Judgment :- 1. This second appeal raises a question of the sufficiency of an acknowledgment under S.19 of the Limitation Act. 2. The suit was based on Ext. B chitty hypothecation bond dated 4-2-1098 securing the due payment of future subscriptions in respect of a prized ticket and charging the property scheduled to the plaint. The bond had been executed by Parangodan, the 1st defendant's father (who was the subscriber in the chitty) and others in favour of the chitty foremen and had passed on to the plaintiff under an execution sale. The defendants 2 and 3 had been impleaded in the suit as subsequent purchasers. Their father Kunhuvareed had obtained a second mortgage over the property and in enforcement thereof had filed suit on 29-5-1114 and obtained decree in O. S.483 of 1114. Subsequently the 2nd defendant, took steps as the executor under his father's will, to execute the decree and in due course of execution, purchased the property himself in full satisfaction. Now the cause of action under Ext. B bond arose on 30-2-1109 when the default occurred in the payment of the chitty subscriptions but the suit herein was filed only on 7-12-1950 corresponding to 22-4-1126 long after the expiry of 12 years, which was the prescribed period of limitation. So the plaintiff relied upon certain admissions of Kunhuvareed contained in his plaint Ext E-1 in the suit O. S.483 of 1114 aforementioned, as constituting sufficient acknowledgment, under S.19 of the Limitation Act. How far the plaintiff could do so is the only question in this appeal. The courts below differed in their opinion upon this matter, for while the learned Munsiff found in favour of the plaintiff and allowed the suit, the learned District Judge held otherwise and dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff. 3. Before the trial court, the defendants 2 and 3 questioned the sufficiency of the acknowledgment, on the ground that they had not come upon the property as the heirs of Kunhuvareed but in their own independent right as auction-purchasers. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff. 3. Before the trial court, the defendants 2 and 3 questioned the sufficiency of the acknowledgment, on the ground that they had not come upon the property as the heirs of Kunhuvareed but in their own independent right as auction-purchasers. But this was obviously untenable, because the defendants 2 and 3 could not ignore the will of their father under which alone they got the right to the property and the father was therefore a person from or through whom they derived their liability to be sued, and as such, could be considered to be the defendant in the case, under the definition of that word in S.2 (4) of the Limitation Act and his acknowledgment would then be enough Before the learned District Judge the question was raised by the defendants 2 and 3 in two aspects, firstly that Ext E-1 did not contain any conscious admission by Kunhuvareed of a subsisting liability and secondly that Kunhuvareed, at the time he filed Ext E-1 plaint was neither personally liable for the debt concerned nor owned any interest in the property, which is sought to be made liable and therefore could not make any acknowledgment in law. Both those aspects were found in their favour. The argument before me has also taken this form. 4. Taking up first, the scope of the admission contained in Ext E-1, the question is whether there is involved an admission of a subsisting jural relationship, of debtor and creditor, and it is also evident that such relation is intended to be continued until it is lawfully determined. Now Ext E-1 stated that the mortgage obtained by Kunhuvareed and which was being sued upon, "had pledged the balance rights in the property after excluding the liability under the chitty security bond No. 119/1098". viz. Ext B. Vide para 1. The relief was accordingly prayed for "that the decree should provide for enforcement of the plaint claim as against those balance rights". To add to these the plaintiff Kunhuvareed, gave up an amount of Rs. 145-14 As-6 Pies out of the plaint claim "in view to the inadequacy in the value of the property pledged to answer both the charges". There can be no doubt therefore that according to Kunhuvareed, the debt under the chitty security bond Ext. B constituted a subsisting liability on Ext E-1 date. 145-14 As-6 Pies out of the plaint claim "in view to the inadequacy in the value of the property pledged to answer both the charges". There can be no doubt therefore that according to Kunhuvareed, the debt under the chitty security bond Ext. B constituted a subsisting liability on Ext E-1 date. This is not a case of bare mention of a first mortgage, when it may be taken to be merely descriptive of the property as in Govindan Nambiathiri v. Parvathi Antharjanam, 8 T. L. J. 204, or again of a mere admission of its existence in time past, apart from the aspect of subsisting liability as in Kandasami v. Suppammal, I. L. R.45 Mad. 443, where the statement cannot be relied on as acknowledgment under S.19. This is rather like the case where the execution of a mortgage and the amount due under the same at date of the statement is admitted as in Official Assignee v. Subramonia Aiyar, A. I. R.1924 Mad. 286, where Schwabe, C. J. said: "An admission to prevent the running, of the time under the Limitation Act need not be in the full sense of the word an admission of the existence of liability at the date of the admission, if the proper inference to be drawn from the admission which is made is that it was intended to represent the debt as then subsisting." The proper approach in cases of this kind was indicated by Krishnan, J, in the same case: "The court has to consider the circumstances in which the statement was made that there was a debt and see whether it was really intended to convey an impression that debt was subsisting at the date of the statement or not; and if it can, from the circumstances infer, that the intention of the person making the statement was to convey the impression that the debt was still subsisting, it will be justified in holding that it is an acknowledgment of subsisting liability". Of course we have to remember that each case has to depend upon its own facts to support the inference as to whether there is an admission of existing liability or not and it is not possible to lay any hard and fast rule. But judged by any test, it appears to me there is no warrant for the conclusion of the learned District Judge that Ext. But judged by any test, it appears to me there is no warrant for the conclusion of the learned District Judge that Ext. E-1 only described the property secured and prayed for sale thereof. I hold therefore that the admission contained in Ext. E-1 was sufficient in its scope for purpose of S.19 of the Limitation Act. 5. Coming to the second aspect as to the competency of Kunhuvareed to make the acknowledgment, it would seem to be unnecessary on the wording of S.19, to constitute an acknowledgment, that the person acknowledging must be under a liability in regard to the matter in question at the time of the acknowledgment. But the view has been taken in some cases that an acknowledgment of liability necessarily implies an acknowledgment by a person who at the time, is under the liability in regard to the matter in question. The earliest case propounding the former view is Jugal Kishore v. Fakhr-Ud-Din I. L. R.29 All. 90 and this case has been consistently followed by the Cochin Chief Court in Mahadeva Ayyer v. Sabhapathy Ayyar, 26 Cochin Law Reports 8, by the High Court of Travancore in Gouri Pillai v. Dharmaraja Iyer, 25 T. L. J. 1194, and Ganapathy Iyen v. Srinarayanan Namboodiripad.1944 T.L.R. 243, and following these, in the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Mathai v. Annamma I. L. R.1955 T-C 1224. The learned District Judge would seem to have followed the submission of the learned editors of Chitaley on Limitation, in preferring the latter view. No reasons have been urged before me to depart from the view taken in the jurisdictions above referred to. It follows therefore that the acknowledgment contained in Ext. E-1 does not suffer by the mere fact that Kunhuvareed was not personally liable and was not also interested in the property at the time he filed Ext. E-1 suit. 6. I therefore allow the appeal and restore the decree passed by the Munsiff allowing the suit. The appellant-plaintiff will get his costs of this court and in the court below. Allowed.