Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and decree in O. S.8 of 1952 on the file of the District Court of Mavelikara. Defendants 9 and 10 are the appellants. 2. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the children of Krishna Panicker" deceased, while defendants 1 to 7 are the members of Krishna Panicker's tarwad. The 1st defendant Kochukutty Amma is the daughter of his sister Lekshmi Amma, deceased. Defendants 6 and 7 are "the children of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant had an elder sister Parvathy deceased, whose children are the defendants 2 to 5. Krishna Panicker obtained from two senior members of the Cherukara tarwad a mortgage with possession under Ext. B dated 26-4-1088 for a sum of Rs. 2450/- in respect of 21 acres 83 cents of Sy. No. 501/1 of Kalloopara Village in Thiruvella Taluk. By Ex. C judgment dated 24-1-1105 in O S.148 of 1096 of the Kottayam District Court against Krishna Panicker as 1st defendant and others, certain junior members of the Cherukara tarwad obtained decree setting aside Ext. B mortgage on the ground that it was executed against the terms of a family udampadi and further it contravened the provisions of the Nair Act of 1088. The decree provided for recovery however on payment of the value of the improvements effected on the property from date of the mortgage. We are concerned in this suit with 15 acres of Ext. B mortgage holding and the value of the improvements thereon amounting to Rs. 1685-8 as. 3. This area of 15 acres which is scheduled to the plaint as item 1 was, at the date of Ext. C suit, in the occupation by permission, of Krishna Panicker's sister Lekshmi and another member Sankaran Raman of his tarwad. They had accordingly been impleaded as defendants 6 and 7 in that suit. They did not raise any contest. On the death of Lekshmi, 6th defendant, pending that suit, her five daughters were impleaded as defendants 9 to 13. Parvathy, the mother of the defendants 2 to 5 here was the 9th defendant and Kochukutty the first defendant here was the 10th defendant. Soon after their impleading, those 9 and 10 defendants raised contention in Ex. C case that Ex. B mortgage did not appertain to Krishna Panicker alone but enured to the tarwad, having been taken in his name as manager thereof. Soon after their impleading, those 9 and 10 defendants raised contention in Ex. C case that Ex. B mortgage did not appertain to Krishna Panicker alone but enured to the tarwad, having been taken in his name as manager thereof. Further they alone were in exclusive possession of and had effected improvements in a 15 acres area covered -by Ex. B, viz., item 1 herein and so the decree for redemption in respect thereof should be passed in their favour only. They appealed incidentally to the application of the doctrine of adverse possession as against Krishna Panicker, vide Ex I written statement dated 14-1-1103. This case of independent right set up by his nieces was of course resisted by Krishna Panicker. But the court by Ex. C judgment gave decree as regards the improvement value on the 15 acres in question jointly in favour of the contending parties, viz., defendants 1, 9 and 10 in that suit leaving it to them to resolve their differences inter s& in separate suit. Krishna Panicker died in 1112. His children have now filed this suit for declaration of their title through their father and for recovery of possession of item 1 from defendants 1 to 7 and their alienees defendants 8 to 14 under Exs. F to P, with mesne profits for three years before suit and for the future. Plaintiffs also claim declaration that they are alone entitled to recover the value of improvements concerned, viz., Rs. 1685.8 as. as and when it is deposited into court. The plaintiffs laid their suit on 12-6-1952. 4. Defendants 9 and 10, two of the alienees, the first under Ex. M sale deed dated 7-5-1120 by defendants 1,6 and 7 and the second under Ext. N sale deed dated 12-10-1950 by defendants 2 to 4, of portions of the property alone contest. They have by their written statements merely sought to resuscitate the contentions raised by Lekshmi Parvathy and Lekshmi Kochukutty in Ext. C suit but laid special emphasis on adverse possession and limitation in the light of the passage of time till this suit was instituted. 5. The court below in elaborate judgment has found that Ex. B mortgage was executed by the Cherukara tarwad only to favour its dependent Krishna Panicker and to requite him for personal services rendered. C suit but laid special emphasis on adverse possession and limitation in the light of the passage of time till this suit was instituted. 5. The court below in elaborate judgment has found that Ex. B mortgage was executed by the Cherukara tarwad only to favour its dependent Krishna Panicker and to requite him for personal services rendered. In fact Krishna Panicker was merely accommodating the members of his tarwad when he allowed them to live, in the mortgage holding but that could not give a hold to the tarwad in respect thereof. The court below further found that the tarwad of Krishna Panicker had not funds enough to effect the large improvements in the holding and so all the improvements therein should be attributed only to Krishna Panicker. On the plea of adverse possession and limitation, the court below found that in virtue of the possession of Krishna Panicker and the permissive nature of the occupation of Lekshmi and her daughters Parvathy and the 1st defendant, as found by it, no such plea really arose. In the result the court set aside all the alienations impugned inclusive of Exs. M and N in favour of the defendants 9 and 10 and granted decree as prayed for, subject only to a modification of the mesne profits claim in regard to which it gave interest at the rate of 12% on the mortgage amount. Items 2 to 5 buildings in item 1 put up by defendants, 5, 8, 9 and 11 were directed to be removed failing which the plaintiffs were given liberty to do so and realise the costs as against the defaulting defendants. 