JUDGMENT This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of Bhutt J. The respondents filed a suit for possession of 815.40 acres of land and Rs. 1,900 as damages against the appellant. The trial Judge, Shri S. M. I. Alvi, decreed the plaintiff's claim for possession of land and Rs. 1,500 as damages. The defendant filed an appeal before the District Judge, Chhindwara, who upheld the decree of the trial Court. The defendant's second appeal also failed before the single Bench of this Court. In order to appreciate the points in controversy, it is necessary to go into the previous history of the lands. Raja Gokuldas (the grandfather of the plaintiff-respondents' mother Rajkumaribai) along with his nephew Rai Bahadur Ballabh-das was the proprietor of village Chhuie in Seoni tahsil. The said area of land, which at that time was about 803 acres and classed as 'forest area', was adjacent to the village Chhuie and formed part of the village, as per revenue records. It was at the time of the Settlement in the year 1918 that this area along with some more land, that is, in all 815.40 acres, was formed into a separate survey number 359/l and named as village Dundal Kheda. Raja Gokuldas and his nephew Ballabhdas laid claim to the said forest area in proprietary right, which claim was disputed by the Government. Ultimately, the dispute was settled. The agreement provided that the claimants gave up their claim of proprietary interest and that Government gave the lands on a perpetual lease, which was transferable and heritable. A formal deed to this effect was executed by the parties on 29-10-1904. The lessees were to pay Rs. 25 as premium or such other sums as might be fixed at the time of the Settlement. The lessees were permitted to utilise the lands in any way they liked subject to the provisions of section 124 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, 1881, and the rules framed there under. At a family partition later, the village Chhuie along with the forest fell to the share of Raja Gokuldas, who was succeeded by his son, Diwan Bahadur Jeevandas, who along with his son Seth Govindass, executed a trust-deed, dated 24-4-1915, in favour of the plaintiffs' mother, Rajkumaribai (daughter of Diwan Bahadur Jeevandas) regarding the said forest lands and some other property. The deed of trust provided that Rajkumaribai was to be the beneficiary during her life-time and the executants were to be the trustees. After Rajkumaribai's death, the trustees were to transfer the trust property to her sons unconditionally, who would become full owners. It was in accordance with the trust that the plaintiff-respondents became owners of the disputed lands, now known as village Dundal Kheda after their mother's death. During Rajkumaribai's life-time, a dispute again arose as to the interest held by the lessees. A claim for proprietary interest was advanced by the lessees. Recommendations by the revenue authorities for grant of proprietary interest were again made on the eve of the Settlement of the year 1918. But ultimately the claim to proprietary right was negative. The forest lands along with more land were formed into a survey number, No. 395/l, and formed into a village known as Dundal Kheda and separately recorded as 'Milkiyat Sarkar' liable to pay Rs. 40 as land revenue annually. The rights of the lessees continued to be governed by the agreement of 29-10-1904. After the date of vesting, namely, 31-3-1951, as per section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (No. 1 of 1951), the Deputy Commissioner acting on behalf of the Government took possession of the entire lands of Dundal Kheda, along with the felled timbsr, on the assumption, that the property vested in the State. Hence the respondents filed the present suit. The questions involved in the present case are these: (i) What was the status or the tenure of the lessees on the appointed date ? (ii) Whether the village Dundal Kheda vested in the State under sections 3 and 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act (No. I of 1951) ? The learned Government Advocate for the appellant contended firstly that the nature of the tenure of the lessees underwent a change at the time of the Settlement of the year 1918, whatever their rights might have been under the agreement of 29-10-1904. He pointed out that the lands did not remain mere lands, but were formed into a separate village having a separate survey number and, therefore, the lessee's status was altered into that of a proprietor, as Rajkumaribai was actually appointed a lambardar and described as a Thekadar in the Settlement Khasra ( vide Ex. D-2). He pointed out that the lands did not remain mere lands, but were formed into a separate village having a separate survey number and, therefore, the lessee's status was altered into that of a proprietor, as Rajkumaribai was actually appointed a lambardar and described as a Thekadar in the Settlement Khasra ( vide Ex. D-2). It may be noted that the said khasra also describes the village to be 'Milkiyat Sarkor' (that is, the property of the Government). Ex. D-5 is the final order of the Government, dated 9-11-1917, stating