JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - The appellants filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif of Khalilabad claiming Rs. 61- as the price of certain mangoes which had been wrongfully and stealthily taken from a tree belonging to them. The suit was filed on the 21st of July 1949. It was contested on the ground that the plaintiffs had nothing to do with the tree whose fruits were in dispute; that the tree belonged to the defendants and that they had rightfully taken the fruits. The trial court rejected the defendant's contention and accepting the plaintiff's claim decreed the suit. The defendants went up in appeal to the Civil Judge and there for the first time raised a plea that the Panchayat Raj Act having come into force in 1947 the Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suit as it was cognizable by the Panchayati Adalat. This plea found favour with the learned Civil Judge. He set aside the decree of the trial court and remanded the case to it so that it may be transferred to the Panchayati Adalat for retrial. Against that order the plaintiffs preferred a first appeal to this Court. It came up for decision before Mr. Justice V. Bhargava. Two contentions were pressed on behalf of the appellants. The first was that the suit was of a nature which was not cognizable by a Panchayati Adalat and that it did not fall under any of the clauses of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 64 of the Panchayat Raj Act of 1947. The second contention was that in any case no Panchayati Adalat had been constituted before the date on which the suit was filed for the village in which the cause of action for the suit had arisen and on that account the suit could not be filed in any Panchayati Adalat. The civil court had, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The first contention was rejected by the learned Judge as he was of opinion that on the allegations made by the plaintiffs themselves the suit fell under clause (c) to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 64 of the Panchayat Raj Act. In respect of the second contention, however, the learned Judge felt that conflicting views had been taken by some learned Judges of this Court and that the conflict should be resolved. (1) of Sec. 64 of the Panchayat Raj Act. In respect of the second contention, however, the learned Judge felt that conflicting views had been taken by some learned Judges of this Court and that the conflict should be resolved. He, therefore, referred the following question for decision to a Division Bench. That is how the case has come before us. The Question is. "Whether Sec. 55 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act bars a civil court from taking cognizance of a suit of the nature mentioned in clause (c) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 64 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act even though on the date on which the suit is instituted on the regular side in the court having jurisdiction otherwise, no Panchayati Adalat had been constituted which would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit." 2. Under the Panchayat Raj Act as it stood on the date when the suit in hand was filed in the Munsif's Court, Sec. 55 provided: "No court shall take cognizance of any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act by a Panchayati Adalat unless an order has been passed by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Munsif under section 85." 3. Sec. 52 of the Act laid down: "Offences under the following sections, if committed within the jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat as well as abetments of ' and attempts to commit such offences shall be cognizable by such Panchayati Adalat." Then followed a list of offences which need not be reproduced here. 4. Sec. 64 of the Act said: "The jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat shall extend to any suit of the following description if its value does not exceed one hundred rupees." Then followed four clauses giving the descriptions of suits. 5. Sec. 56 of the Act required: "If at any stage of proceedings in a criminal case pending before a magistrate it appears that the case is triable by a Panchayati Adalat, he shall at once transfer the case to that Panchayati Adalat, which shall try the case de novo. Since then sections 55, 56 and 64 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act have been amended in several respects. But we are concerned in this case not with the amended sections but with the sections as they originally stood in 1949 when the present case was instituted. 6. Since then sections 55, 56 and 64 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act have been amended in several respects. But we are concerned in this case not with the amended sections but with the sections as they originally stood in 1949 when the present case was instituted. 6. The question which has been referred to us turns on the interpretation of Sec. 55 of the Panchayat Raj Act. The intention of the section obviously was to exclude the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in respect of a certain class of cases or suits (under the Act 'case' means a 'criminal proceeding' and 'suit' means a 'civil suit') and to make such cases or suits exclusively triable by the Panchayati Adalat. The contention of the defendants is that as soon as the Panchayat Raj Act came into force the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to entertain suits and cases which according to the Act had been made cognizable by the Panchayati Adalat came to an end irrespective of the fact whether Panchayati Adalats had been actually constituted under the Act and had started functioning or not. The bar created by Sec. 55, it is contended, was an absolute bar and was not dependent in any manner on the creation of Panchayati Adalats. