Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to revise the order of the District Judge, of Ernakulam in C.M.A. No. 42 of 1957 confirming the order of the District Munsiff of Ernakulam in I.A.No.3621 of 1957 in O.S. No. 547 issuing a temporary injunction. 2. To the north of the Y.W.C.A. compound in this town there are three plots of land bearing the Survey Nos. 502/1, 502/6 and 502/2. They range from east to west, survey No. 502/1 being the easternmost plot and survey No. 502/2 being the westernmost plot. Somewhat to the north-west of survey No. 502/2 there is another plot bearing the survey No. 502/5. Between survey No. 502/5 and the Y.W.C.A. compound there is a small arm of survey No. 502/2 which forms an outlet or way from survey No. 502/2 to the Chittoor road. To the north of survey Nos. 502/5,502/2 and 502/6 there is a lane running eastwards from the Chittoor road and ending of the north-west corner of survey No. 502/1. Survey No. 502/4 lies north of this lane, abreast of survey Nos. 502/2 and 502/5. Survey Nos. 502/1 and 502/6 belong to the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 547 of 1957, and survey No. 502/4 is the compound in which their tarwad house is situated. Defendant 3 is the owner of survey No. 502/2 and defendant 4 is her husband. 3. This suit, O. S.547 of 1957, was brought on the allegation that the lane to the north of survey Nos. 502/5, 502/2 and 502/6 belongs to the plaintiffs and is their private property and that the defendants were trespassing upon it. Plaintiffs prayed for a declaration of their title in respect of the lane and for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from trespassing upon and making use of it. Their case was that the defendant's way to survey No. 502/2 from Chittoor road was along the arm of that survey number lying between survey No. 502/5 and the Y.W.C.A. compound. Pending the suit plaintiffs also asked for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from trespassing upon the lane and making use of it. Defendants 3 and 4 opposed the application for temporary injunction contending that the lane in question was not a private lane but a public pathway and that even if it was originally a private pathway they had perfected the right to use it by prescription. Defendants 3 and 4 opposed the application for temporary injunction contending that the lane in question was not a private lane but a public pathway and that even if it was originally a private pathway they had perfected the right to use it by prescription. According to them, they have been using it even before the revenue settlement in the Cochin State which, it was stated before me, was between the years 1079 and 1081 M.E. 4. Ext. P3, the settlement register, shows that the disputed land is a lane which was registered in the name of the late Sri Marayil Krishna Menon, the kamavan of the plaintiffs' tarwad and Ext. P4 shows that Sri Marayil Krishna Menon had executed a will directing that this lane should be used as a common pathway by the members of his tarwad. Relying mainly on these two documents, the learned District Munsiff found that the plaintiffs had a prima facie case as regards title; and acting on the commission report in the case he also held that the defendants were making use of the lane only during the recent times. On the strength of these findings he allowed the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction, and his order was confirmed on appeal by the District Judge. Defendants 3 and 4, therefore, filed this revision petition. 5. In view of Ext. P3 the correctness of the finding of the lower courts that the plaintiffs have a prima facie case as regards title cannot be disputed. Nevertheless, I do not consider that their orders allowing the plaintiff's application for injunction are sustainable. The principles which should guide courts in dealing with applications for interlocutory injunctions are stated as follows in Joshi's Easements and Licences, page 211 and 212(1957 Edition). "An interlocutory injunction of a mandatory character can only be granted if the court is satisfied that the matter is an emergent one and immediate assistance is needed to prevent 'irremediable injury' being done to the legal or equitable rights Of the claimant. Ordinarily, courts are very slow in granting interlocutory mandatory injunctions, for unless the courts are satisfied that a pressing and irreparable injury has already been inflicted on the plaintiff the courts are not disposed to issue mandatory orders. Whether an interlocutory order will be granted or not in a particular case is a question left entirely to the discretion of court. Whether an interlocutory order will be granted or not in a particular case is a question left entirely to the discretion of court. No doubt, such discretion is to be applied in a sound and reasonable way and not arbitrarily. The leading principle which ought, generally speaking, to be the guide of court and to limit its discretion in granting injunctions is that only such restraint should be imposed as may suffice to stop the mischief complained of and to keep things in status quo during the pendency of the litigation". (underlining mine) The Patna High Court has observed in Kalyanpur Lime Works v. State of Bihar (A.I.R.1951 Pat. 226) "the fact that a prima facie case has been made out by showing "that there is a fair question for trial, does not necessarily mean that a temporary injunction must follow restraining the contesting defendant from dealing with the property. Whether an order of injunction should or should not issue will depend on the facts of the case, and the Court must also consider the question of irreparable or serious injury and balance of convenience. (italics mine). It is obvious from the orders of the courts below that they have not adverted to the aspect I have emphasised above in the Patna decision, namely, that the court must consider the questions of irreparable or serious injury and balance of convenience, and that, instead of preserving the status quo during the pendency of the suit, their orders would only result in the status quo being upset. 