ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. These two petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arise out of proceedings under Section 7 of the M. B. Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, Samvat 2006 for the assessment of reasonable annual rent of a shop. Dalip Singh made an application on 14th March 1950 to the Rent Controller, Gohad, alleging that he was a tenant of a shop belonging to non-applicants, Totaram and Gangaram in the town of Gohad for about twenty years; that formerly he had been paying Rs. 2-4-0 as monthly rent but since 14th October 1949 the landlords enhanced it to Rs. 13 and that that rent was excessive. It was prayed that fair rent be assessed. The landlords opposed this application. After recording evidence produced by the parties, the Rent Controller by his order dated 23rd July 1953, assessed Rs. 7 per month as fair rent of the shop. As both the parties were dissatisfied with that decision, they filed cross-appeals before the District Judge, Bhind. The learned District Judge dismissed both the appeals. Being aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority, both the parties have come to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Shri Hargovind Mishra, appearing for Totaram and Gangaram, first of all contends that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to try the case before him, inasmuch as the statutory requirement of giving a notice under Section 7(2) of the M. B. Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, Samvat 2006 had not been fulfilled by the tenant applicant. The argument is that although the tenant did give notice dated 20th December 1949 to the landlords, that notice was of no avail because by that time the Act of Samvat 2006 had not even been enacted. Relying on the decision reported in 1954 M. B. L. J. 953, it is urged that there was no foundation for invoking jurisdiction under Section 7(2) for want of notice UNDER THAT ACT. This contention cannot be allowed to be raised here because it has been taken for the first time in this Court. In their written statement filed before the Rent Controller, the landlords did not take that objection at all. As has been held in Madhav Rao v. Ram Bharose 1955 MBLJ 1530 the objection must be deemed to have been waived and cannot be taken up now. In their written statement filed before the Rent Controller, the landlords did not take that objection at all. As has been held in Madhav Rao v. Ram Bharose 1955 MBLJ 1530 the objection must be deemed to have been waived and cannot be taken up now. It has also been held in Secretary of State v. Sheoramjee air 1952 Nag. 213 that the objection as to want of statutory notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be waived and once it is not taken at the earliest opportunity, it could not be allowed subsequently and it amounts to estoppel by conduct. In fact that point is now well settled. In the Privy Council decision reported in A.I.R. 1914 P. C. 140, on which Shri Mishra relies, it is laid down that the plea of want of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. But that is not precisely the point before us. The Privy Council decision on the question of waiver of notice required under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the one reported in Vellyan Chetliar v. Government of Madras 74 I.A. 223. In our opinion that authority applies to this case as the principle is the same. The case of Akhtar Hussain 1954 MBLJ 953 : AIR 1955 M. b. 21 is thus distinguishable because there the objection regarding want of notice was specifically taken in the written statement. Shri Mishra next argues that the finding of the Rent Controller was based on the Municipal Assessment Register but the Rent Controller could not give any decision on that basis because that was not the case pleaded by the tenant. Inviting our attention to Section 3 (e) of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, Samvat 2006 which defines the expression 'Reasonable Annual Rent' his argument is that fair rent can be determined: (1) on the basis of the rent which was actually realised on 1st January 1941 or (2) on the basis of rent which the premises could fetch on 1st January 1941 or, (3) on the basis of rent as shown in the Assessment Register of the Municipal Committee on 1st January 1941. Since in the present case the tenant elected to found his case on the first basis, the Rent Controller could not set up a new case for him and determine fair rent on the second or third basis. Since in the present case the tenant elected to found his case on the first basis, the Rent Controller could not set up a new case for him and determine fair rent on the second or third basis. Adverting to the plaint we find that the tenant was essentially complaining against the rent being excessive and came to the Controller with specific prayer for assessment of reasonable rent. