Order.- The petitioner was the owner of the lands and respondents 1 and 2 were the tenants. After Madras Act XXV of 1955 came into force, the petitioner applied for the eviction of respondents 1 and 2, who will be referred to hereafter as respondents, on two grounds: (1) that they were in arrears of rent and (2) that they had utilised a portion of the land that had been leased to them for agricultural purposes, for construction of sheds they Were using as fuel depots. The Revenue Court found that the respondents were in arrears of rent. But under section 3 (4) (b) of the Act the Revenue Divisional Officer permitted the respondents to pay the arrears of rent. That was done, and that ground of eviction was therefore no longer available. With reference to the second contention, the Revenue Divisional Officer recorded: “This fuel depot is said to be maintained on a small extent. I do not think that this can be taken to fall under section 3 (a) (b).” The application of the petitioner was rejected. The petitioner applied under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari, to set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Revenue Divisional Officer erred in allowing time to the respondents to pay the arrears of rent, particularly in the circumstances of this case. The Revenue Divisional Officer had jurisdiction to grant the time. The jurisdiction Was vested in him by section 3 (4) (b). The mere fact that the Revenue Divisional Officer did not record the reasons in writing why he permitted the tenants further time to pay the arrears, does not, in my opinion, affect, in the circumstances of this case, the exercise of this jurisdiction. Nor does it make an erroneous exercise of discretion. Since the arrears of rent have been paid, that may no longer be a ground for eviction for the learned counsel for the petitioner to urge at this stage. One of the grounds on which eviction can be sought is that set out in section 3 (2) (c), use of the land for any purpose not being an agricultural or horticultural purpose. The extent of the land which has been diverted from agricultural or horticultural purpose is immaterial. One of the grounds on which eviction can be sought is that set out in section 3 (2) (c), use of the land for any purpose not being an agricultural or horticultural purpose. The extent of the land which has been diverted from agricultural or horticultural purpose is immaterial. If any portion of the holding is used for a purpose other than agricultural or horticultural purposes the liability for eviction from the entire holding will arise under section 3 (2) (c) of the Act. The specific finding of the Revenue Divisional Officer was that a portion of the land was in use as a fuel depot. What the extent was, was not recorded; but then it was not material. I am unable to understand the further conclusion of the Revenue Divisional Officer, that it did not fall within the scope of section 3 (2) (b). Certainly use of the land as a fuel depot is not putting the land for agricultural or horticultural purposes. As I have pointed out, the extent of the land is immaterial in deciding whether the respondents as cultivating tenants had committed an act which came within the scope of section 3 (2) (c) of the Act. This is really a case where the Revenue Divisional Officer failed to exercise the statutory jurisdiction vested in him. In fact he has virtually ignored the specific statutory direction in section 3 (2) (c). It is not a matter for discretion. The rule nisi is confirmed, and a writ of certiorari will issue setting aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, which in effect means that he will have to dispose of the petition afresh in accordance with law and decide whether on the second contention, if proved, the petitioner is entitled to obtain an order of eviction. The petition is allowed. No order as to costs. V.S. ----- Petition allowed.