JUDGMENT P.K. Tare, J. 1. This is the plaintiffs' appeal against the dismissal of their claim by Shri G.G. Saksena, Second Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 6-A of 1955 decided on 22-7-1955. 2. The respondent executed a deed of mortgage by conditional sale dated 3 7-1948 (Ex, P. 1) in favour of the appellants for a consideration of Rs. 16,000, whereby eight annas village share of mouza Pondi, along with 147.64 acres of sir and 22.59 acres of khud kasht lands and a house were mortgaged with stipulations that interest was to be charged at twelve annas per cent per month, and the whole of the amount with interest was repayable within two years, in default of which the mortgagee was to become entitled to foreclose the property. As per recitals of the deed; the debt was incurred in order to redeem the previous mortgage debt of one Jagannath Prasad amounting to Rs. 12.154 in respect of this very property, and to repay some other debts. 3. After the enactment of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act 1 of 1951, the village share vested in the State, while the sir and Khudkasht lands became the malik makbuza of the ex-proprietor mortgagor under Section 38 of the said Act. He filed an application before the Claims Officer under Section 19 (1) of the Act for determination of the mortgage debt due to the appellants. By order dated 14-11-195], the Claims Officer reduced the rate of interest from twelve annas per cent per month to eight annas per cent per month and determined the amount due as Rs. 14,115 after deducting the amount of compensation, viz, Rs. 1,885, which was directed to be paid to the appellants towards their mortgage-debt Out of the amount of Rs. 1885, a sum of Rs. 584/8, was however, adjusted towards the arrears of land revenue and the balance of Rs. 1,300/8 was paid to the appellants towards their mortgage debt. 4. The appellants filed the present suit on 30-1-1953 for foreclosure of the property. They alleged that the order of the Claims Officer was without jurisdiction, because the mortgage debt was an 'excluded debt' and not a 'secured debt'. They, therefore, contended that the rate of interest could not be reduced. The principal amount of Rs. 16,000 with Rs. 4. The appellants filed the present suit on 30-1-1953 for foreclosure of the property. They alleged that the order of the Claims Officer was without jurisdiction, because the mortgage debt was an 'excluded debt' and not a 'secured debt'. They, therefore, contended that the rate of interest could not be reduced. The principal amount of Rs. 16,000 with Rs. 6,540 as interest at the rate of twelve annas per cert per month from 3-7-1948 to 18 1-1955 was accordingly claimed to be due, out of which giving credit for the compensation amount of Rs. 1,300/8, a decree for the balance of Rs. 21,239/8 was prayed for. In the alternative it was pleaded that the plaint be treated as an application under Section 28 of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, In that connection, it was urged that the application should be treated as within time by excluding the period from 23-4-51 (date of application) to 14-11-1951 (date of order) under Section 34 of the Act. 5. The respondent's defence was that the order of the Claims Officer was not without jurisdiction, as the debt was not an excluded, but a secured debt, and, therefore, the only remedy was one provided by Section 28 of the Act and not by way of a suit. The plaint, if treated as an application under Section 28 of the Act, was said to be barred by time, as not having been filed within one year of the date of the order of the Claims Officer. 6. The learned trial Judge held that the debt was a 'secured debt' and not an 'excluded debt', and accordingly the order of the Claims Officer was held to be within jurisdiction. The plaint was treated as an application under Section 28 of the Act, but it was rejected as bring barred by time. Hence the present appeal. 7. The Learned Counsel for the appellants urged that the debt was an excluded debt and accordingly the order of the Claims Officer was without jurisdiction, as he could not scale down an 'excluded debt'. It was contended that the debt in question is covered by Section 17 (c) (vi) of the Act, which is as follows:- Excluded debt refers to secured claim due in respect of a mortgage claim against property in the hands of a subsequent transferee who has taken the transfer in order to satisfy the mortgage. It was contended that the debt in question is covered by Section 17 (c) (vi) of the Act, which is as follows:- Excluded debt refers to secured claim due in respect of a mortgage claim against property in the hands of a subsequent transferee who has taken the transfer in order to satisfy the mortgage. The learned trial Judge, however, held that the mortgage debt of the appellants was not an 'excluded debt'. One of the reasons