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs, however, urges that such an absolute bar could never have been intended by the legislature. The bar created by Sec. 55 came into existence only after the Panchayati Adalats had started functioning. It is pointed out that some time was bound to be taken by the administrative authorities after the coming into force of the Act for the constitution of Panchayati Adalats, and the legislature could not obviously intend that during this intervening period there should be no authority to take cognizance of suits and cases contemplated by Sec. 52 and 64 of the Act. 7. Keeping in view the terms of Secs. 55, 56 and 64 of the Act it appears to us that the correct interpretation is that suggested on behalf of the plaintiffs. Sec. 55 bars all other courts from taking cognizance of "any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act by a Panchayati Adalat." What then are the cases or suits which are under the Act cognizable by a Panchayati Adalat? Sec. 55 bars all other courts from taking cognizance of "any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act by a Panchayati Adalat." What then are the cases or suits which are under the Act cognizable by a Panchayati Adalat? Cases cognizable by a Panchayati Adalat are, according to Sec. 52, cases relating to offences "committed within the jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat." Suits cognizable by a Panchayati Adalat have not been separately catalogued as has been done in respect of cases. But according to Sec. 64 the jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat shall extend to suits falling under the descriptions given in clauses (a) to (d) of that section. It appears to be obvious that an offence cannot be committed within the jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat till the Panchayati Adalat has been constituted. Similarly before the jurisdiction of a Panchayati Adalat can include any suit, that Panchayati Adalat must be functioning. A court cannot have any jurisdiction territorial or otherwise before it comes into existence and is legally constituted. Panchayati Adalats did not come into existence simply by the enforcement of the Panchayat Raj Act. Under Sec. 42 of the Act, after the Act had come into force, the Provincial Government or the prescribed authority was to divide the district into circles and to establish Panchayati Adalats for each circle. Panches had to be elected under Sec. 43 of the Act. A Sarpanch had to be elected under Sec. 44. The Panchayati Adalat could begin functioning only after these elections had been held. It was only when the Panchayati Adalat had been established that it could start exercising jurisdiction and taking cognizance of cases and suits. Till then the ordinary courts continued to have jurisdiction. If the other interpretation suggested by the defendants is accepted, serious inconveniences may follow and valuable rights may even be defeated. For instance, an offence mentioned under Sec. 52 may be committed and cognizance in respect of it cannot in that case be taken either by ordinary courts or by the Panchayati Adalat, the latter not being in existence. The limitation for a suit may be expiring, but it cannot be filed either in the ordinary court or in the Panchayati Adalat because no Panchayati Adalat is functioning. It is a well established principle of construction that the ousting of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts should not be readily inferred. The limitation for a suit may be expiring, but it cannot be filed either in the ordinary court or in the Panchayati Adalat because no Panchayati Adalat is functioning. It is a well established principle of construction that the ousting of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts should not be readily inferred. It should be inferred only when it is expressly provided in the enactment or necessarily follows from its provisions. It is an equally well established principle that if two interpretations are possible, the one tending to result in inconveniences and anomalies should be avoided provided of course the other interpretation which does not lead to such results does not involve a straining of the language of the statute. If Sec. 55 is interpreted bearing these principles in mind, we have no hesitation in saying that it does not exclude the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts till the Panchayati Adalat begins to function. 8. It is noticeable in this connection that Sec. 56 of the Act applies to cases only and not to suits. The result is that so far as criminal cases are concerned even if the ordinary court takes cognizance of a case because no Panchayati Adalat is functioning, if during the pendency of a case a Panchayati Adalat begins to function, the case has to be transferred to that Adalat and ceases to be triable by the ordinary court. Such a contingency does not appear to have been contemplated by the Act so far as suits are concerned. In respect of suits the material date is the date of the institution of the suit. If on that date a panchayati Adalat is functioning the ordinary civil court has no jurisdiction, but once it takes cognizance of a suit, it will retain jurisdiction to decide it even if a Panchayati Adalat is subsequently brought into being. 9. The first case in which this question was considered appears to be the case of State v. Badri, 1950 A.L.J. 564 The incident in that case had taken place on the 28th of June 1949. The complaint was filed on the 4th of July 1949 in the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court, but was forwarded to the City Bench Magistrates for disposal. It was decided by the Bench Magistrates on the 12th of October 1949. The complaint was filed on the 4th of July 1949 in the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court, but was forwarded to the City Bench Magistrates for disposal. It was decided by the Bench Magistrates on the 12th of October 1949. The Panchayati Adalat of the area in which the incident had taken place started functioning on the 15th August 1949 under a notification dated the 27th of July 1949, but a Sarpanch of the Panchayati Adalat was not elected till the 12th of October 1949. The point that was raised was that the Panchayati Adalat having started functioning from the 15th of August 1949 the Bench Magistrates should have transferred the case to that Adalat under Sec. 56 of the Act and had no jurisdiction to try the case. It was contended on behalf of the complainant that as the Sarpanch of Panchayati Adalat had not been elected the Panchayati Adalat had not really started functioning before the case was decided. But Malik, C. J., who was dealing with the case, took the view that the fact that the Sarpanch had not been elected was in no way material and if the Panchayati Adalat had been constituted during the pendency of the case in the Court of the Bench Magistrates, those Magistrates were bound to transfer the case to that Adalat and should not have decided the case themselves even though a sarpanch had not been elected. As we have already pointed out in view of Sec. 56 of the Panchayat Raj Act, the Magistrate's Court ceased to have jurisdiction from the date on