Ramaswami, J.- This is an appeal against the conviction and sentence by the learned Sessions Judge of Coimbatore in Sessions Case No. 179 of 1957. The facts are: The deceased Subbana Goundan and P.Ws. 1 and 7 are related. The deceased, P.W. 1 (brother of the deceased), P.W. 9 and others lived in the same locality in Karupparayanpalayam. The accused Chinnavalayan belonging to a different community lived by the side of the house of the deceased. P.W. 2 is the concubine of the deceased. The house of P.W. 7 is to the east of the house of the deceased. P.W. 8 is the wife of Marudayya Goundan whose house is shown as ‘D’ in the rough sketch prepared by the Sub-Inspector and he is the next door neighbour of the deceased. P.W. 9, Nanjappa Goundan, lives in the house marked as ‘E’ in the rough sketch in the opposite row of the deceased’s house, as can be seen from the rough sketch. His house is practically opposite to that of P.W. 8. P.W. 10 is a resident of Kalapatti and at the material time was working in Karupparayanpalayam along with the deceased. On the night of the occurrence he was sleeping in the house of the deceased. P.W. 11, Velappa Goundan, is the brother of the deceased and is residing in the Pillayar Koil shown as ‘F’ in the rough sketch and east of deceased’s house. He is attached to that temple as Poojari. It is brought out in the evidence in this case that in this locality there was brewing of illicit arrack and consumption of the same. In this State, where prohibition has brought great blessings, in its wake, it has also brought animosities over the preparation and consumption of bootlegging liquor. The favourite pastime of these people is to tip off the Police or the prohibition staff against each other, bringing about consequent ill-feelings. This case is an illustration. On the night of 2nd October, 1957, one Subbayan was playing harmonium in the house of the deceased Subbana Goundan. To hear that, P.Ws. 1 and 7 had come there. P. W. 10 was sleeping in the house of the deceased after taking food. Subbayyan stopped playing harmonium by about 9-30 p.m. P. Ws. 1 and 7 and the deceased continued chatting till late in the night. To hear that, P.Ws. 1 and 7 had come there. P. W. 10 was sleeping in the house of the deceased after taking food. Subbayyan stopped playing harmonium by about 9-30 p.m. P. Ws. 1 and 7 and the deceased continued chatting till late in the night. It is in P.W. 2’s evidence that about 10 p.m. the deceased along with P.W. 10 returned with two brass-vessels M.O. 1 series and a mud-pot with arrack and P.W. 10 had told her that they had taken them from the pallam or depression where the accused was preparing the arrack. P.Ws. 1 and 7 tell us that while they and Marudayya Goundan were talking in P.W. 1’s house, the deceased told them that he had brought from the pallam brass-vessels M.O. 1 series and the arrack prepared by the accused and asked P.Ws. 1 and 7 to come with him and have a drink. P. W. 1 refused. P.W. 7 after refusing went with the deceased and had a drink. Then we do not know what happened. The next piece of evidence regarding the movements of the deceased and the accused begins with 2 a.m. P.W. 8 testifies that after chatting for some time with P.Ws. 1 and 7 she went to sleep in P.W. 1’s house. She had a young child which seems to have awakened at about that time and therefore she was soothing that child to go to sleep. Then she heard a cry of “ayyo” and opened the door and came out and saw the accused running eastwards by the side of her house with an iron-rod in his hand about 2 feet long chased by P.W. 7 who shouted “Chinna is running. You also come”. This witness impressed the learned and experienced Sessions Judge as a trustworthy witness. She swears that she saw the accused running with an iron-rod chased by P.W. 7 and followed by P.W. 1. P.Ws. 1 and 7 tell us that on hearing the noise of beating which was followed by the cry of “ayyo” of the deceased, P.W. 7 ran put of P.W. 1’s house through the western entrance and saw at the north-western corner of P.W. 1’s house in the open space the accused hitting the deceased with a crow-bar. Seeing P.W. 7 the accused ran away towards east. He chased the accused. Seeing P.W. 7 the accused ran away towards east. He chased the accused. P.W. 1 who also on hearing the cry came out of his house through the eastern entrance and saw the accused being chased by P.W. 7. P.W. 7 called out P.W. 1 “come on with me”. Both of them chased the accused and the accused hid himself in a cholam-field just east of the Vinayagar Koil which is about a furlong from the house of P.W. 1. This galatta woke up Palaniammal and when she came out she saw the deceased lying with blood over his body and mouth. She then went and fetched P.W. 11 from the Pillayar Koil. P.W. 11 came and saw his brother lying with injuries and unconscious in the open space east of the deceased’s house and north-west of P.W. 1’s house. There is no evidence to show that before leaving the place P.W. 11 met P.Ws. 1, 7 and 8. P.W. 11 removed his brother in a jutka to the Peelamedu Police Station and gave the report Exhibit P-6 in which naturally not being an eye-witness and not having contacted P.Ws. 1, 7 and 8, he had to say that he did not know who the assailant Was. The injured man was removed from Peelamedu Police Station to the Hospital where he died at 2. p.m. on 2nd October, 1957. In this connection it will also be remembered that the first information report given by P.W. 11 shows that he expected his brother to give information to the Police and did not expect him to die, though at that juncture he was not in a condition to give information. The information given at the Police Station was registered by the Head Constable as first information report in Grime No. 410 of 1957 on 2nd October, 1957, at 7 a.m. