Judgement JUDGMENT: This second appeal is preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge of North Accot in A. S. No. 183 of 1954, modifying the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsiff of Ami in O. S. No. 159 of 1953. 2. The facts are :-Annamalai Mudaliar, the second defendant, had become indebted to his own sister Muniammal, the first defendant, on a promissory note dated 16-8-1949. The brother and sister have not been getting on well. On the foot of that promissory note the first defendant filed O. S. No. 262 of 1951 against the second defendant and obtained a decree on 20-9-1951. It was an instalment decree. The first instalment was payable on 15-10-1951. The first defendant was taking steps to attach the only property belonging to the judgment-debtor second defendant viz., a soda-water manufacturing shop run under the name and style of "Baby Soda Factory" in Arni Bazaar. There was obstruction by the judgment-debtor more than once. The attachment was duly effected on 8-4-1952. 3. The plaintiff Thyagaraja Mudaliar who is a Javuli merchant of the locality and belonging to the same community as the defendants, came forward with a claim petition purporting to have purchased the Baby Soda Factory under a sale deed Ex. A-1 said to have been executed by the first (second?) defendant on 1-10-1951 and registered within a week thereafter. The items of consideration for this sale deed are stated to be Rs. 155 due on account of the credit purchase of piecegoods by the first (second?) defendant in the Javuli shop of the plaintiff in connection with the marriage of his daughters, evidenced by Ex. A-2, and a sum of Rs. 345 said to have been paid in cash to the vendor, totalling Rs. 500. The debt of Rs. 155 seems to be a true one. 4. This claim petition was dismissed by the learned District Munsif of Arni Mr. P. Paramasiva Mudaliar. Thereafter the plaintiff filed the suit out of which this second appeal arises for vacating the said claim order. 5. The trial Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that though the second defendant owed Rs. 155 to the plaintiff under Ex. A-2, the payment of Rs. P. Paramasiva Mudaliar. Thereafter the plaintiff filed the suit out of which this second appeal arises for vacating the said claim order. 5. The trial Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that though the second defendant owed Rs. 155 to the plaintiff under Ex. A-2, the payment of Rs. 345 in cash is a fictitious amount made up for the purpose of taking a fraudulent conveyance from the first (second?) defendant in collusion, in order to defraud the first defendant from realizing the fruits of her decree. On appeal by the defeated plaintiff the learned District Judge came to the following conclusion : "It is certainly true that, that in an action of this character, the burden lies upon the claim petitioner (appellant) to prove that the claim order was liable to be set aside. But it seems to me that though the sale as such might not be binding on the decree-holder............... because the movables are alleged to be worth far more than the sum of Rs. 500 paid by the appellant under Ex. A-1 and also because the evidence tends to show that the sale was not given effect to, in the sense that the son of the judgment-debtor still appears to be in possession and control of the machinery and the business, nevertheless this is a case in which it is abundantly clear that the appellant parted with the consideration Rs. 500 in order to obtain some kind of charge or security, the appellant being a prior creditor of the judgment-debtor in respect of an amount of Rs. 155. Under those circumstances, the question is whether, as stressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the appellant is at least not entitled to a charge or lien for Rs. 500 upon the machinery and accessories, the decree-holder................. being at liberty to proceed against the movable properties, subject to this charge." The learned District Judge then persuaded himself that he could allow the appeal to the limited extent of holding that the appellant has at least established a right to a lien or charge over the property conveyed under Ex. A-1 to the extent of Rs. 500, though the property probably being worth double this amount, the title of the appellant as such cannot be upheld. A-1 to the extent of Rs. 500, though the property probably being worth double this amount, the title of the appellant as such cannot be upheld. He gave liberty to the decree-holder first defendant to levy execution against these properties as the properties of the judgment-debtor subject to this charge in favour of the appellant. The defeated Muniammal has preferred this second appeal. 6. In this second appeal two points arise for determination viz., whether the sale under Ex. A-1 is a fraudulent conveyance brought into existence by the plaintiff and the second defendant in collusion to defraud the decree-holder Muniammal; and secondly, whether any relief can be given to the plaintiff in equity. 