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1958 DIGILAW 269 (MAD)

Velur Devasthanam by sole trustee Srila Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi Avergal v. S. Sundaram Nainar

1958-09-15

RAMASWAMI GOUNDER

body1958
Judgment.- This is an appeal preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Mayuram, in Appeal Suit No. 5 of 1955 reversing the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif of Sirkali, in original suit No. 179 of 1954. The facts are: The Velur Devasthanam is owner of the suit property. It consists of 30 acres and 80 cents of Nanja and Punja land. This Devasthanam has been leasing out the lands in open auction after wide publicity. Therefore, the auction purchasers knew full well what they were bidding for and on what terms in those auctions. In the auction held for faslis 1361 to 1363, the defendant Sundaram Nainar became the successful bidder. He agreed to take the lands on lease for three faslis at 650 kalams of paddy per fash, Rs. 5 cash rent and 70 bundles of straw in three instalments. The defendant cultivated the suit lands for three faslis. In all he has paid 540 kalams. There was a balance of no kalams. The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of the arrears of these no kalams. It may be pointed out here that the leases are unconditional leases namely that irrespective of Rajikam or Deivikam this defendant would pay for the three faslis at 650 kalams. On this suit being filed, the defendant put forward two contentions: that the contract with him got frustrated by reason of the passing of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannayals Protection Act (XIV of 1952); secondly that by reason of what is called the Mayuram agreement he was under the impression that 550 kalams represented 70 per cent. of what those lands would yield and equate to the auction amount, and that, therefore, he is entitled to remission of 97½ kalams. The District Munsif found no merits in either of these contentions put forward by the defendant and decreed the suit in regard to the number of kalams as prayed for but at a valuation which was fixed by the learned District Munif. There was an appeal and in the appeal the learned Subordinate Judge persuaded himself that though there was no frustration under section 56 of the Indian Contract Act fairness and equity required a remission of 10 per cent. or 65 kalams should be given. Hence this second appeal by the Velur Devasthanam in regard to the remitted portion. There was an appeal and in the appeal the learned Subordinate Judge persuaded himself that though there was no frustration under section 56 of the Indian Contract Act fairness and equity required a remission of 10 per cent. or 65 kalams should be given. Hence this second appeal by the Velur Devasthanam in regard to the remitted portion. I shall first of all dispose of the Mayuram agreement which was so vehemently relied upon by the learned advocate, Mr. Kuppuswami Aiyar, before me. This Mayuram agreement has been set out in a decision of this Court reported in Santhanakrishna Odayar v. Vaithilingam1. The substance of that Mayuram agreement was that on account of the various disturbing factors which had arisen in the agrarian world in these parts, the landlord should collect such amount as would give him 70 per cent. and the pannayal 30 per cent. of the produce. But this was in 1948 and this auction has taken place in 1951 and there is no evidence at all that in this open auction where this defendant was the successful bidder he ever thought of this Mayuram agreement or that the landlord thought of it and that influenced the fixation of the successful auction bid of this defendant. Intact, we have no materials at all about the yield of the land in order to say whether even this thought could have entered the head of this defendant. All that can be said is that this Mayuram agreement is one more frustration which has been thought up by this defendant in order to default payment of the stipulated rent. Therefore, this Mayuram agreement is neither here nor there and cannot be used to influence our decision. Turning to the next point, namely, whether when there is an unconditional agreement to pay rent at a particular quantity it is open to us on equitable principles to grant a remission? Assuming that there are some equitable grounds to grant a remission though I am not prepared to say that in this case there are materials for coming to any such conclusion, the learned advocate for the appellant relied upon the following decisions before me to make out that even in such a case we cannot give remissions in the case of these unconditional leases excluding Rajikam and Deivikam. In Dwijendranath v. Jitendranath2, where it was held that in case the lessee stipulated that he would not be entitled to remission on account of inundation, drought, etc., and made an unconditional contract to pay rent he would not be entitled to any abatement on the general principles of law even though the land was diluviated by a river. In Srinivasa v. Ramraj3, it was held that where the lease deed provided that the tenant should not claim reduction of rent either on account of celestial or terrestrial disturbances or on account of any village practice or usage the tenant was liable to pay according to the contract, and was not entitled to plead relief by way of custom in the village. Reference was then made to a decision reported in Ramakrishna v. Rangachariar4, where it was held that in the absence of custom or contract to the contrary the obligation to grant remission was purely moral and not legal and cannot be enforced in a suit and that the tenant was not entitled to a remission on account of savi or failure of crops. It is clear from the above decisions that the lessee was liable to pay in accordance with the contract and that there is no power in the Court to relieve him against the obligations under it. In Harilakshman v. Secretary of State for India5, there was lease of Government salt works for a period of 5 years. The lessees failed to execute the lease or pay the rent but were in possession of the properties. In the suit for recovery of rent after the first year the lessees denied their liability on the ground that the contract became impossible of performance on account of the strike of workmen. The learned Judges held that there was no implied understanding as to the availability of sufficient supply of labour in the manufacture of salt so that when the labour supply failed the obligations ceased to operate, and that the lessee was liable to pay the stipulated rent. That decision proceeded on a principle of frustration of the contract embodied in section 56 of the Contract Act. In the present case there is no scope for the application of such a principle. That decision proceeded on a principle of frustration of the contract embodied in section 56 of the Contract Act. In the present case there is no scope for the application of such a principle. In Sinnappa v. Ramaswami1, it was held that even in a case where the leased lands got silted by floods and it was impossible to put them right by means of expenditure, the tenant could not refuse to pay rent pleading impossibility of performance. The above cases have been referred to in a recent decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Ramachandra. Aiyar, J., in Sri Kampahareswara Devasthanam v. Appaswami Padayachi and others2, wherein the dispute was between the present plaintiff representing another Devasthanam and certain lessees, Appaswami Padayachi and others. The arguments which are now put forward before me by Mr. Kuppuswami Aiyar were urged in that appeal and have been negatived by the Bench. It was held that the lessees were liable to pay the stipulated and unconditional rents and that it was not open to the Court to invoke some kind of equitable principle to relieve the defendants from the obligations under the lease deed. Before parting with this case I may point out that the learned advocate for the appellant rightly pointed out here that if the grievance of this lessee was that the rent was inequitable the proper vehicle provided for agitating the matter is before the local Conciliation Officer and which is the machinery prescribed by the State for ventilation of this grievance and not a civil Court which is both expressly and impliedly barred from going into these matters (vide section 14 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Protection Act). The net result of this analysis is that this Second Appeal has got to be allowed and the Decree and Judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside except as to the price of paddy and the Decree and Judgment of the learned District Munsif restored, but, in the circumstances, without costs. V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.