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Sri Narayanan Nair, P.W. 14, proceeded to the Hospital on coming to know that the injured person had been sent to the Government Head Quarters Hospital at Coimbatore, and enquired P.Ws. 2 and 11 at the Hospital. He then proceeded to the scene of occurrence. He recovered on the pathway two teeth M.O. 2, some blood-stained earth M.O. 3 and some bloodstained stones M.O. 4. From the house of the deceased he recovered some blood-stained earth and other articles. 2 and 11 at the Hospital. He then proceeded to the scene of occurrence. He recovered on the pathway two teeth M.O. 2, some blood-stained earth M.O. 3 and some bloodstained stones M.O. 4. From the house of the deceased he recovered some blood-stained earth and other articles. He prepared a rough plan of the scene of occurrence Exhibit P-12. It was elicited from him that the distance between the western entrance of P.W. 1’s house and the north-western corner of P.W. 1’s house may be 30 feet and the length of the northern Wall of P.W. 1’s house is 40 to 45 feet. This would show that P.W. 7 could have run and seen the accused actually hitting the deceased. P.W. 13, the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, Coimbatore, on receipt of intimation that the deceased died in the Hospital proceeded there and held the inquest at 7-30 p.m. on 2nd October, 1957. The autopsy was held by P.W. 4. The autopsy showed that the injuries on the deceased would have been caused by a crow-bar or a heavy stick at the time mentioned by the prosecution. The Doctor found as many as 16 external injuries. The Doctor denied the suggestion put to him in cross-examination that the injuries could have been caused by a lightweight bamboo. The case for the accused was an alibi, viz., that he was absconding from the village for about 15 days prior to the occurrence, since there was a summons issued to him in a prohibition case and in support of which he produced two documents. One is stated to be a true copy of the charge-sheet No. 322 of 1957, dated 17th September, 1957, filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Peelamedu, against the accused and the other is said to be a true copy of a Mahazar, dated 17th September, 1957, for seizure of some bottles of arrack. These documents did not in any way help the accused because as pertinently pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge “ the mere fact that a charge-sheet has been filed will not show that the accused would have absconded” . It was a petty charge-sheet and a bootlegger like the accused would not have anticipated such a frightful punishment as to scare him away from the village. It was a petty charge-sheet and a bootlegger like the accused would not have anticipated such a frightful punishment as to scare him away from the village. Before entering into a discussion of the evidence one point of law which was urged before the lower Court and negatived by the learned Sessions Judge deserves more than a passing consideration on account of it arising frequently in sessions cases. It was urged before the learned Sessions Judge that the evidence of P.Ws. I and 7 referred to above, viz., that the deceased told them that he had brought the vessels and arrack of the accused from the pallam a little earlier to his murder, was inadmissible as it did not fulfil the requirements of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. The expression "circumstances of the transaction" occurring in section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act has been a source of endless perplexity to Courts faced with questions as to what matters are admissible within the meaning of that expression. The decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Pakala Narayanaswami. v. Emperor1, sets out the limits of the matters that could legitimately bo brought within the purview of that expression. Unfortunately, however, as is the case with the decision of their Lordships in Kotayya v. Emperor2, with reference to the information admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act, so is it with this decision under section 32 (1) of the said Act, in that difficulties arise from the contention often raised before us as to what their Lordships meant to say or did not mean to say. Lord Atkin who delivered the judgment of the Board has, however, made it abundantly clear that, except in special circumstances, no circumstance could be a circumstance of the transaction if it is not confined to, either the time actually occupied by the transaction resulting in death, or the scene in which the actual transaction resulting in death took place. The special circumstance permitted to transgress the time factor is, for example, a case of prolonged poisoning, while the special circumstance permitted to transgress the distance factor