7.The factors which constitute a fraudulent conveyance must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case. But certain broad indicia have been formulated in England, America and India. It is surprising how human nature is the same all the world over irrespective of colour, creed and race. 8. Halsburys Laws of England (Simonds Edition), Volume 17 page 657 (Para 1269) has the following to say: "There are a number of circumstances which weigh with the Court in determining whether, in any particular case, there was an intent to defraud creditors. The strongest of these indications, or badges, of fraud is the continuance of the grantor in possession of the property he has purported to alienate, when such continuance in possession is not in accordance with the tenor and object of the conveyance; and even though the grantee is let into possession jointly with the grantor, the presumption of fraud will still be raised. Continuance in possession is not, however, evidence of fraud where the possession is consistent with the nature of the grant, as in the case of a mortgage; but retention of the title deeds of the property granted is an indication of a fraudulent intent. Continuance in possession is not, however, evidence of fraud where the possession is consistent with the nature of the grant, as in the case of a mortgage; but retention of the title deeds of the property granted is an indication of a fraudulent intent. Other indications of a fraudulent intent are the fact that the alienation comprises substantially the whole of the property of the grantor; in the case of an alienation of shares, that a call has been made upon them; that the alienation is made after a writ has been issued against the grantor, or after execution has been issued; that the conveyance by which it is effected contains an unnecessary statement to the effect that it was made without a fraudulent intent; that the conveyance contains a false recital, though this will not be conclusive against a party who did not know that the recital was false; or that the grantor reserved to himself a power of revocation." Twynes case (1602) 1 Smith LC (13th Edn.) 1 (A); Morris v. Morris, (1895) AC 625 (B); Sanders v. Crossley, (1919) 2 Ir R 71 (C); Perry-Herrick v. Attwood, (1857) 27 LJ Ch 121 (D); Re Hirth; Ex parte Trustee, (1899) 1 QB 612 (E); Re Troughton, (1894) 71 LT 427 (F): Alton v. Harrison; Poyser v. Harrison, (1869) 4 Ch A 622 (G); Edmunds v. Edmunds, (1904) P. 362 (H); Pearce v. Bulteel, (1916) 2 Ch 544 (I); Re Baker, (1936) Ch 61 (I); Re Hookers Settlement (1954) 3 All ER 321 (K). 9. 24 American Jurisprudence, page 173 (Section 14) has the following to say regarding the indicia or badges of fraud : "Certain circumstances have come to be recognized as indicia or badges of fraud: and proof thereof has a more or less well-defined evidentiary force or effect. The evidentiary effect of circumstances of this character depends upon the showing as to whether a satisfactory explanation thereof has been presented. The facts which are recognised indicia of fraud are numerous, the most important being the insolvency or indebtedness of the transferrer, lack of consideration for the conveyance, retention by the debtor of possession of the property, relationship between the transferrer and the transferee, the reservation of benefit to the transferrer, the pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or concealment, and the transfer of the debtors entire estate. None of these things alone proves fraud but they do warrant an inference of fraud especially where there is a concurrence of many of these "badges." 10. Dhodi in his "Law of Fraud and Fraudulent Transfers in India", second edition, page 205 and following, indicates the following as the badges of fraudulent conveyances : "(1) The strongest indication is the continuance of the grantor in possession of the property where such possession is not under or consistent with the deed of conveyance even if the possession be jointly with the grantee, except where the grantor and grantee are husband and wife. The mere fact of having some interest in property would not render it void. (2) The retention of title deeds of the property alienated, by the alienor would render it void. (3) Indebtedness is a very strong evidence though not conclusive proof of fraudulent intention. (4) Alienation of substantially the whole of the property of the grantor e.g., gift of all before attachment. (5) Alienation made after issue of warrant of attachment, after notice of suit, after injunction in execution: and soon after decree. (6) False recital, known to be false, made in the deed of alienation, e.g., (i) fictitious items mentioned in a deed giving preference to a creditor, (ii) only part of the consideration recited having been paid. (7) The grantor reserving to himself a power of revocation. Mere fact of having some interest in the property would not render it void. (8) The deed of alienation contained an unnecessary statement to the effect, that the alienation was being made without any fraudulent intent. (9) A transfer having in effect delayed creditors is not void, unless there be inadequate consideration or other facts raising presumption of fraud. (10) Lack of passing of consideration mentioned in the deed when taken with other facts may go to show the deed to be a sham one, not passing anything. The intention of the parties to a transaction and the nature of interest thereby created can be determined from the following factors :- (1) Motive of entering into a benami transaction may be to defeat an impending execution. The motive of defeating an impending execution does not affect a transfer effected to prefer one creditor over another. It does not amount to a transfer intended to defeat all the creditors. The motive of defeating an