Judge--with all due respect--was incorrect and the order of the Board of Revenue holding that there was a right of appeal to the Board was quite proper and correct in the circumstances. We accordingly hold that the order of the learned single Judge--with all due respect--was incorrect and the order of the Board of Revenue holding that there was a right of appeal to the Board was quite proper and correct in the circumstances. The result, therefore, is that the order of the learned single Judge is set aside with costs and the order of the Board of Revenue is reinstated. Counsel's fee Rs.50. Security deposit shall be refunded to the Appellant.