This second appeal under sec. 224(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been filed by the defendants against whom the respondents suit for ejectment has been decreed by the lower appellate court after reversing the decree of the original court which had dismissed the suit. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record as well. Put briefly the facts of the case are that the respondent created a usufructuary mortgage of the land in mortgage, that during the subsistence of the mortgage the appellants were admitted as tenants, the mortgage was eventually redeemed and thereafter the respondent brought this suit for ejectment on the ground that after redemption of the mortgage the appellants were liable to be treated as trespassers. The trial court held that the appellants were lawfully admitted as tenants and as such they could not be held as trespassers. The first appellate court took a different view and has referred to A.I.R., 1956, Supreme Court 305 for holding that after the redemption of the mortgage the appellants who were admitted as tenants by the mortgagees could not be held as tenants. 3. The main point involved for determination in the case is as to whether a tenant of agricultural land duly admitted by the mortgagee during the continuance of the mortgage would continue to hold the status of a tenant or not in accordance with the provisions of the Act after the redemption of the mortgage. The lower appellate court has referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court which lay down the law on the subject. It has, however, failed to appreciate the real contents of these decisions. In A.I.R. 1952 Supreme Court 205 Mahavir Gope and others vs. Harbans Narain Singh, their Lordships were pleased to observe as below :— "Para 6. The general rule is that a person cannot by transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than the himself has. A mortgagee cannot, therefore, create any interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee. Further, the mortgagee who takes possession of the mortgaged property must manage it as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own; and he must not commit any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the property. Further, the mortgagee who takes possession of the mortgaged property must manage it as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own; and he must not commit any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the property. It follows that he may grant leases not extending beyond the period off the mortgage; any bases granted by him must come to an end at redemption. A mortgagee cannot during the subsistence of the mortgage act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagors interests such as by giving a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights in the land thereby defeating the mortgagors right to Khas possession It would be an act which would fall within the provisions of sec. 76 sub-cl.(e) of the Transfer of Property Act." "Para 7. A permissable settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is a different matter altogether. It is an exception of the general rule. The tenant cannot be ejected by the mortgagor even after the redemption of the mortgage. He may become an occupancy Raiyat in some cases and a non-occupancy Raiyat in other cases. But the settlement of the tenant by the mortgagee must have been a bonafide one. This exception will not apply in a case where the terms of the mortgage prohibit the mortgagee from making any settlement of tenants on the land either expressly or by necessary implication." 4. This decision was examined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1956, 30 and it was quoted with the approval. It was observed in this case that: — "The law is that a person cannot confer on another any right higher than what he himself possesses, and therefore a lease created by a usufructary mortgagee would normlly terminate on the redemption of the mortgage. Sec 76 (a) enacts an exception to this rule. If the lease is one which would have been made by the owner in the course of prudent management, it would be binding on the mortgagors, notwithstanding that the mortgage has been redeemed. Sec 76 (a) enacts an exception to this rule. If the lease is one which would have been made by the owner in the course of prudent management, it would be binding on the mortgagors, notwithstanding that the mortgage has been redeemed. Even in such a case, the operation of the lease cannot extend beyond the period for which it was granted." 5. Malik C.J. of the Allahabad High Court while examining the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope vs. Harbansnarain Singh pointed out that the general rule is that the mortgagor is not bound by the transfers made by the mortgagee or by contracts entered into by him unless his action can be supported on the ground that it was authorised by law or that he was empowered to act under some power or authority. A permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by a statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is a different matter altogether. It is an exception to the general rule. 6. Thus these decisions law down that ordinarily a lease granted by a mortgagee in possession would terminate with redemption of the mortgage unless some rights spring up in the tenants under seme statute. It is an admitted fact that the appellants were tenants of the disputed land when the Act came into force. Sec, 15 of the Act lays down that every person who is a tenant at the commencement of the Act, subject to the provisions of sec. 16 shall be entitled to all the rights conferred and be subject to all the liabilities imposed on Khatedar tenants by this Act. Sec. 161 of the Act lays down that no tenant shall be ejected from his holding otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The redemption of the mortgage is alleged to have taken place on 16.7.56 and the present suit for ejectment wag brought on 20.7.56 i.e., after the enforcement of the Act. As pointed out above sec. 15 conferred the status of Khatedar tenants upon the appellants and to sustain an action for ejectment against them it has to be within the four corners of the Act. As pointed out above sec. 15 conferred the status of Khatedar tenants upon the appellants and to sustain an action for ejectment against them it has to be within the four corners of the Act. The mortgagee could not have conferred a better title upon the appellants than he himself had in the land But the Act could do it and has done it. The learned counsel for the respondent has frankly conceded the validity of this view. He at one stage of the arguments sought to differentiate on the ground that the appellants were not admitted as tenants by the "land holder" as the mortgagee could not be held as such. But it is unnecessary to go into this point for the term tenant has been defined in the Act as a person by whom rent is payable or would be payable but for contract express or implied. There is no reference in the definition to the fact that such a tenant should be admitted by a fulfledged land holder and not a mortgagee of proprietory rights. After an examination of the definition of the term tenant in the Act the learned counsel for the respondent did not consider it proper to press further with his point of distinction. 7. To conclude therefore we hold that the enforcement of the Act on 15-10 55 has made the position of the appellants unassailable except in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act. On the day the Act was enforced they were tenants of the disputed land and hence they became entitled to all the rights of a Khatedar tenant. They can be ejected only on the grounds provided in the Act and on no other. The ground on which the present suit for ejectment is based against them has not been provided in the Act. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court restored as a result whereof the respondents suit for ejectment against the appellants shall stand dismissed throughout. 8. The parties shall bear their cost throughout.