JUDGMENT O.H. Mootham, C.J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner and the second respondent were candidates for election to the office of Sarpanch of a Panchayat Adalat, and at an election held on the 14th September, 1956, the second respondent was declared elected. The petitioner thereupon filed an election petition under Sec. 12C of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act before the Sub-Divisional Officer in which he challenged the validity of the second respondent's election. His allegations were that the second respondent was disqualified from being elected as Sarpanch on two grounds; first, that he was less than thirty years of age, and, secondly, that he had been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. The Sub-Divisional Officer by an order dated the 24th September, 1957, dismissed the petition and the petitioner now comes to this Court, the prayer being that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari. 3. We are concerned in this petition only with the question whether the second respondent was disqualified for election as Sarpanch on the ground that he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude a disqualification under Cl. (h) of Sec. 5A of the Act. It is not in dispute that some years ago the second respondent was charged before a Magistrate with the offence of stealing a camera and was found guilty. Instead however of passing a sentence upon him the learned Magistrate considered the case to be a fit one for the exercise of the power conferred upon him by Sec. 3 of the U. P. First Offend; Probation Act, and he released the petitioner after due admonition. The Sub-Divisional Officer had some doubt whether the proceedings before the Magistrate resulted in the conviction of the second respondent, and in the circumstances he acceded to an application made to him on behalf of that respondent that he should, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by R. 13 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Rules read with the first proviso to Sec. 5A of the Act, remove the disqualification from which the second respondent undoubtedly suffered if the proceedings before the Magistrate resulted in a conviction. 4. The first proviso to Sec. 5A states that certain of the disqualifications therein enumerated, including the disqualification under Cl. 4. The first proviso to Sec. 5A states that certain of the disqualifications therein enumerated, including the disqualification under Cl. (h), "may in the manner prescribed be removed by the State Government," and R. 13 provides that an application for removal of a disqualification under, inter alia. cl. (h) shall be presented to the Sub-Divisional Officer of the subdivision concerned, and that the Sub-Divisional Officer may, after such enquiry as he deems fit, accept the application and remove the disqualification. Now, in the present case the Sub-Divisional Officer was of opinion that the disqualification of the second respondent should be removed and, although he has not in terms ordered that it be removed, it must I think be implied that he has done so. He then proceeded to dismiss the election petition. 5. In this Court two questions have been raised. The first is whether the second respondent had been "convicted" of an offence involving moral turpitude. Now, Sec. 3 of the U. P. First Offender's Probation Act reads as follows: "3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition. In any cases in which a person is found guilty of the offence of theft, dishonest misappropriation, or cheating, punishable under the Indian Penal Code, or of any offence punishable with not more than two year's imprisonment and no previous conviction is proved against him, the court by which he is found guilty may, if it thinks fit having regard to the age, character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender, and to the trivial nature of the offence or any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, instead of sentencing him to any punishment, release him after due admonition." 6. Learned Counsel for the second respondent has contrasted this section with sub-Secs. (I) and (1A) of Sec. 562 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under these subsections power is conferred upon a court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct or with admonition instead of sentencing them to imprisonment, but in each case the offender must be a person who has been convicted of an offence mentioned in the sub-sections. So also Sec. 4 of the U.P. First Offenders' Probation Act empowers the court to release on probation of good conduct a person who has been convicted of an offence referred to in that section. So also Sec. 4 of the U.P. First Offenders' Probation Act empowers the court to release on probation of good conduct a person who has been convicted of an offence referred to in that section. The argument is that the omission froth Sec. 3 of the latter Act of any reference to the conviction of the offender implies that the legislature intended that the proceedings of the court should not involve the conviction of the person in respect of whom an order under that section is made. 7. At first sight this argument is attractive, but in my opinion it is not well founded. It is true that the words "convicted" or "conviction" do not