is, for example, a case of decoying with intent to murder. The special circumstance permitted to transgress the time factor is, for example, a case of prolonged poisoning, while the special circumstance permitted to transgress the distance factor is, for example, a case of decoying with intent to murder. This is because the natural meaning of the words, according to their Lordships, do not convey any of the limitations such as (1) that the statement must be made after the transaction has taken place, (2) that the person making it must be at any rate near death, (3) that the circumstances can only include acts done when and where the death was caused. But the circumstances must be circumstances of the transaction and they must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence. The following facts and extracts from the judgment of their Lordships amply bear out the foregoing observations and show that there need be no doubts as to the limits of the matters admissible under section 32 (1): The question was whether the statement of the widow of the deceased, that on a certain day (a couple of days prior to murder) the deceased had told her that he was going to town B as the accused’s wife had written and told him to go and receive payment of his dues, was admissible under section 32 (1). Their Lordships observed: "The statement may be made before the cause of death has arisen, or before the deceased has any reason to anticipate being killed. The circumstances must be circumstances of the transaction; general expressions indicating fear or suspicion, whether of a particular individual or otherwise not directly related to the occasion of the death, will not be admissible. But statements made by the deceased that he was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact killed, or as to his reasons for so proceeding, or tthat he was going to meet a particular person, or that he had been invited by such person to meet him, would each of them be circumstances of the transaction, and would be so whether the person was unknown or was not the person accused. Such a statement might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused. ‘Circumstances of the transaction’ is a phrase no doubt that conveys some limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in ‘circumstantial evidence’ which includes evidence of all relevant facts. Such a statement might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused. ‘Circumstances of the transaction’ is a phrase no doubt that conveys some limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in ‘circumstantial evidence’ which includes evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the other hand narrower than ‘res gestae ‘Circumstances must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence, though, as for instance in a case of prolonged poisoning they may be related to dates at a considerable distance from the date of actual fatal dose. It will be observed that ‘the circumstances’ are of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant. It is not necessary that there should be a known transaction other than that the death of the declarant has ultimately been caused, for the condition of the admissibility of the evidence is that ‘the cause of (the declarant’s) death comes into question’. In the present case the cause of the declarant’s death comes into question. The transaction is one in which the deceased was murdered on one of two successive days next following his statement in question; and his body was found in a trunk proved to have been bought on behalf of the accused; the statement made by the deceased that he was setting out to the place where the accused lived and to meet a person, the wife of the accused, who lived in the accused’s house, appears clearly to be a statement as to some of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. The statement was rightly admitted". The Madras decisions may now be briefly reviewed. Venkatasubbareddi, In re1: Where the alleged statements of the deceased to certain witnesses, not in the presence of the accused, some months prior to the murder contained a disclosure of the intention of the deceased to cancel a will and disinherit the accused, and the prosecution relied on this disclosure as constituting the motive for the accused to murder the deceased, the statements could not be proved by hearsay evidence of the witnesses who heard the deceased make the statements, unless the statements could be brought under section 8, Explanation I, or section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. The statements, not being statements as to the cause of the declarant’s death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the declarant’s death, were not admissible under section 32 (1). The expressed intention of the deceased did not also amount to conduct within the meaning of Explanation I to section 8, since what the deceased said was not in explanation of, nor did it accompany, any act of the deceased. Raman Servai v. Emperor2: The portion of the statement which explains the immediate cause of the speaker’s death can no doubt be used; but the portion of the statement which was obviously not part of the transaction that led to the death of the person may be disallowed as there will be no legal use under section 32 (1). But where the