Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff, whose suit for redemption has been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge of Parur, is the Appellant before me. The short point that arises for consideration is as to whether the suit is barred by limitation under Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act, corresponding to Art.134 of the Indian Limitation Act prior to its amendment in 1929. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage dated 25-6-1086, Ext. A, executed by one Meethian who was then holding a kanom right in respect of the properties. Several defences were raised by the defendants as to the right of the plaintiff to redeem, namely, that there was an oral surrender of the mortgage right and, therefore, Ext. A has got itself extinguished. It was also contended that the plaintiff does not derive any title to redeem the mortgage, Ext. A. On both these points, the trial court, as well as the appellate court, have concurrently held against the defendants. The only point on which both the courts have differed is as regards the suit being barred by limitation under Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act. 3. The trial court was of the view that the documents relied upon by the plaintiff did not in any way bring the case within the ambit of Art.122. Further, the trial court also held that there is no evidence to show that the defendant's enjoyment as owners was brought to the notice of the mortgagor or his legal representatives. Probably, the latter reasoning of the trial court may not be correct in law. 4. The learned District Judge was of the view that the recitals in Exts. E, III and V clearly show that the rights of full owner were being transferred under those documents and therefore the suit will be barred by virtue of Art.122. The question is whether the decision of the learned District Judge on this question of limitation is correct. Mr. Mohamad Naha, learned counsel for the appellant, has attacked the reasoning of the learned District Judge and has taken me through the various recitals in Exts. E. III and V. He has also contended that the reasoning of the District Judge cannot be supported in view of my judgment reported in Yohannan v. Ummen (1957 K.L.J 1196). On the other hand, Mr. Madhavan Nair and Mr. E. III and V. He has also contended that the reasoning of the District Judge cannot be supported in view of my judgment reported in Yohannan v. Ummen (1957 K.L.J 1196). On the other hand, Mr. Madhavan Nair and Mr. Vadakkel, learned counsel appearing for the two defendants-respondents, separately, have maintained that the recitals in Exts. E. III and V clearly bring into operation the provisions of Art.122 of the Travancore Limitation Act. 5. In order to appreciate the contentions of both the learned counsel a few dates with reference to the transactions may be useful. 6. The properties belonged originally to an Illom called Mylakkodath Illom and they granted a kanom right on 1st Karkidakam 1078 in favour of one Ahamedkunju Meethian. On 25-6-1086 under Ext. A, this Meethian executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of one Chacko Raphael. 7. On 12-3-1087 Mylakkodath Illom executed a sale of their jenmom right under Ext. F to Chacko Raphael who was the usufructuary mortgagee under Ext. A. This sale deed Ext. F clearly recites that the properties are subject to a kanom right in favour of Ahamadkunju Meethian. As Chacko Raphael was indebted to the Puthenchira church by virtue of certain transactions, the church filed a suit O.S.238 of 1099 in the District Munsiff's Court, Perumpavoor, and obtained a decree on the basis of Exts. B and C, namely, the simple mortgages executed by Chacko Raphael. 8. The church obtained a sale certificate Ext. II; the said sale certificate, also shows that it is only the rights of Raphael that have been brought to sale and purchased by the church. Even otherwise this sale certificate, Ext. II, need not detain me any further because it is not the case of the defendants that limitation starts by virtue of this sale. The learned District Judge also has held that what the church purchased was only the right, title and interest of Chacko Raphael which was jenmom right and the rights in the decree in O.S. 765 of 1085 purchased by him under Ext. F reserving the kanom right in favour of Meethian. Subsequently on 11-2-1106, under Ext. E, the church assigned the properties purchased by them under the decree, to one Kochunni Owkkarkutty and this Owkkarkutty by virtue of two sale deeds assigned his entire rights in favour of defendants 1 and 2. F reserving the kanom right in favour of Meethian. Subsequently on 11-2-1106, under Ext. E, the church assigned the properties purchased by them under the decree, to one Kochunni Owkkarkutty and this Owkkarkutty by virtue of two sale deeds assigned his entire rights in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The transaction in favour of the second defendant was on 20.9.1107 under Ext. V and that in favour of the first defendant was on 24-5-1112 under Ext. III. It is really, on the recitals contained in Exts. E, III and V, that the question as to whether the suit is barred by limitation has to be decided. Before considering the actual recitals, it is enough if I refer to my decision reported in Yohannan v. Ummen (1957 K. L. J. 1196). I have reviewed the case law bearing upon the matter and I have