6. Mr. K.K. Mathew, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants 9 and 10 did not seek to canvass before us the findings of the lower court, except as regards adverse possession and limitation raised by his clients. Dealing with these pleas, he strenuously contended that the court below had failed sufficiently to consider the rival case as to possession between Krishna Panicker and his nieces, in the light of Ext. R mortgage dated 16-12-1101 executed by Krishna Panicker in favour of his son-in-law with respect to the plaint schedule property and the findings entered as regards it in Ext. III judgment dated 29-6-1103 in criminal case between that mortgagee's brother and the grand-nephews of Krishna Panicker, which arose soon later. R mortgage dated 16-12-1101 executed by Krishna Panicker in favour of his son-in-law with respect to the plaint schedule property and the findings entered as regards it in Ext. III judgment dated 29-6-1103 in criminal case between that mortgagee's brother and the grand-nephews of Krishna Panicker, which arose soon later. It is no doubt true that the learned Magistrate in Ex. III judgment found that Ex. R was intended as a ruse to get at possession of the properties and had proved abortive. But that finding by itself could not go far. For, Lekshmi the ancestress of the grand-nephews had at no time chosen to question Krishna Panicker's title to the mortgage or his possession thereunder and it was only after her death and the improvements in the property had been effected that her daughters ever came into the scene at all. There was also the evidence of Pw. 2 the kariasthan of the Cherukara tarwad for long between 1094 to 1112, to say that Krishna Panicker effected the improvements in the property and that the first defendant or Parvathy had no possession of the property except occupying the huts constructed by Krishna Panicker in the property. As against this we have the 10th defendant as Dw.1 swearing to a new case that 1st defendant and Parvathi were in possession from the date of the mortgage and they had put up the shed. There is no reason in the circumstances to depart from the finding entered by the court below upholding Krishna Panicker's possession of the property during the course of the litigation in O. S.148 of 1096 and later. The fact that he did not file suit during his lifetime for declaration and recovery as here may only mean that he was so generously inclined towards his nieces and their-children as not to get worked up against them on account of their erstwhile opposition. And this would appear to be confirmed by the fact that the alienations effected by the defendants 1 to 7 all commence with the death of Krishna Panicker. We hold therefore along with the lower court that the question of adverse possession and limitation raised by the defendants 9 and 10 does not arise. 7. And this would appear to be confirmed by the fact that the alienations effected by the defendants 1 to 7 all commence with the death of Krishna Panicker. We hold therefore along with the lower court that the question of adverse possession and limitation raised by the defendants 9 and 10 does not arise. 7. Learned counsel referred to the hostile and open declaration of Lakshmi Parvathi and the 1st defendant as against Krishna Panicker in the written statement filed so long ago as 1103 and the failure of Krishna Panickar till 1112 when he died or of the plaintiffs or his heirs till 1951 to vindicate their rights over the property or the improvements therein. But in the face of the finding already entered by us as to permissive nature of their occupation, the question of the applicapility of Art.142 cannot arise. For when a third party takes possession with the permission of the owner the latter is neither dispossessed nor does he discontinue possession within the meaning of the Statute. Nor can Art.144 apply to the case. For possession commenced under the authority of or in subordination to the true title does not become transformed into a hostile one by a mere change in the mental attitude. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kadathu Ambi v. Secretary of State, I.L.R. 47 Mad. 572 P. C. "a licencee cannot claim title only from possession however long unless it is proved that the possession was adverse to that of the licensor to his knowledge and with his acquiescence". 8. He is required to prove that his possession became adverse at a particular point of time to the knowledge of the person against whom the prospective title is claimed. Of this there is no proof in the case. 9. It follows, therefore, that there is no substance in the appeal. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.