JUDGMENT J.K. Tandon, J. - Bengali Mal, the Petitioner, owns two houses, one bearing municipal no. 811 at Motia Gali and the other bearing municipal no. 598 situated at Kashmi Gali in the town of Agra. House no. 598 is said to be the bigger of the two. The petitioner has been staying in a portion of house no. 811 while the rest of it is in the occupation of tenants. A portion is also in the possession of a friend of his for which, as the petitioner has said, he pays no rent. 2. The other house used to be in the occupation of two persons but one of them, who was occupying a saiban and two small rooms and tin shed on the second floor, vacated it some time back and this portion was then allotted or rather released in favour of the petitioner. Out of the portion released in his favour a saiban and a small room is said to be in the occupation of the petitioner's wife's- sister's husband free of rent. The petitioner admits that he could not actually occupy the rest of the portion released as there was neither any kitchen, latrine or bath room etc. The second portion of this house used to be in the occupation of one Babu Lal and his son Bengali Mal (this Bengali Mal is different from respondent no. 2 who also bears the name Bengali Mal). They vacated it sometime in April, 1957, but sent intimation about the intended vacation to the Rent Controller sometime in February. On 23rd February, 1957, the petitioner, therefore, applied to the Rent Controller that this portion might be released in his favour for his own personal occupation on the ground that the accommodation in house no. 811 was inadequate for his needs. On 14th March, 1957, Bengali Mal, respondent no. 2, also made an application to the Rent Controller for the allotment of the same accommodation. The petitioner's allegation is that he has a big family consisting of a wife, four sons, two daughters and an old mother while the eldest son is of marriageable age and he imminently needed to occupy the larger accommodation which was available in this house. The Rent Controller by his order dated 26th March, 1957, rejected the petitioner's application and allotted the portion vacated by Babu Lal in favour of respondent no. 2. The Rent Controller by his order dated 26th March, 1957, rejected the petitioner's application and allotted the portion vacated by Babu Lal in favour of respondent no. 2. The petitioner's grievance now is that the Rent Controller made the allotment in favour of Bengali Mal without consulting the applicant as however was necessary under Rule 7 of the Rent Control Rules, and further that he paid no regard to the needs of the petitioner. After the allotment had been made in favour of respondent no. 2 the petitioner applied once again on 30th March, 1957, to the Rent Controller for a review of his earlier order and in this application he also offered to vacate the portion that was in his possession in house no. 811 in favour of respondent no. 2. This time also the Rent Controller did not accepted the petitioners request and declined to review the earlier order. The present petition is, therefore, directed against the two orders dated 26th March, 1957, and 20th April, 1957, by which the allotment in favour of respondent no. 2 was maintained. 3. The grounds urged are that the Rent Controller failed to appreciate that a part of the accommodation was in the occupation of the petitioner and for that reason he had no jurisdiction to allot the accommodation in favour of respondent no. 2. Again the Rent Controller was wrong in rejecting the review application because respondent no. 2 was not prepared to accept the alternative accommodation offered to him. Referring to the number of members in his family the petitioner has further attacked the legality of the allotment order on the ground that it was arbitrary and failed to take into consideration the growing needs of the petitioner. 4. Rule 7 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949, on which reliance has been placed in support of the proposition that the Rent Controller was bound to consult the petitioner before allotting the accommodation in favour of respondent no. 2, requires that action under that rule has to be taken where a part of the accommodation is in the occupation of the owner himself. What, however, appeared in the present case was that although a part of house no. 598 had been allotted in favour of the petitioner, he was not occupying it. 2, requires that action under that rule has to be taken where a part of the accommodation is in the occupation of the owner himself. What, however, appeared in the present case was that although a part of house no. 598 had been allotted in favour of the petitioner, he was not occupying it. On the contrary, as his own allegation show, a part was in the occupation of his brother-in-law and the rest on account of its unsuitability was lying unoccupied. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the possession of the brother-in-law, who was living for and on behalf of the petitioner, should be deemed to be the possession or rather the occupation of the petitioner himself. The brother-in-law was no doubt in occupation of a part of the premises but to urge on that account that the petitioner was in occupation of the portion is not correct. Occupation means actual holding, it means more than mere possession. The occupation of the brother-in-law may be possession of the petitioner but since he was not actually holding any portion of the premises it cannot be said that he was in occupation. Even the fact that the portion had been released in his favour earlier will not amount to his occupation of the portion which, as I pointed out earlier, implies actual holding of the property. It cannot, therefore, under the circumstances, be accepted that the petitioner was in occupation of a part of the premises. 5. But apart from this fact, the petitioner's grievance that he was not consulted has to be turned down on merits also. The order of the Rent Controller dated 26th March, 1957, bears full testimony to the fact that that order was made by him after hearing both the parties and taking into consideration their respective claims. I do not see any force in the contention of the learned counsel that the Rent Controller should consult the landlord only after he has rejected the request of the owner for release of the accommodation in his own name. I do not see any force in the contention of the learned counsel that the Rent Controller should consult the landlord only after he has rejected the request of the owner for release of the accommodation in his own name. Rule 7 only requires that the owner shall be consulted and the accommodation shall so far as may be possible allotted in accordance with his wishes There was only one other claimant in the present case, so there was neither any occasion nor the necessity to consult the owner after his request for release in his favour had been turned down. The requirements of rule 7 were not disregarded in this case. 6. As regards the fact that the accommodation was not released in favour of the petitioner, Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949, has no doubt provided that the Rent Controller may, if he is satisfied that any accommodation is needed bona fide for his personal occupation by the owner, release it in his favour. The petitioner's grievance is that his growing needs and requirements of the large family, that he had, were not taken into consideration. The Rent Controller's order dated 26th March, 1957, shows that he was not convicted either by the genuineness of the need or of the bona fide nature of the petitioner's claim for release of the accommodation in his favour. He was already living in another house of his own and was further not prepared to vacate that accommodation. The learned counsel has discussed with great vehemence the fact that the accommodation in the other house was offered subsequently by the petitioner and, therefore, in any case at the time when he applied for the review of the order dated 26th March, 1957, the Rent Controller should have acceded to his request. It is not possible nor is open to this Court in these proceedings to enter upon an appraisement of facts which was really the jurisdiction of the authority which made the order. The fact whether the authority making the order applied its mind to the matters before it and whether it came to the same conclusion as some other court or authority will come is not necessary. What is relevant is whether the conclusion reached by it is not an impossible conclusion on the material that was before it. The fact whether the authority making the order applied its mind to the matters before it and whether it came to the same conclusion as some other court or authority will come is not necessary. What is relevant is whether the conclusion reached by it is not an impossible conclusion on the material that was before it. In the present case if there was the circumstance that he was living in a portion of house no. 811 there was also the circumstances that out of that house itself one of the rooms had been permitted by the petitioner to be occupied by a friend of his free of rent. Again, although a portion of house no. 598 was vacated sometime back and released in his favour, he permitted his brother-in-law to occupy a portion and did not shift or even occupy a part of it. All these facts were undoubtedly before the Rent Controller and I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that the conclusion at which he reached in the case was reached without applying his mind to the matters. The subsequent offer made by the petitioner to release the portion of house no. 811 in favour of the allottee failed to improve the position. In the first place this offer was made too late; at the time of the allotment order he was not prepared to vacate that either. Secondly its relevance is only to this extent whether the Rent Controller on that account should have reviewed his order. I do not see there is anything in the order dated 20th April, 1957, to hold that it was made without applying the mind to the relevant matters. 7. There is in my opinion no force in this petition. It is therefore dismissed. No order is made as to the costs.