that there was to be no change in the tenure of the lands, that the forest lands were to be formed into a separate village and that a fresh draft-lease was to be prepared. By a further communication, dated 18-2-1918 (Ex. D-6), Government dropped the proposal of a fresh lease and ordered that the new village Dundal Kheda be treated as a 'Thekadari village'. Rajkumaribai executed a power of attorney, dated 22-4-1920 (Ex. D-7) in favour of Seth Chimanlal authorising him to represent her in her dealings with the Government. On the basis of the said documents, the learned Government Advocate urged that the village Dundal Kheda became a Thekadari village after the Settlement. As such, he contended that the village vested in the State on the date of vesting. In this connection, he pointed out the definition of the word 'Proprietor', which includes a Thekadar. It is as follows: 2 (m) 'Proprietor', in relation to- (i) the Central Provinces, includes an inferior proprietor, a protected thekadar or other thekadar, or a protected headman. At page 39 of the Final Report on the Revised Settlement of the Seoni district for the year 1916-1920 published by the Government, we find the following in para. 65 of the report: In the remaining 61 villages, of which one lies in the Seoni tahsil, the leases have been continued. A small plot of Government forest was claimed by the-malguzar of Chhuie and was granted to him by a special lease subsequent to Settlement. This has now been shown as a separate village Dundal Kheda, bringing the total of Government Thekadari villages to 62. Raiyatwari villages were dealt with separately in para. 69 of the said report at page 40. We have thus to see what the incidents of a Thekadari village were. Dr. This has now been shown as a separate village Dundal Kheda, bringing the total of Government Thekadari villages to 62. Raiyatwari villages were dealt with separately in para. 69 of the said report at page 40. We have thus to see what the incidents of a Thekadari village were. Dr. Kathalay in his book, 'C. P. Land Revenue Act' merely enumerates the five classes of villages including a Thekadari village (page 156 of his commentary). No further light is thrown on the topic. Baden Powell in his book 'Land Systems of British India' Volume, at page 217, explains the 'Proprietary Rights' thus: The first thing that will strike the student is the use of the term 'proprietary right' in these pages and in Indian Revenue books generally. It does not occur in text-books on English law or jurisprudence. I presume that the use of such a phrase is due to the feeling that we rarely acknowledge anything like a complete unfettered right vested in any one person. The interest in the soil has come to be virtually shared between two or even more grades, the cause of which we just now discussed. It is true that in many cases, only one person is called 'landlord' or 'actual proprietor' but his right is limited; the rest of the right, so to speak, is in the hands of the other grades, even though they are called 'tenants' or by some vague title such as 'tenure holders'. In many cases, as we have seen, this division of right is accentuated by the use of terms like 'sub-proprietor' or 'proprietor of his holding'. The 'proprietary right' seems then a natural expression for the interest held by a landlord, when that interest is not the entire 'bundle of rights' (which in the aggregate make up an absolute or complete estate) but only some of them, the remainder being enjoyed by other persons. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1953 SCR 476 : AIR 1953 SC 108 have approved of the said definition of 'Proprietary Right' by the learned author, which is a safe guide for understanding the terms proprietary right or proprietary interest. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1953 SCR 476 : AIR 1953 SC 108 have approved of the said definition of 'Proprietary Right' by the learned author, which is a safe guide for understanding the terms proprietary right or proprietary interest. Applying the said test, we find that the position of a proprietor is that of an intermediary between the sovereign power exercising eminent domain on the one hand and the under-tenure-holders enjoying lesser rights of mere usufruct on the other hand. The word 'thekadar' used in section 2 (m) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act (No. 1 of 1951) has been used in the sense of a thekadar of proprietary right (whether protected or otherwise) and not a mere lessee from the Government. The word 'thekadar' does not occur in sections 3 and 4 of the Act. We find it mentioned in section 39, which provides for reservation of the occupancy status in the lands in favour of the persons referred to therein. The word 'forest' mentioned in section 4(1)(a) of the Act obviously refers to forests granted to or held by a person in proprietary right or interest. It would not include the cases where forests are given on lease in non-proprietary right. The lease in the present ease would, in our opinion, not be affected by any of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act. Thus whatever be the positive