JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - In this case much to my regret I have to dismiss the writ petition for reasons which I will shortly explain. 2. The applicant was a tenant of house No. 7 Murlidhar Quarters, since 1943 up till the 13th February, 1957, when he was evicted by force under the provisions of Sec. 7-A (3) of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 3. The applicant is an employee in the Defence Department and on the 24th February 1955, he was transferred from Lucknow to Panagar, district Burdwan, West Bengal. It appears from his affidavit, which to my mind sets out the facts truthfully, that he left his family, children and his mother and household goods in the house. The members of the family used from time to time to go to Panagar, but it is apparent that they were still residing when not in Panagar in the house in question in Lucknow. When the applicant was ejected under Sec. 7-A (3) of the aforesaid Act, a list of articles on the premises was drawn up and these article were put in the possession of a supurdar. A perusal of that list will clearly show that essential articles of furniture etc., which are necessary for a person who is in occupation of an accommodation, were found on the premises, so much so that even condiments which are used in cooking were found. Such condiments one knows, are liable to get bad if they are stored and are normally bought in small quantities for daily use. This is well known. The circumstances under which the applicant was ejected by force are that a representation was made to the Rent Control authority that the accommodation in the possession of the applicant was vacant. Thereupon an allotment order was made by the Rent Control authority in favour of one Sri Ram Adhar Misra. After the allotment order a notice was sent under the provisions of Sec. 7-A (1) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act to the applicant to appear and to satisfy the District Magistrate that the order of allotment was not duly passed and that he was entitled to remain in possession of the accommodation. The said notice in two days required the applicant to "show cause". The notice was actually served on the applicant on the 12th February, 1957. The said notice in two days required the applicant to "show cause". The notice was actually served on the applicant on the 12th February, 1957. The applicant sent a wire on that date requesting the Rent Control authority to withhold proceedings and intimating that his family was reaching Lucknow immediately. The Rent Control authority after receiving the telegram passed an order on the 15th February, 1957, which runs as follows:- "Whereas your telegram dated the 12-2-1957 has been considered and rejected as you have once vacated the house cannot reoccupy it. You can remove your locks from the house and deliver its possession to the allottee Sri Ram Adhar Misra, under Sec. 7-A (2) of the Act within 24 hours of the receipt of this notice failing which the allottee will be put in possession of the same by such force as is considered necessary." 4. Then on the 20th February, 1957 the Deputy Superintendent of Police (City) was directed to enforce the aforesaid order in the manner provided by Sec. 7-A (3) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. From the facts narrated hereinbefore it will appear that two day's time was granted from the receipt of the notice under Sec. 7-A (1) to "show cause" to a person who was residing in another province. The "show cause notice," which is annexure C to the affidavit of the applicant, has clearly stated that the reply "if any should reach this office within two days of the receipt" of the notice "failing which further action will follow." It will be seen that the notice is addressed to the applicant at Panagar. Therefore, knowing full well that the applicant was in another province, the Rent Control authority, nonetheless, gave only two days' time to the applicant to "show cause". The applicant did the best he could under the circumstances and sent a telegram dated the 12th February, 1957. The substance of that telegram has been set out in paragraph 14 of the applicant's affidavit, though the telegram has not been filed. 5. The question which arises is whether in giving such a short notice the Rent Control authority carried out the spirit of Sec. 7-A (1) of the Act. Surely when a person is to be given an opportunity to "show cause" sufficient time should be given to him to enable him to effectually "show cause". 5. The question which arises is whether in giving such a short notice the Rent Control authority carried out the spirit of Sec. 7-A (1) of the Act. Surely when a person is to be given an opportunity to "show cause" sufficient time should be given to him to enable him to effectually "show cause". Merely the letter of the law should not be followed in every case but the spirit underlying the enactment should be kept in view. In any case, I think when the legislature under Sec. 7-A (1) of the Act directs a notice to show cause should be issued, then it clearly means that sufficient notice should be given in order to enable an effective representation to be made. I would, therefore, have felt it my duty to set aside the impugned order of allotment passed by the Rent Control authority and to direct that a date should be fixed when the case of the allottee and of the applicant should be considered after both of them had been given an opportunity to satisfy the Rent Control authority in regard to the merits of their respective case. That the Rent Control authority can, of its own motion, recall a previous allotment order has been laid down by a Bench of this Court in the case of Suraj Narain v. The District Magistrate, Kanpur 1958 A.L.J. R. 283 Therefore the Court can set aside the present allotment order and direct the Rent Control authority to consider the question of allotment afresh. But I am faced with one difficulty. Even though there is the power in the Rent Control authority to recall a previous allotment order, there is no power given under the Act to remove a previous allottee who has been already put in possession. There is no provision in the Act that the old allottee can by force be removed and the new allottee put in. The only power to use force is under Sec. 7-A (3) as against a person who is occupying accommodation in contravention of the provisions of the Act. If a person occupies accommodation under an allotment order passed under the Act, it cannot be said that he is occupying the accommodation in contravention of any provisions of the Act. The only power to use force is under Sec. 7-A (3) as against a person who is occupying accommodation in contravention of the provisions of the Act. If a person occupies accommodation under an allotment order passed under the Act, it cannot be said that he is occupying the accommodation in contravention of any provisions of the Act. In my view, a fresh order of allotment, after cancelling the previous order which the Rent Control authority passes, is not an order which is enforcible by the Rent Control authority either under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Code of Criminal Procedure nor is it an order which can be enforced under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Therefore, though the power to cancel a previous allotment may be there, the power to put a new allottee into possession, after removing the old allottee, is not there. The existence or non-existence of this power in the Rent Control authority was not directly in issue in Suraj Narain's case cited above. It is true that in that case the new allottee had been put in possession after the first allotment was recalled, but the point in controversy in the case simply was whether the Rent Control authority had power to recall the previous allotment order: the point in the case was not, as to what was the mode of removing the previous allottee who had obtained an order of allotment. No doubt, a loose phrase has been used that the Rent Control authority has the power to set matters right". It is well settled that every case is an authority for the proposition that it lays down, and inasmuch as no direct preposition of law has been laid down in regard to the power of the Rent Control authority to evict an allottee put in possession whose allotment has later been cancelled, I do not consider that Suraj Narain's, case covers the point which I am discussing and which is in issue before me. Under the circumstances, even if I allow the writ application, there would be no machinery to enforce the Rent Control authority's order should it now be in favour of the petitioner. In the totality I dismiss the writ petition but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.