earlier portion of a statement gives the outline of the story of the attack on the deceased, such portion also must be held admissible in evidence against all the persons mentioned in the statement. Venkatigadu v. Emperor3: The accused was charged with the murder of a girl K. It Was suggested on behalf of the prosecution as a possible motive for the crime that the accused had attempted to seduce K and that he had killed her because she repulsed his advances. The mother of K was allowed to say in evidence that before she, the mother, left the house for another village some hours before the murder K implored her to come back by night, because on a former occasion the accused had tried to have sexual intercourse with her, K. This alleged statement of K was not admissible under section 32 (1), since it had nothing whatever to do with the circumstances under which K met with her death, and the prosecution could not prove the alleged motive through inadmissible evidence. Veerankutti Hajee v. Emperor4: Where the only evidence of an alleged motive for murder consisted in statements alleged to have been made by the deceased to some witnesses long prior to the murder, the statements were inadmissible. Veerankutti Hajee v. Emperor4: Where the only evidence of an alleged motive for murder consisted in statements alleged to have been made by the deceased to some witnesses long prior to the murder, the statements were inadmissible. Beggam Appala Narasayya V. Emperor5: The motive evidence was entirely derived from the statements made by the deceased to his wife and wife’s sister which provided nothing more than grounds for supposing that the deceased suspected the accused of having betrayed his wife’s sister in a civil suit which in no way could be associated with the actual murder. The statements were wholly inadmissible, since general expressions indicating fear or suspicion, whether of a particular individual or otherwise, and not directly related to the occasion of death, were clearly held to be inadmissible under section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. Public Prosecutor v. Munigan6: In a murder case it was in evidence as an alleged motive for the murder that the accused had been on intimate terms with a certain girl and the deceased was attempting to arrange the marriage of that girl with another person. The evidence for this alleged motive for the murder was derived from the statements said to have been made by the deceased prior to her death. These statements were inadmissible in evidence and there should be little reason for the burdening of the record with statements of persons who subsequently died, and which are totally inadmissible under section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. The following five illustrative cases of other High Courts will illustrate the extents of the “circumstances of the transaction.” Dr. Jainand v. Rex1: L stated that K, the deceased, had told him that J, the accused, had obtained from him cash-certificates worm some thousands of rupees and had also taken from him all his ornaments, saying that he would get a permit for a motor truck and purchase a truck and that J was not purchasing the truck nor was he returning his money and ornaments. The fact in issue was whether J had committed the murder of K. The facts that J had taken money and ornaments from K and that K had on the day of the murder gone to J to demand the money and ornaments are relevant facts under section 7 of the Evidence Act, showing occasion, cause or effect of the fact in issue. The delivery of the money and ornaments by K, the demand by K for their return and J’s promise to return on a particular day, the going of K from B to H to receive the money and ornaments, the visit of K to J’s house on the date of the murder and the murder of K as alleged by the prosecution, are all ‘circumstances, relating to the same transaction. The statements made by K in respect of these ‘circumstances’ will all be relevant facts. K being dead, the verbal statements could be proved under section 60 of the Act by the oral evidence of the persons who heard them; in other words, by the persons to whom they were made. Therefore, the statement made by L was admissible in evidence. Gian Chand v. Emperor2: S was suspected of theft. He was closely questioned. He made a confession that he had committed the theft at the instigation of G and that he had handed the property to G. S agreed to go and see G and get the property back. The next day S left his house to see G and after that day was never seen alive. Section 32 and sub-sections (1) and (3) make it quite clear that the statement of S is clearly admissible. It certainly is a statement which would have exposed S, who could not be called, to a criminal prosecution, and it is also a statement as to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death of S. Emperor v. Fazz3: Where the accused are charged with an offence under section 330, Indian Penal Code and the deceased committed suicide as the result of their ill-treatment, the statements made by the deceased are admissible in evidence under section 32 (1), Evidence Act, though the accused are not charged with casuing the death of the deceased, as the ill-treatment by the accused was the cause, though not the direct cause of death and though the convicts