incidents of a Thekadary village, in the present case it is neither a proprietary interest nor a raiyatwari tenure. It appears to be a special tenure, exclusively of its own kind, governed by the terms of the lease, dated 29-10-1904, which remained unaltered even by the Settlement of the year 1918, when men classing it as a Thekadary village meant nothing in particular. The lessees did not become proprietors, as they had no under-tenures to manage. They were directly responsible to Government to pay the nominal land revenue of Rs. 40. They had to deal with Government without any intermediaries, nor were they intermediaries between the Government and any under-tenure-holders. The essential condition of 'the proprietary interest' was lacking. The lessees did not become proprietors, as they had no under-tenures to manage. They were directly responsible to Government to pay the nominal land revenue of Rs. 40. They had to deal with Government without any intermediaries, nor were they intermediaries between the Government and any under-tenure-holders. The essential condition of 'the proprietary interest' was lacking. The word 'Thekadari' in the Settlement Khasra of the year 1918 appears to have been used in the general sense, in which it is understood in Hindi. A lease too is loosely called a 'Theka' in Hindi. Therefore, we hold that by the use of the phrase, 'Thekadary village' in the Settlement Khasra of the year 1918, the incidents of the original lease, dated 29-10-1904, were not in any way altered and that the status of the predecessor of the present respondents as simple lessees continued to be the same even after the Settlement. It was akin to the status of plot-proprietors or Government lessees in the Berar Land Revenue Code. However, in the present case, we are not required to pronounce upon the positive incidents of the lessee's tenure and we leave that question open by merely observing that the interest was of a special kind, but it did not amount to a proprietary interest. Coming to the question, whether the village Dundal Kheda comprising of the forest lands vested in the State under sections 3 and 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, the learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the definition of the word 'proprietor', vide section 2 (m), and urged that the same meaning has to be imported into sections 3 and 4 of the Act. We have no quarrel with that rule of interpretation. A Thekadar (or lessee) of proprietary right or interest would certainly be covered by the scheme of expropriation provided by sections 3 and 4 of the Act. But a mere lessee would not be covered if Government still continues to be the proprietor. We have no quarrel with that rule of interpretation. A Thekadar (or lessee) of proprietary right or interest would certainly be covered by the scheme of expropriation provided by sections 3 and 4 of the Act. But a mere lessee would not be covered if Government still continues to be the proprietor. The Government having negative the lessee's claim for grant of proprietary rights in the year 1904, as also at the Settlement of the year 1918, it is not open to the appellant to contend that the status of the respondents should be taken to be that of proprietor, merely because of the use of the word 'Thekadar' in the Settlement papers of the year 1918, although the essential factor regarding the position of an intermediary was at no time present. We are strengthened in our conclusion by what their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and others 1954 SCR 842 : AIR 1954 SC 139 , while considering the preamble of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (No. I of 1952) for the purpose of interpreting sections 2(g) and 2(h) which define the phrases 'estate' and 'intermediaries' respectively, observed as follows at page 848: Section 3(1) authorises the State Government to issue a notification declaring that the estate specified therein has passed to the State. The State Government has no power to issue a notification in respect of any property unless such property is an 'estate' as defined in section 2(g). A perusal of the relevant part of that definition which has been quoted above will at once shew that in order to be an 'estate' the collection of mahals or villages must, amongst other things, be held by the same 'intermediary'. An 'Intermediary', according to the definition in section 2(h), must be, amongst other things 'a Zamiadar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar, or Jagirdar within the meaning of "the Wajib-ul-urz or any Sanad, deed or other instrument'. The point to note is that in order to be an 'intermediary' within the definition, it is not enough, if the person is a Zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar or Jagirdar simpliciter but he must fall within one or other of the categories 'within the meaning of the Wajib-ul-urz or any Sanad, deed or other instrument'. The point to note is that in order to be an 'intermediary' within the definition, it is not enough, if the person is a Zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar or Jagirdar simpliciter but he must fall