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was no pleading. Moreover the tenant led particular evidence of Ram Narain on the basis of Municipal Register. At that stage the landlords did not object to the production of that evidence. Thus they were fully aware of the case which the tenant sought to prove. The landlords bad ample opportunity to produce their evidence. Hence on the authority of the Supreme Court in Nagubai's case AIR 1956 S. C. 593, we hold that this point of Shri Mishra has no substance. Then, coming to the merits of the case, the argument of the Learned Counsel for the landlords is that the judgment of the Rent Controller was not in accordance with settled principles of law and the learned District Judge too has not appreciated the points raised before him nor has he given correct findings. It is urged that the Rent Controller erred in fixing Rs. 7 as fair (monthly) rent. Shri P. D. Gupta, Learned Counsel for the tenant Dalip Singh, also argues that the finding of the appellate authority in affirming the figure of Rs. 7 per month is arbitrary. On a perusal of the judgments of the Rent Controller and the District Judge what we find is that the Rent Controller, after discussing the evidence adduced by the parties negative the allegation of the tenant that on 1st January 1941 he was paying Rs. 2-4-0 as monthly rental, but relying on the Municipal Assessment Register he held the monthly rental value of the shop to be Rs. 2-8-0 as on 1st January 1941. Increasing that by 50 per cent. as allowed by the law it came to Rs. 3-12-0. Then the Rent Controller took into consideration the enhancement in the Municipal House-Tax for the disputed shop, and he held that since the tax had been increased from 0-12-0 per year to Rs. 4 per year, the difference was to be borne by the tenant. as allowed by the law it came to Rs. 3-12-0. Then the Rent Controller took into consideration the enhancement in the Municipal House-Tax for the disputed shop, and he held that since the tax had been increased from 0-12-0 per year to Rs. 4 per year, the difference was to be borne by the tenant. But, obviously by an arithmetical mistake, he added Rs. 3-4-0 to Rs. 3-12-0. It was thus that he fixed Rs. 7 per month as a monthly fair rent. The Rent Controller should have really added the twelfth part of Rs. 3-4-0 to Rs. 3-12-0. The learned District Judge held that the Rent Controller had undoubtedly committed that mistake in calculation but because he was otherwise satisfied that Rs. 7 was the fair rent the result remained unaffected. His approach and his finding can be gathered from his own words quoted below: On a perusal of this judgment we are clearly of the opinion that the District Judge has not fully applied his mind to the materials before him. The Sthan Niyantran Vidhan provides only one appeal from the judgment of the Rent Controller. His judgment is final, which implies that the Legislature has entrusted to the District Judge a very important duty and the appellate authority is failing in it, if it does not appear from his judgment that he has made an honest endeavor to appreciate the real controversy between the parties, and to consider the evidence produced by them and the points urged by them. Every litigant is entitled to be told the reasons for every finding given in his favour or against him. The appellate authority was bound to apply its mind fully to the case before arriving at a certain conclusion. The expression is neither here nor there; no one knows what those entries were which impressed the learned District Judge. Similarly the opinion: is wholly vague and unmeaning. What those 'other reasons' were which weighed in the mind of the appellate authority are not known. Such a judgment cannot give satisfaction to any litigant. Both the parties have come to this Court and they are rightly aggrieved. No other remedy is open to them. Where on its face it appears that the appellate authority has passed such a perfunctory and vague judgment, it becomes our duty to interfere. Such a judgment cannot give satisfaction to any litigant. Both the parties have come to this Court and they are rightly aggrieved. No other remedy is open to them. Where on its face it appears that the appellate authority has passed such a perfunctory and vague judgment, it becomes our duty to interfere. this Court has to see that subordinate Courts do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. Both these petitions must, therefore, be allowed and the case must be sent back to the appellate authority for a fresh decision. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment passed by the District Judge, Bhind, on 6th May 1954 in Civil Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 35 and 43 of 1953, and we direct the District Judge, Bhind to hear those appeals afresh and decide them according to law Parties to bear their own costs in this Court. I agree. Petition allowed.