are not legally responsible for the suicide, the whole affair of ill-treatment and suicide being all one transaction. T. Ratnakaran v. State4: Where it was the case of the prosecution that the accused wanted to do away with the deceased because of her pregnancy through him, held, that the statement of the deceased to the witnesses of her condition and of the person responsible for it would be admissible under section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, as it was a circumstance which had some proximate relation to her death. Satish Chandra Saha v. State5: The statement of the deceased that he was going to the accused to release his cow which the accused had confined, made almost immediately preceding the quarrel over the recovery of the cow during the course of which the deceased had sustained an injury from the accused resulting in his death, is admissible in evidence under section 32 (1) as it relates to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. See also Thommi Anthcni1, Mrs. Rego v. Emperor2, Shivabhai v. Emperor3, Emperor v Sowra Bhuian4,and Lekha Singh5. To sum up, to test the relevancy of statement under section 32 (1) is not what the final finding in the case is, but whether the cause of the death of the person making the statements comes into question in the case. The expression any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, is wider in scope than the expression the cause of his death; in other words, sub-section (1) of section 32 refers to two kinds of statements (1) when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or (2) when the statement is made by a person as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. The words resulted in his death, do not mean ‘caused his death’; see State v Ramprasad Singh6. Thus it is well settled that declarations are admissible only in so far as it points directly to the fact constituting the res gestae of the homicide; that is to say, to the act of killing and to the circumstances immediately attendant thereon like threats and difficulties, acts, declarations and incidents which constitute or accompany and explain the fact or transaction in issue are admissible for or against either party as forming part of the res gestae. Both English and American Law are to the effect that the declarations are only admissible to prove the cause of and the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death and not previous or subsequent transactions though relevant to the issue R. v. Mead7, R. v. Hind8, R. v. Morton9 (vide Phipson on “Evidence”, Ninth Edition page 332) and declarations must refer to the res gestae of the homicide (see catena of decisions at the foot of pages 738-740 of Underhill’s “Criminal Evidence”, Fifth Edition). The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, correctly decided that “the statement made by P.Ws. 1 and 7 that the deceased told them that he had brought the vessels and arrack of the accused from the pallam a little while ago would afford a. motive for the accused to commit the crime and is admissible under sections 8 and 32 (1) of the Evidence Act.” On the facts of the case, the offence has Been brought home to the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The motive for the commission of the offence was that the accused was a bootlegger and that the deceased purloined the illicitly brewed arrack of the accused and also brought away the brass-vessels and the mud-pot with arrack and consumed it with P.W. 7 and that on that account there has been subsequently a quarrel between the deceased and the accused and the beating of the deceased by the accused with an iron-rod resulting in the death of the deceased. That it was the accused who beat the deceased with the iron-rod is made clear from the evidence of P.WS. 1, 7 and 8. The accused was chased by P.W. 7 but he made good his escape, taking advantage of the open country affording cover on account of the tall cholam crops. P.W.11 who gave information to the Police not having been shown to have contacted P.Ws. 1, 7 and 8 and who also expected his brother to live and give information to the Police and produced the injured at the Police Station — but unfortunately the injured man did not recover the ability to speak and passed away — not mentioning in the First Information Report the name of the assailant is not a serious blemish in this case. On the other hand, the investigation has been taken up promptly and the material witnesses have been examined. On the other hand, the investigation has been taken up promptly and the material witnesses have been examined. The recoveries made and the medical evidence show that the offence took place at the time and in the manner alleged. The accused has absconded immediately after the commission of the offence. The alibi set up by him that he was scared by an impending prohibition case and had left the village, was found to be untrue by the lower Court. The net result of this analysis, is that the prosecution has brought home to the accused the offence for which he has been convicted. The conviction is correct and the sentence imposed is the minimum prescribed by law for an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The sentence also is confirmed and this appeal is dismissed. V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.