ORDER H.R. Krishnan, J This is an application under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution by an objector to the grant of a permit on a particular route to the non-applicant; this objection was rejected both by the Regional Transport Authority and in appeal by the State Transport Authority as well. The prayer is that this Court may in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction correct the appellate judgment dismissing the Applicant's objection; and under Article 226, direct the Regional Transport Authority to cancel the permit given to the non-applicant No. 1. The grounds are: (i) Firstly, that the decision of the two authorities has been vitiated by the Regional Transport Authority having in an illegal manner granted a temporary permit to the same applicant, and then making use of that fact, as a ground justifying grant of the permanent permit. (ii) Secondly, the decision that there is sufficient traffic has been arrived at from the grant of the temporary permit itself. (iii) Thirdly, the appellate authority was wrong in holding that the applicant had sufficient number of stage carriages at the time of the application to run the service on the new route, in accordance with the new permit. (iv) Finally, it is urged that the whole procedure has been wrong. The application was for the extension of a permit over a longer route whereas the procedure adopted and the permit granted were for what can be called a new permit altogether. In fact, the extension of a route is not contemplated in the statute. The facts of the case are the following. Both the applicant and the non-applicant No. 1 are operators of stage carriages. At the relevant period the applicant was running a service from Satna to a place called Birsinghpur via Kothi. The distance from Satna to Kothi is about 14 miles and Birsinghpur is some distance beyond. The non-applicant No. 1 was running a service from Maihar to Satna. In March 1956, he made an application that he might be given a permit on an extended route, and the stage carriage which was plying from Maihar to Satna may be permitted to ply beyond Satna to a place called Jhali, via Kothi, Jhali itself being about 8 or 10 miles beyond Kothi in a direction different from Birsinghpur. In March 1956, he made an application that he might be given a permit on an extended route, and the stage carriage which was plying from Maihar to Satna may be permitted to ply beyond Satna to a place called Jhali, via Kothi, Jhali itself being about 8 or 10 miles beyond Kothi in a direction different from Birsinghpur. The permit when granted has the effect that both the operators were plying buses, between Satna and Kothi on the same route, but at different hours; and then branched off, the applicant towards Birsinghpur as before, and the non-applicant to Ohali as part of his new route. Of course, the non-applicant would have come from Maihar to Satna and would be going from Satna to Maihar, but that was a route with which the applicant had no concern. The application was published in the manner provided in Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and objections were invited. The applicant did not apply for a permit on this new route from Satna to Jhali but seems to have offered to take the bus already plying on detour from Kothi to Jhali and back, and then to Birsinghpur as before. The usual report was taken from the District authorities on various matters including the sufficiency of traffic and possibly the condition of the road and the like. Ultimately, the applicant's objection notwithstanding, the permit was granted and the non-applicant was allowed to ply two stage carriages on this route Satna-Jhali via Kothi. As far as that new route was concerned this was a fresh permit, but it could also be called an extended permit in the sense that the stage carriages having come from Maihar to Satna were now permitted to proceed beyond Satna on this route. Between the application and the grant of the permit a temporary permit was issued. Various allegations have been made about the manner of grant of the temporary permit, but I note that it should not have been granted after the coming into operation of the amending Act 100 of 1956, which has enacted the first proviso to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, expressly to the effect that such a temporary permit should in no case be granted in respect of a route for which an application for a new permit is pending. There is no doubt that the temporary permit for this period was not proper. Had there been any application either before the State Transport Authority in appeal, or before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the grant of the temporary permit it would certainly have been allowed. But as pointed out by the State Transport Authority the temporary permit has ceased to be of any force, and now we are concerned only with the permanent permit granted by later order. We have still to see, whether the mere fact that the non-applicant was granted a temporary permit, has been given as the only or the main justification for the grant of a permanent permit. The nearest approximation to this is a passage in the Regional Transport Authority's order. Apropos to the question whether there was sufficient scope the Regional Transport Authority writes in its order dated 22-5-1957 that: From the report of the Deputy Commissioner and the D.S.P. it appears there is a scope on this route for two daily services. Formerly temporary permits used to be granted to the operators on this route. In view of the amendment to Section 62 of the Act, the practice has been discontinued. Grant of a temporary permit shows that there is scope on this route. It is clear that apart from any temporary permit, whether in the past or in connection with this application itself, the authority was finding that there was scope, on the report of the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police. Even if only the report of these officers is taken into account there was justification for the grant in view of the scope. Again, the temporary permit spoken of in this connection is not the permit granted illegally after this application but the permit granted "formerly" when it was legal. Thus the fact that a temporary permit had been illegally granted for some time to this non-applicant has not really affected the