given by him was that there was nothing to indicate that the previous debt of Jagannath Prasad was mortgage debt in respect of the property mortgaged with the appellants. This assumption is contrary to the clear recitals in the present mortgage deed and is, therefore, not correct. However, the mere existence of a previous mortgage alone is not enough to attract the operation of Section 17(c) (vi) of the Act which requires that the subsequent transferee should take the transfer in order to satisfy the previous mortgage. Therefore, unless the subsequent transferee undertook to discharge the previous mortgage, his subsequent mortgage would not be an 'excluded debt'. In the present case, though the subsequent mortgage was effected in order to satisfy the previous mortgage debt and other unsecured debts, the liability to satisfy the same remained with the mortgagor and not with the appellants. Accordingly, the subsequent mortgage was a 'secured debt' and not an 'excluded debt'. In this view the order passed by the Claims Officer was with jurisdiction. Consequently, the amount of Rs. 14.115/- declared by the Claims Officer to be due on the suit mortgage was validly determined under Section 27 of the Act. 8. The appellant's suit as originally filed was not tenable under Section 33 (c) of the Act. A mortgage with a condition of foreclosure doubtless does not create a personal liability on the debtor inasmuch as the mortgagee's right is limited only to the property that is mortgaged and cannot attach to the person or other property of the debtor. However, it does burden the debtor with a liability to pay the amount due, and clothes the mortgagee with the corresponding right to receive it. This relationship continues until a final decree of foreclosure is passed, and ac accordingly, the present suit is hit by clause (c) of Section 33 of the Act. 9. However, it does burden the debtor with a liability to pay the amount due, and clothes the mortgagee with the corresponding right to receive it. This relationship continues until a final decree of foreclosure is passed, and ac accordingly, the present suit is hit by clause (c) of Section 33 of the Act. 9. The question, therefore, is whether the plaint was rightly treated as an application under Section 28 of the Act. In our opinion, since the Court is the same, the mere form of the document by which the Court was moved, would not stand in the way of treating it of a nature contemplated by law. The trial Judge was, therefore, right in treating the plaint as an application under Section 28. 10. Having treated the plaint as an application under Section 28 of the Act, the trial Judge rejected it on the ground of limitation. Section 28 of the Act is as follows:- Any creditor in whose favour an order under section 27 has been passed may within one year apply to the Civil Court for passing a preliminary decree for sale of the encumbered property and the Civil Court shall accordingly pass a preliminary decree for sale fixing such time for payment as it may deem fit. The limitation for filing an application under this section is one year from the date of the order passed under section 27 of the Act. As the order of the Claims Officer was passed on 14-11-1951, the present suit filed on 30-1-1953 was clearly beyond the prescribed period of one year. 11. The Learned Counsel for the appellants, however, urged that under Section 34 of the Act, the time during which the proceedings before the Claims Officer had continued was liable to be excluded, while computing limitation. Section 34 of the Act provides as under:- In calculating the period of limitation for any suit filed in, or proceedings before, Civil Court in respect of any secured debt or claim which was the subject of any proceedings under this Chapter, the time during which such proceedings had continued shall be excluded. The respondent filed his application under section 19 (1) of the Act before the Claims Officer on 23-4-1951. The proceedings were pending before that tribunal till 14-11-1951, when the final order determining the debt was passed. The respondent filed his application under section 19 (1) of the Act before the Claims Officer on 23-4-1951. The proceedings were pending before that tribunal till 14-11-1951, when the final order determining the debt was passed. The application under section 28 of the Act, however, should have been filed within one year of the date of the order passed under section 27 of the Act. Accordingly, the time spent during the proceedings is not material in computing the period of limitation provided in section 28 of the Act, The contention of the appellants in their pleadings that they were entitled to deduct the period from 23-4-1951 to 14-11-1951 (i.e. 6 months and 20 days) from the period of one year is not, therefore, tenable. 12. As a result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.