within one or other of the categories 'within the meaning of the Wajib-ul-urz or any Sanad, deed or other instrument'. Accordingly, the first head of argument advanced before us by learned counsel for the appellants is that the State Government had no authority to issue the notification because they are not intermediaries and, therefore, their properties are not estates. This argument obviously proceeds on the footing that the Act is intra vires the Constitution and if it succeeds then no question of constitutionality will arise. We have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by our learned brother Bose and we agree, substantially for reasons stated therein, that the appellants Shri Biswambhar Singh and Shri Janardhan Singh are not intermediaries as defined in section 2(h) and their respective properties, namely, Hemgir and Sarapgarh are not 'estates' within the meaning of section 2(g) and that being so the State Government had no jurisdiction or authority to issue any notification under section 3 with respect to their properties. Following the rule of interpretation laid down by their Lordships of the said case, we hold that the word 'Thekadar in section 2(m) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act (No. I of 1951) has the connotation of an intermediary and that a mere lessee or a Thekadar, who is not an intermediary would not be a 'proprietor' within the meaning of the section. The definition in section 2(m) may be inclusive, but still it has certain limitations and it has to be co-related with the preamble and other provisions of the Act, which clearly indicate the abolition of proprietary rights in the sense of intermediary interest. The Act does not affect the personal property of the proprietors noV any other property of the non-proprietors. The Act does not affect the personal property of the proprietors noV any other property of the non-proprietors. As regards the case of Raja Rajinder Chand v. Sukhi 1956 SCR 889 relied on by the learned Government Advocate for the appellant, it related to a suit filed by the superior proprietor against the inferior proprietor for a declaration that he (former) was the owner of all pine trees standing on the lands of the defendants within the said Jagir and for a permanent injunction restraining the latter from interfering with his rights of ownership and extraction of resin from the said trees. While discussing the question of the right of the superior proprietor, their Lordships made the following observations at page 901 of the ruling: The question now is whether the aforesaid Sanad was a grant primarily of land revenue, or it made a grant of other royal rights including the right to all pine trees which is the particular right under consideration in the six suits brought by the appellant. It is, we think, well settled that the ordinary rule applicable to grants made by a subject does not apply to grants made by the sovereign authority; and grants made by the Sovereign are to be construed most favourably for the Sovereign. This general rule, however, is capable of important relaxations in favour of the subject. It is necessary to refer here to such only of those relaxations as have bearing on the construction of the document before us; thus, if the intention is obvious, a fair and liberal interpretation must be given to the grant to enable it to take effect; and the operative part, if plainly expressed, may take effect notwithstanding qualifications in the recitals. In cases where the grant is for valuable consideration, it is construed in favour of the grantee, for the honour of the Sovereign; and where two constructions are possible, one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be more regarded than the Sovereign's profit (see para. 670 at p. 315 of Halsbury's Laws of Eng'and, Vol. VII, s. 12, Simonds Edn.). Their Lordships were considering the rights of the superior proprietor vis-a-vis the inferior proprietor in respect of the trees standing on the lands of the latter on the basis of the entries made in the Wajib-ul-urz. 670 at p. 315 of Halsbury's Laws of Eng'and, Vol. VII, s. 12, Simonds Edn.). Their Lordships were considering the rights of the superior proprietor vis-a-vis the inferior proprietor in respect of the trees standing on the lands of the latter on the basis of the entries made in the Wajib-ul-urz. We do not find anything which would support the learned counsel's contention in the present case, where the decision of the ease turns on the interpretation of the word 'proprietor' in section 2(m) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act (No. I of 1951). To conclude, we find that the interest of the respondents as lessees under the agreement of 29-10-1904, not being proprietary, could not and, in fact, did not vest in the State by virtue of sections 3 and 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950 (No. I of 1951). The Deputy Commissioner had no lawful authority to dispossess the respondents, purporting to act under the provisions of the said Act. The judgment of the learned single Judge, with all due respect, is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.