decision even in the matter of the finding about the ''scope". This disposes of the first two grounds. The third ground is really in regard to a finding of fact. Under the law before the amendment by Act 100 of 1956 an applicant for a new permit had to show that he was already in possession of stage carriages of the proper description and capacity. This disposes of the first two grounds. The third ground is really in regard to a finding of fact. Under the law before the amendment by Act 100 of 1956 an applicant for a new permit had to show that he was already in possession of stage carriages of the proper description and capacity. The application was given in March 1956 but it came up before the Regional Transport Authority only in April, 1957. Assuming that the test was as prescribed in the old Section 46 the State Transport Authority had found as a fact that the non-applicant had two spare buses. He had been already plying 6 buses and had applied for two more on this route. Therefore, he should have had 8 buses which is exactly what the State Transport Authority had found. Mr. Patankar, counsel for the present applicant, offered to prove from the fact on the file of this case that the State Transport Authority was wrong in coming to the finding of fact that the applicant had two extra buses; he might have got the new buses after the permit was granted, but it is wrong to say that he already had them on the date of the application. I am not prepared to enter into this question of fact. In my opinion, it is not the business of the High Court in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution to go into the findings of fact; in regard to it, the statutory appellate authority should be deemed to be the final forum. In view of the amendment of the Act before the matter came up "before the Regional Transport Authority this whole controversy is now altogether pointless, As the Section 46 stood originally, the application was for a permit in respect of the particular vehicle. But the section has been recast and now the applicant has only to state how many buses he intends or proposes to operate or keep in reserve in relation to the route concerned. Any way in view of the finding of fact given by the appellate authority it is unnecessary for this Court to examine this ground. Finally we have a new ground not apparently canvassed either before the Regional Transport Authority or before the appellate authority. At any rate, I do not find it expressly mentioned in the applications, or discussed in the orders concerned. Finally we have a new ground not apparently canvassed either before the Regional Transport Authority or before the appellate authority. At any rate, I do not find it expressly mentioned in the applications, or discussed in the orders concerned. The application was for the extension of the route. . "Extension on a permanent basis up to Jhali of M/S. "Jotumal Salamat Rai's service from Maihar to Satna". The procedure adopted was one laid down in Section 57 which speaks of "application for grant of permits". The permit itself is in the form of a new one on the extended portion of the route. The argument is that the law does not contemplate any extension of the route, and, therefore, no such application could have been entertained. Again, the permit granted was not the permit that was sought because the applicant wanted an extension and he has been given a new permit. This apparently ingenious argument has not been discussed by any High Court hitherto in any reported case. The nearest approximation to it is contained in Barrackpore Bus Syndicate v. Serajuddin AIR 1957 Cal. 444 . In that case there were several other points; the finding was that the "route was not condition of the permit; still, a variation of the route is in effect the grant of permit in a tresh route and is therefore a fresh permit". That Court held that once the route is varied, a fresh permit was necessary and the test laid down in Section 47 applied and certainly the procedure in Section 57, should be adopted. This is almost obvious. Whether we call it an extension of the route A-B to a point C, or whether it is a fresh permit for the new Section B-C the result is the same. The stage carriage of the appropriate quality and capacity should leave at the prescribed hour from the point B and point C respectively. So long as these conditions are observed it makes no difference, whether the stage carriage only starts from point B or whether it has already come from point A over a route that is already permitted. As far as the authorities are concerned it might as well have dropped from the skies. So long as these conditions are observed it makes no difference, whether the stage carriage only starts from point B or whether it has already come from point A over a route that is already permitted. As far as the authorities are concerned it might as well have dropped from the skies. All they are concerned with are the proper quality, capacity, timing at points B and C. Thus what may be called an application for an extended route is also an application for the new route that forms the extension. It is only a manner of saying. The condition is that the operator shall go on a particular route and not on any other. If, there is to be a new route there is to be a fresh permit. The route is a new route, if the original permit does not justify plying on that stretch of the road. Thus, it is merely quibbling with words to say that an extension was sought, and a fresh permit was granted. It is of interest to note that the Act does not provide for what has been called an extension of the route. From this it is argued on behalf of the objector that there can be no extension. This ground is not correct. What the applicant or anybody means by an extension of the route is a new stretch of route or the area not covered by the previous permit; so it is a new route to that extent and the procedure in the law should be followed. I, therefore, find there is no force in this ingenious argument. In the result, I find no justification either for correcting the appellate order of the State Transport Authority or for directing that authority and the Regional Transport Authority that the permit granted to the non-applicant No. 1 should be cancelled. The application is dismissed, pleader's fee to the non-applicant No. 1 of Rs. 100. Application dismissed.