appear in Sec. 3, but before an offender can be released after due admonition under that section the court has to find him guilty of the offence with which he is charged, and in my opinion it is immaterial whether the section states that the offender is convicted of the offence or that he is found guilty of the offence. The two expressions have the same meaning. The verb 'to convict' is defined in the Oxford Shorter Dictionary as meaning 'to prove to be guilty,' and that meaning has been given to the word in at least two English cases. In Reg. v. Blaby, (1894) 2 Q. B. 170 the question to be decided was the meaning to be given to the word 'conviction' in a statute which provided that certain consequences should ensue upon a conviction for a misdemeanour following upon a previous conviction for a similar offence. At the trial a certificate was produced that the prisoner had been convicted on a previous occasion but that no judgment had been pronounced. It was argued for the prisoner that conviction must include judgment or sentence, but that Court of Crown Cases, Reversed in a judgment delivered by Hawkins, J., observed that it was the intention of the legislature "that the finding of the jury that the accused was guilty should be treated as a conviction; 'convicted' meant 'found guilty' and the sentence was to follow on the conviction." 8. In Rex v. Frank Sheridan, (1937) 1 K. B. 223 the defendant was charged at petty sessions with an indicatable offence and consented to be dealt with summarily. That court, after hearing the evidence on both sides, announced that it found the defendant guilty. In Rex v. Frank Sheridan, (1937) 1 K. B. 223 the defendant was charged at petty sessions with an indicatable offence and consented to be dealt with summarily. That court, after hearing the evidence on both sides, announced that it found the defendant guilty. Certain previous convictions of the defendant were then proved, whereupon the court, without passing sentence upon the prisoner, committed him for trial in the court of quarter sessions. It was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that there had been a conviction of the prisoner at petty sessions and that he could not therefore be tried for the same offence at quarter sessions. 9. The word 'conviction' is defined neither in the Penal Code nor in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but its meaning is, I think, made clear by Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 258 of the latter Act. The headnote to this sub-section is 'Conviction' and the sub-section provides that "Where in any case under this chapter the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 349 or Sec. 562, shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law." Sentence follows upon the conviction, and a conviction means that the accused has been found guilty. The consequence of taking the contrary view that proceedings under Sec. 3 of the U.P. First Offender's probation Act do not involve a conviction are serious, for not only would the accused person be deprived of his right to appeal against the order passed against him a right to which the Oudh Chief Court in S. N. Chopra v. S. A. Hameed, A.I.R. 1945 Oudh 59 has held he is entitled but he could not claim the protection of Sec. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if he was tried again for the same offence, as that section applies only where a person has been convicted or acquitted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction. I am therefore of the opinion that the second respondent was convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude and was prima facie disqualified under Sec. 5A of the Act from being chosen for the office of Sarpanch. 10. In these circumstances it becomes necessary to consider the effect of the Sub-Divisional Officer's order made under R. 13 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules removing the disqualification of the petitioner. 10. In these circumstances it becomes necessary to consider the effect of the Sub-Divisional Officer's order made under R. 13 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules removing the disqualification of the petitioner. I entertain considerable doubt with regard to the propriety of a Sub-Divisional Officer entertaining an application under that rule made by a person the validity of whose election is at the time being considered by the Sub-Divisional Officer, but this matter has not been the subject of argument before me and I express no opinion on it. It appears however clear that the order made by the Sub-Divisional Officer under R. 13 can have no retrospective effect, and that therefore the only effect of the Sub-Divisional Officer's order of the 24th September, 1957, was to remove the second respondent's disqualification as and from that date. His disqualification continued up to that date and he was therefore, in my opinion, disqualified under Sec. 5A of the Act from standing for election as Sarpanch. This aspect of the matter appears to have escaped the attention of the Sub-Divisional Officer. 11. The result is, therefore, that the Sub-Divisional Officer's order of the 24th September, 1957, cannot stand. The petition is allowed and a writ in the nature of certiorari will issue quashing that order. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.