6. As the application was disposed of by the learned District Munsiff without examining any witness there is no oral evidence in the case to show that the defendants had been using this lane before the settlement. But there are ample reasons to consider, and it is also evident from the order of the learned District Judge, that the defendants had been using this lane for a very long time. The learned judge says in Para.4 of his order: "On the other hand, there is no evidence on the side of the defendants to show that they or their predecessors were using this lane for over 20 years without interruption and have thus acquired any easement right over the same as pathway. The learned judge says in Para.4 of his order: "On the other hand, there is no evidence on the side of the defendants to show that they or their predecessors were using this lane for over 20 years without interruption and have thus acquired any easement right over the same as pathway. It may be noted here that though there was originally a gate from the defendants' property to the disputed lane it was not used always." If there was originally a gate from the defendants' property to this lane the chances are that the gate was being used, for, there is no point in having a gate into a lane if it was not meant to be used. In the settlement, though the property was registered in the name of the plaintiff's karanavan, it was expressly treated and classified as a lane, and the will executed by the plaintiffs' karnavan had also directed it to be used as a common pathway by all the members of the plaintiffs' tarwad. In these circumstances, the admitted fact that there was originally a gate in the defendants' compound opening into the lane tends considerably to support the case that the defendants also had been using this lane in the past. No doubt, it is said in the commissioner's report that the opening in the defendants' compound wall leading into the lane is a recent opening and that the defendants were using the lane only recently. But the commissioner had no direct knowledge as regards the time during which the defendants had been using the lane, and the fact that the present opening in the wall is a recent one would not by itself be sufficient for holding that their user of the lane is a recent one, when it is an admitted fact that there was even originally a gate in their compound opening into the lane. Further, even according to the plaint allegations, the defendants were using the lane at least from July 1957. This suit was filed only in October 1957. There is no allegation that any irreparable or serious harm or injury would be caused to the plaintiffs by the defendants continuing till the disposal of the suit, to use the lane which they were admittedly using at least from July 1957 and into which they had a gate for a very long time. There is no allegation that any irreparable or serious harm or injury would be caused to the plaintiffs by the defendants continuing till the disposal of the suit, to use the lane which they were admittedly using at least from July 1957 and into which they had a gate for a very long time. It was contended by the respondents' counsel that the use of this lane by the defendants would cause nuisance to the plaintiffs. But, I fail to see what nuisance would be caused. The lane was being used as a byroad by the members of the plaintiffs' tarwad which consists of at least two houses, probably more. If members of one more house also use it as a byroad till the disposal of the suit in the manner they have been admittedly using it for some time now I cannot understand how nuisance would be caused to the plaintiffs. Nor do the lower courts say that nuisance would be caused to the plaintiffs by the user of this lane by the defendants. 7. Another contention of the respondents' learned counsel was that, as the defendants had a way along the arm of their property lying to the south of survey No. 502/5, there was no necessity for them to have a way along this lane also during the trial of the suit. According to the respondents' counsel, this lane is now being used by the defendants for taking motor lorries to the defendants' property in connection with the business of defendant 4 who is a building contractor. There is no evidence before me to show that along the arm of the property mentioned above lorries could be taken to the defendants' property. Even if lorries could be taken, the fact that the defendants had another pathway or road is no reason for allowing an injunction restraining them from using this lane which they have been using at least for some time. On the whole, the balance of convenience is definitely for not granting the injunction; and the effect of the injunction would be to alter the status quo before the disposal of the suit. 8. On the whole, the balance of convenience is definitely for not granting the injunction; and the effect of the injunction would be to alter the status quo before the disposal of the suit. 8. It was also contended by the respondents' counsel that this was not a case in which the revisional jurisdiction under S.115, Code of Civil Procedure, can be exercised, especially in view of the concurrent findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs have a prima facie case as regards title to the lane. But, as pointed out in Kalyanpur Lime Works v. State of Bihar (A. I.1951 Pat. 226), the fact that the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case does not necessarily mean that a temporary injunction can be issued Before issuing such an injunction the court must consider and satisfy itself whether the effect of the injunction would be to preserve or alter the status quo during the pendency of the litigation and whether irreparable or serious injury would be caused to the plaintiffs if the injunction is not issued. If the effect of the injunction would be to alter the status quo during pendency of the trial and no irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiffs by preserving the status quo it is not a fit case for issuing a temporary injunction which is a remedy which should be sparingly resorted to, since it would often result in giving to the plaintiffs the remedy they seek in the suit even before the contentions of the contending parties are properly tried. As the courts below have omitted to consider these essential aspects and have only considered the question of prima facie title to the land, it cannot but be held that they have acted with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction. The case, therefore, clearly falls under clause (c) of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and attracts the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this court. 9. For the reasons stated above, I allow this Civil Revision petition. The orders of the courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs' application for a temporary injunction, I.A. No. 3621 of 1957, is dismissed. Parties will bear their costs. Allowed.