which the Panchayati Adalat was established and was bound after the establishment of that Adalat to transfer the case to it. Simply because a Sarpanch had not been elected it could not be said that the Panchayati Adalat had not been established. The view taken by Malik, C. J. appears to have been in consonance with the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Joti Prasad v. Amba Prasad, A.I.R. 1933 Allahabad 358 In that case the election of a chairman of a District Board was being questioned in the civil court. Under the provisions of the District Board's Act the election could have been questioned only in the Tribunal provided by the Act. Under the provisions of the District Board's Act the election could have been questioned only in the Tribunal provided by the Act. It was, however, contended that though the Tribunal was functioning no rules had been framed for dealing with an election petition relating to the election of chairman of the Board and it was therefore open to the person challenging to go to the ordinary civil court. This contention was, however, rejected and it was held that if the Tribunal was there the jurisdiction of the civil court stood ousted and could not be held to be continuing simply because the rules dealing with the election petition questioning the election of a chairman had not been framed. 10. The next case in which the question arose for consideration is the case of Kripa Ram v. Ram Asrey, A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 414 The offence in that case had been committed on the 29th of April 1949 and the ordinary criminal court had taken cognizance of it and had convicted the accused person. It was contended before the Sessions Judge that on account of the enactment of the Panchayat Raj Act the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case even though a Panchayati Adalat had not been established by the date on which cognizance had been taken. The contention found favour with the Sessions Judge and he recommended to the High Court that the conviction should be set aside and the Magistrate should be directed to transfer the case to the Panchayati Adalat. It is not clear from the report whether a Panchayati Adalat had been established during the pendency of the case or not. The reference made by the Sessions Judge was, however, accepted, the conviction recorded by the Magistrate was set aside and the case was sent back to him with the direction that he should transfer it to the Panchayati Adalat concerned to be tried denovo. From this final direction it appears to follow that a Panchayati Adalat had been constituted during the pendency of the case and Sec. 56 of the Act had therefore come into operation. If that was the case, no exception can be taken to the correctness of the view taken by the learned Judge. From this final direction it appears to follow that a Panchayati Adalat had been constituted during the pendency of the case and Sec. 56 of the Act had therefore come into operation. If that was the case, no exception can be taken to the correctness of the view taken by the learned Judge. If, however, the Panchayati Adalat had been established only after the decision of the case by the Magistrate, we find it difficult to understand how the Magistrate could have transferred the case to the Panchayati Adalat under Sec. 56. If the case had already been decided by the Magistrate before the Panchayati Adalat came into existence there could be no question of its being sent back to the Magistrate for being transferred to the subsequently established Panchayati Adalat for decision under Sec. 56 of the Act. 11. The case in Kripa Ram v. Ram Asrey, A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 414 was dissented from by Desai, J. in Tunda v. The State, 1953 A.L.J. 344 The view taken in that case was that if on the date on which the offence was committed or on the date on which the conviction of the accused was recorded there was no Panchayati Adalat which had jurisdiction to try the case, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to try it was not lost. 12. The same view has been taken recently with respect to a civil suit by Gurtu, J. in Tribeni Kumari v. Mst. Ram Dulari, A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad 168 He too was of opinion that Sec. 55 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act bars the civil court from taking cognizance only of suits which are cognizable under the Act by a Panchayati Adalat and if there is no Panchayati Adalat constituted to take cognizance, no suit can be cognizable by it. 13. After giving the matter our best consideration therefore we have come to the conclusion that the question referred to us must be answered in the negative. We answer it accordingly. 14. The case will now go back for disposal to the learned Judges who referred to question to us. 15. V. Bhargava , J. (Dec. 1, 1958) - This was a first appeal from order passed by the lower appellate court remanding a suit to the trial Court with a direction to transfer it to the Panchayati Adalat. 14. The case will now go back for disposal to the learned Judges who referred to question to us. 15. V. Bhargava , J. (Dec. 1, 1958) - This was a first appeal from order passed by the lower appellate court remanding a suit to the trial Court with a direction to transfer it to the Panchayati Adalat. In this appeal one of the points, that was urged before me when it first came for hearing was whether the Jurisdiction of the Munsif who had taken cognizance of the suit was barred even though on the date on which the suit was instituted no Panchayati Adalat had been constituted which could have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That point was referred by me to a Bench in view of certain conflicting decisions. That decision of the Bench on this question has now been received. The Bench has held that the Jurisdiction of the Munsif to entertain the suit was not barred and he was competent to deal with the suit. In the circumstances the order passed by the lower appellate Court has to be set aside and the case has to go back to the lower appellate Court for decision of the appeal afresh on merits. 16. I, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court and send it back to that court with direction that that court will proceed to decide the appeal on merits. No one has today appeared on behalf of the appellants and in these circumstances I would direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal in this Court: the case in the lower Court will abide the result.