also discussed the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Skinner v. Kunwar Naunihal Singh (A.I.R.1929 P.C.158). Further I have also referred, with respectful approval, to the principles laid down on matters like this by the Travancore-Cochin High Court consisting of Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Govinda Pillai in the decision reported in Venkitasubramania Iyer v. Narayanan (1954 KLT 113). It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to again refer to the case law on the subject. The principles that have been laid down are that the transferor must be purporting to transfer a right, title or interest independent and unconnected with the mortgage in his favour. A transfer of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee in favour of a third party for valuable consideration will be hit by Art.122 only when such transfer is made in denial or in defiance of the mortgagor's title in express terms. 9. Therefore, the question is whether the learned District Judge had decided the case properly in accordance with the principles laid down by the decisions referred to above. The reasoning of the learned District Judge is that the transfers clearly show that they are effected in defiance of the mortgagor's title and that they were dealing with the property as if they are owners. I have been taken through the three documents, Exts. E, III and V by learned counsel appearing on both sides and I am not able to accept the reasoning of the learned District Judge The first document, Ext. I have been taken through the three documents, Exts. E, III and V by learned counsel appearing on both sides and I am not able to accept the reasoning of the learned District Judge The first document, Ext. E, clearly shows that what the Church purported to assign was only the right, title and interest it acquired by court purchase which itself was only the right, title and interest that the judgment-debtor Raphael himself possessed. Ext. F clearly shows that the properties were purchased by Raphael subject to a kanom right in favour of Meethian. In Ext E, after stating the circumstances under which the court sale proceedings took place, there is a very clear recital that the vendors, the church, purchased only the ""yWs AvWLwU" of Chacko Raphael. It also shows that, after that purchase, the church has been holding the same in the right in which they purchased. Again, there is a recital that after the purchase the church have not in any way created any liabilities or encumbrances on the property. Further, in the operative portion it says that whatever right they purchased and they had, are being transferred and they have also assured "the purchasers of that right. These recitals clearly show that the vendors were not at all dealing with the properties in their own rights as full owners in defiance of the usufructuary mortgage liability under Ext. A. 10. Mr. Madhavan Nair has drawn my attention to the passage in Ext. E that there is no encumbrance on the property. That is not correct. I have referred to it earlier. What the document says is that after the purchase by the church they have not created any encumbrance on the properties and it is this assurance that has been given to the purchasers. Equally, the two other documents, Ext. III and V, in favour of defendants 1 and 2 respectively, also show that Owkkarkutty, who purchased the properties under Ext. E, was only transferring whatever rights he had in the property by virtue of the purchase under Ext. E. Therefore, I am not able to find in any of these documents any recital which will show that the vendors acted in defiance of the right of the mortgagor or they purported to transfer anything more than their mortgage rights in the properties. E. Therefore, I am not able to find in any of these documents any recital which will show that the vendors acted in defiance of the right of the mortgagor or they purported to transfer anything more than their mortgage rights in the properties. I may also refer to the latest judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Nani Bai v. Gita Bai (A.I.R.1958 S.C. 706). Their Lordships were dealing with a case under the corresponding Art.134 of the Indian Limitation Act. At page 710 their Lordships observe: Article 134 of the Limitation Act contemplates a sale by the mortgagee in excess of his interest as such. The legislature, naturally, treats the possession of such transferees as wrongful, and therefore, adverse to the mortgagor if he is aware of the transaction, Hence, the longer period of 60 years for redemption of the mortgaged property in the hands of the mortgagee or his successor-in interest, is cut down to the shorter period of 12 years' wrongful possession if the transfer by the mortgagee is in respect of a larger interest than that mortgaged to him. In order, therefore, to attract the operation of Art.134, the defendant has got affirmatively to prove that the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest has transferred a larger interest than justified by the mortgage. If there is no such proof, the shorter period under Art.134 is not available to the defendant in a suit for possession after redemption." No other points have been argued by either side. 11. In the result, the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge are set aside and those of the trial court restored with costs throughout. No leave. Allowed.