impending execution does not affect a transfer effected to prefer one creditor over another. It does not amount to a transfer intended to defeat all the creditors. It does not render a bona fide transfer for adequate consideration, void. Such an intent is not one amounting to defraud, delay or defeat creditors within S. 53, Transfer of Property Act. (2) Position of the parties to the transaction, their condition, state and rank and the direct tendencies of the transfer are circumstances determining their intention. (3) Previous or subsequent conduct of the parties, the possession of the property in question; the possession of title deeds of the property, are factors on the point of intent. (4) Relationship of the parties to one another, as father and sons, or husband and wife, or a transfer to an employee of the transferors legal adviser, transfer to uncle, transfer to brother; go to decide the question of intention. Mere relationship is not enough. (5) The source or adequacy of purchase money determines intent...........". Har Prasad v. Mohammad Usman, AIR 1943 All 2 (L); Bhikabhai Muljibhai v. Panachand, ILR 43 Bom 707: (AIR 1919 Bom 99) (M); Gopal v. Bank of Madras, ILR 16 Mad 397 (N); Muthu K. R. V. Alagappa Chetty v. Dasappa Chettiar, 1913 Mad WN 141 (O); Chidambaram Chettiar v. Sami Iyer, ILR 30 Mad 6 (P), Solema Bibi v. Hafez Mahammad Hossein, AIR 1927 Cal 836 (6); Gopichand v. Jodhraj Deojit, AIR 1929 All 458 (R); Narayana Pattar v. Viraraghavan Pattar, ILR 23 Mad 184 (S); V. V. Rajabhadar Mudaliar v. Thiruvengada Mudaliar. AIR 1928 Mad 20 (1) (T); Gaya Prasad v. Murlidhar, AIR 1927 All 714 (U); Maung Din v. Ma Hnin Me, AIR 1925 Rang 227 (V); Mohideen Tharagan v. Muhammad Mustappah Rowther, AIR 1930 Mad 665 (W); Bhagwant v. Kedari, ILR 25 Bom 202 (X); Atmaram Udhavdas v. Dayaram Sawney, AIR 1929 Sind 94 (Y); Ghunsham Das v. Uma Pershad, 50 Ind Cas 264: (AIR 1919 PC 6) (Z); Mt. Amina Begam v. Sheo Prasad, AIR 1931 Oudh 344 (Z1); Mrs. N. Johnstone v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1931 Lah 419 (Z2). 11. Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find the following indicia of fraudulent conveyance making out that Ex. A-1 is one such. Amina Begam v. Sheo Prasad, AIR 1931 Oudh 344 (Z1); Mrs. N. Johnstone v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1931 Lah 419 (Z2). 11. Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find the following indicia of fraudulent conveyance making out that Ex. A-1 is one such. Firstly, this conveyance came into existence after Muniammal had started proceedings to realise her debt. Secondly, this is the only piece of property which the judgment-debtor possessed in this world. Thirdly, in the sale deed Ex. A-1 no provision has been made for discharging the decree debt of Muniammal. Fourthly, the vendee plaintiff has been prevaricating alternately that he made no enquiries regarding the indebtedness of the vendor and that the vendor apprised him of his indebtedness. In either event the fraudulent intent of this vendee would stand made out. Fifthly, it has been established that this Baby Soda Factory is worth Rs. 1,000 and more and has been purported to be sold for Rs. 500. Sixthly, subsequent to this alleged purchase, possession of the Soda Factory has been with the vendor and it has been managed through his son. Though the plaintiff claimed to have been in possession and enjoyment of the movables right from the date of his purchase on 1-10-1951, the licence for the business Ex. A-5 and the visitors book maintained under the Shops and Establishments Act, Ex. A-4 show that they have come into existence only after the date of attachment. It is only the vendors son who according to the plaintiff, is the sole employee of the business. The learned District Munsif therefore came to the correct conclusion relying on Narasimhamurti v. Maharajah of Pittapur, AIR 1941 Mad 690 : 1941 (2) MLJ 99 (Z3), that this sale transaction was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat Muniammal from realising the fruits of her decree. 12.Then in regard to equity, if any, in favour of the vendee it is an elementary maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity". In this case the sale deed itself is not supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 500 as concluded by the learned District Judge. On the other hand, the evidence as analysed by the learned District Munsif clearly shows that cash consideration of Rs. 345 did not pass. In this case the sale deed itself is not supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 500 as concluded by the learned District Judge. On the other hand, the evidence as analysed by the learned District Munsif clearly shows that cash consideration of Rs. 345 did not pass. In fact it stands to common sense that the plaintiff, a shrewd merchant, will not throw good money after bad money. Therefore, when the entire transaction is a fraudulent one brought about in collusion by the vendor and vendee in order to defraud an innocent third party, the charge created by the learned District Judge is unmerited on facts and unknown to law. The plaintiff is not entitled to any equity in his favour in this suit. 13. In the result, the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge are set aside and the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif are restored and this second appeal is allowed with costs. 14. No leave. Appeal allowed.