These two references have been made by the learned Sessions Judge of Cachar for setting aside orders dated 5-1-57 passed by the learned Additional District Magistrate, re­fusing to take action against the opposite party under S. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As the points involved are almost similar, they are both disposed of by this judgment. (2) The applicant in both the cases is the Manager of the Rampore Tea Estate in the dis­trict of Cachar. He alleged that the opposite parties were employees of the tea estate and during the period of their employment they have been given residential quarters. Subsequently, on some ground, to which it is unnecessary to refer, it appears that the tea estate dispensed with the services of the opposite parties and asked them to vacate the quarters in their occu­pation; but the opposite parties refused to do so. It was further alleged that in addition to their refusal to vacate the quarters, which they were lawfully bound to do, the opposite parties had been creating trouble amongst the labourers working in the tea estate. He accordingly pray­ed that they should be ordered under S. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to vacate the houses in their occupation, and that they should be restrained from obstructing the Manager of the tea estate in taking possession of those quarters. (3) The application was sent for enquiry and report to the local Police who reported that the opposite parties were responsible for foment­ing trouble amongst the labourers in the tea estate. The Magistrate, however, refused to take any action under S. 144 of the Code of Cri­minal Procedure on two grounds. He points out that there is an industrial dispute pending be­fore the Industrial Tribunal in respect of the dismissal of these employees and that under rule 66 framed under S. 16 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951, the two employees were entitled to remain in occupation of their respective resi­dential quarters which they have been occupy­ing, until disposal of the matter. The other reason which the learned Addi­tional Dist. Magistrate gave for not proceeding under S. 144 of the Code was that already pro­ceedings under S. 107 of the Code were pend­ing against these employees. These reasons are quite sound and justify the action taken. The other reason which the learned Addi­tional Dist. Magistrate gave for not proceeding under S. 144 of the Code was that already pro­ceedings under S. 107 of the Code were pend­ing against these employees. These reasons are quite sound and justify the action taken. (4) The learned Sessions Judge, however, has made a reference to this Court mainly on the ground that the refusal to take action under S. 144, Cr. P. Code, was in contravention of some observations made by this Court in Amulyabhu-shan Chaudhuri v. Sudhindrakumar Deo, Cri­minal Revn. No. 59 of 1955 (Assam) (A). In that case, Deka, J. observed that in cases of emer­gency, private rights should not stand in the way of an order under that section where the Magistrate thought that, in the circumstances of a particular case, such an order was necessary to preserve public peace. The allegations in this case were that the opposite parties employees were fomenting trou­ble in the labour circle working in the tea estate, and the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the Police report in support of those allega­tions. If these allegations are correct, I see no reason why a proceeding under S. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is pending between the parties, should not prove effective. In case the Magistrate finds that the opposite parties are actually trying to commit a breach of the peace or disturb public tranquillity or doing any wrongful act that may occasion a breach of the public peace or disturbance of public tranquillity, he can pass appropriate orders under that section to prevent the opposite parties from doing so. In fact, a proceeding under S. 107, Cr. P. C., in those circumstances, would be the most ap­propriate proceeding. But, if the intention of the petitioner is that the opposite parties should be evicted from the houses in their occupation by an order under S. 144, Cr. P. C., then his re­medy is obviously misconceived. Section 144, Cr. P. C.,' is not meant to be utilised for that purpose. It is true that if the Magistrate thinks that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, he is entitled to make an order under S. 144, Cr. P. C., directing any party to abstain, from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management. It is true that if the Magistrate thinks that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, he is entitled to make an order under S. 144, Cr. P. C., directing any party to abstain, from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management. That, the Magistate can always do so when such an order is necessitated by the circum­stances of a particular case to prevent obstruc­tion, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life and safety or disturbance of the public tranquillity or a riot or an affray, is clear on the face of the section itself. There is no such thing here. The only al­legation is that these employees who were and are in occupation of these premises, have been dismissed from their employment and, therefore, they are liable to vacate the said premises. This, by itself, is no ground for an order under S. 144 of the Code, and obviously when the Magistrate refused to act under section 144 of the Code, he thought that no such immediate prevention or speedy remedy was necessitated as to compel him to act thereunder. The section is meant merely for emergency purposes, and the Magis­trate has to utilise his sound discretion in utilis­ing its provisions. The observations made by Deka, J. in the case in question do not in any manner support the contention of the petitioner. The whole basis for the application is that the opposite parties have been fomenting trouble amongst the la­bourers by continuing to reside in those pre­mises. That complaint, if it has any foundation in fact, can be adequately met by the proceed­ing under S. 107 of the Code of Criminal Proce­dure. In my opinion, therefore, the orders pass­ed by the learned Additional District Magistrate are fully justified in law and do not warrant in­terference. (5) The references are, therefore, discharg­ed. References discharged.