ORDER A.H. Khan, J. The facts giving rise to this reference are that the police submitted a charge-sheet against Shankar Dayal and Dwarkaprasad in the Court of Addl. District Magistrate, Guna, under Sections 353 and 448, Indian Penal Code alleging that on 14-2-1957, the two accused went to a school situated in Guna Chhaoni and made an attempt to assault Shri Satya Dev, one of the teachers of the school. On 4-5-1957, the trial Court framed charges against the accused under Sections 352 and 447, Indian Penal Code. On the charges being thus framed, the police moved the trial Court, praying that the teacher was a public servant within the meaning of the Supreme Court decision in G.A. Monterio v. State of Ajmer AIR 1957 SC 13 , the appropriate section under which a charge should have been framed against the accused was Section 353 and not Section 352, Indian Penal Code. The trial Court thereupon altered the charge from Section 352 to one under Section 353, Indian Penal Code. Against the alteration of the charge, a revision was filed by the accused before the learned Sessions Judge, Guna who has referred the matter to the High Court, recommending that the order of the trial Court, altering the charge should be quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is of the opinion that if a Magistrate frames a charge other than the one mentioned in the charge-sheet, then the Magistrate has impliedly discharged the accused of the offence mentioned in the charge-sheet and that later on the Magistrate cannot alter the charge to one mentioned in the charge-sheet. Such an implied order of discharge can be set aside only under Section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure code by a higher Court. He relies upon two authorities, A.I.R. 1936 Nag. 78 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 430 for the view he has taken. On a perusal of both the authorities referred to above, I find that the question decided in these cases is absolutely different from the question involved in this case. In A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 430, the charge-sheet filed against the accused was for an offence under Section 307, Indian Penal Code but the Magistrate framed a charge under Section 337, Indian Penal Code and convicted the accused thereunder. In A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 430, the charge-sheet filed against the accused was for an offence under Section 307, Indian Penal Code but the Magistrate framed a charge under Section 337, Indian Penal Code and convicted the accused thereunder. It was held by G. Menon J., that the action of the Magistrate amounted to an implied discharge of the accused under Section 307, Indian Penal Code and that it was open to the District Magistrate under Sections 436 and 437, Code of Criminal Procedure code to order a further enquiry into the matter. The fact that distinguishes the Madras case from the present one is that the Madras case did not involve the question of alteration of the charge by the trial Court itself. Similarly in the Nagpur case referred to above, the accused was challenged under Section 325, Indian Penal Code. The trial Court held that the prosecution had not made out a case under Section 325 and so the Magistrate charged the accused under Section 323, Indian Penal Code only. The Additional Sessions Judge on revision, set aside the order of the discharge under Section 325, Indian Penal Code and sent the case back for further enquiry under Section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure code. It was held that the Sessions Judge had the power to interfere under Section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure code. What is to be noticed is that in both these cases what was considered was whether the Sessions Judge had the power to act under Section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure code or not. Nothing has been said about the powers of the Magistrate himself to alter the charges under Section 227, Code of Criminal Procedure code. Thus the above two cases do not furnish any useful analogy on the point. In the case before me the question is not whether the Sessions Judge can interfere under Section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure code or not but whether the Magistrate himself can alter the charge he has once framed. Thus the above two cases do not furnish any useful analogy on the point. In the case before me the question is not whether the Sessions Judge can interfere under Section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure code or not but whether the Magistrate himself can alter the charge he has once framed. In replying to this question I can do no better than quote Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure code which runs as under: Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced, or in the case of trials before the Court of Sessions or High Court, before the verdict of the jury is returned or the opinion of the assessors is expressed. On a plain construction of this section, I have not the slightest doubt that a Magistrate can always alter or add any charge till the time he has pronounced the judgment. The learned Sessions Judge in his reference has not said that on merits the alteration of the charge is erroneous and wrong. The learned Sessions Judge treated the framing of a charge by a Magistrate "as a finding on a point of law or fact". But I am afraid that a charge is not tantamount to a "finding" by the Magistrate. A charge is prima facie an accusation made against an accused person. It is neither a finding of fact nor of law. In Reily v. Emperor ILR 28 Cal. 434 (437), a charge is defined as a precise formulation of the specific accusation against a person who is entitled to know its nature at a very early stage. The object of a charge is to enable the accused to concentrate his attention on the case and to afford him an opportunity to meet it. In this view of the matter, a charge cannot be equated with a finding of fact or law. For reasons stated above I would not like to interfere with the alteration of the charge and would in consequence disallow the reference.