ORDER Shiv Dayal Shrivastava, J This is an application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure code by Kaniram and three others praying for transfer of Criminal Case No. 179 of 1957 pending in the Court of Shri K.G. Kanugo, Magistrate, First Class, Chachora. The Petitioners Kaniram, Smt. Tulsi, Gandia, and Mangi are being tried by the Magistrate, First Class, Chachora for the offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, the accusation being that they caused burns on the person of Smt. Sunder Bai. On the 19th December 1957 the prosecution examined five witnesses and closed its evidence. One of these witnesses was Ramkishan P.W. 10. On the 28th December 1957 the accused made an application to the Sessions Judge, Guna for transfer of the case to some other Court. The learned Sessions Judge sent for the report of the Magistrate. Having received the report and having applied his mind to the matter he has dismissed the transfer application. The accused are not satisfied and have come to this Court now with the same prayer. The complaint of the Petitioner is that after the examination of Ramkishan the learned Magistrate instructed the Prosecuting Sub-Inspector of Police to submit a report that witness Ramkishan had perjured and that Ramkishan and other witnesses were threatened by the Court with the result that Ramkishan and other witnesses made statements which they would not have made but for the above attitude of the Magistrate. Moreover, the Magistrate himself on that very day tried Ramkishan for the offence of giving false evidence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted and sentenced him. The counsel for the accused made an application to the Court for recording what happened before it and on this application the Magistrate passed strictures against the counsel. For these reasons the accused have an apprehension that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the Court of that Magistrate. Shri Atal, learned Counsel for the Petitioners presses before me all these points. The learned Government Advocate opposes this application for transfer. It appears from the statement of Ramkishan that he admitted to have said something untruthful in that very deposition. Shri Atal, learned Counsel for the Petitioners presses before me all these points. The learned Government Advocate opposes this application for transfer. It appears from the statement of Ramkishan that he admitted to have said something untruthful in that very deposition. Although the record of the case which must have been separately instituted for trying Ramkishan for the offence of perjury is not before me, I can gather from the report of the learned Magistrate that Ramkishan was on that very day tried by the Magistrate himself. The learned Government Advocate is not able to point out to me the law under which the learned Magistrate could do so. Section 479-A of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down the procedure for such a case. He could only make a complaint thereof in writing and forward the same to a Magistrate of the First Class. The Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the accused in his own Court because he could not make a complaint to himself. The report of the learned Magistrate dated 4th February 1958 which he sent to the Sessions Judge Guna does not make it clear whether he instituted a preliminary enquiry or he himself tried and convicted the accused. All that the Magistrate has said is that he proceeded according to law, but what he actually did has not been specified. A separate order is being passed about that. But that mistake of law is no ground for transfer (A.I.R. 1936 Nag. 146 : A.I.R. 1956 M.B. 17). Then the question is whether the Magistrate in any way threatened Ramkishan or any other witness. In his report above mentioned, dated 4th February 1958, the learned Magistrate has denied that allegation. The affidavit of Gandia Bai which has been filed in this Court is wholly vague and indefinite. It merely makes a mention of a threatening attitute of the Court; that is not enough. In the application for transfer which was made in the Sessions Court, the only fact which was stated was that when Ramkishan witness wanted to engage a counsel to defend himself in the proceedings for perjury he was scolded and his request was turned down. Even there the Petitioners did not quote the words used by the Magistrate. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Magistrate in any way frightened the witnesses. Even there the Petitioners did not quote the words used by the Magistrate. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Magistrate in any way frightened the witnesses. I would believe the report of the learned Magistrate that that allegation is wrong. I would presume that no Magistrate would threaten or frighten any party or any counsel. No Magistrate is given such jurisdiction or power. Whenever a party makes such a serious allegation against the presiding officer of a Court he must say all the facts with precision and in detail for the consideration of the superior Court. The next grievance of the Petitioners that the proceedings which were instantaneously instituted against Ramkishan witness had a prejudicial effect on the other witnesses, prima facie does not seem to be correct. As the learned Magistrate has said in his above mentioned report, two witnesses Kanhaiya P.W. 11 and Gordhan P.W. 12 who were examined after Ramkishan turned hostile. The third witness Harichandra P.W. 13 is a head constable and the last witness P.W. 14 is the Sub-Inspector of Police. I must observe that any discussion or comment contained in this order about these witnesses will not be considered when the case is decided on merits, because obviously it is too premature to arrive at any opinion nor is this an occasion for the same. All that I am concerned at this stage is whether there was any reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused that they would not get a fair and impartial trial in Shri Kanugo's Court. Then I have to consider the effect of the order passed by the learned Magistrate on the application dated 9th December 1957, filed before the Magistrate by the counsel for the Petitioners. The application reads as follows: On this the Magistrate passed the following order: Shri Atal, learned Counsel for the Petitioners says that it is clear from the order that the Magistrate became annoyed with the counsel and became prejudiced against the accused which should be sufficient to transfer the case from his Court. It is difficult to say that the learned Magistrate was actually annoyed with the counsel or that he became prejudiced, but I do not see anything objectionable in the conduct of the counsel either in making that application or in the language employed therein. It is difficult to say that the learned Magistrate was actually annoyed with the counsel or that he became prejudiced, but I do not see anything objectionable in the conduct of the counsel either in making that application or in the language employed therein. If the counsel thought that the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate in starting the prosecution of a witness in the midst of that trial, and in between the examination of two prosecution witnesses (Kanhaiyalal and Gordhan), was wrong, that it was illegal for the Magistrate to try Ramkishan himself and to punish him, and that his clients might require to bring those facts to the notice of a superior Court for any purpose whatever, his anxiety was only legitimate to get them recorded. The learned Magistrate has not said in his order that the counsel wrote anything which was not a fact. I cannot appreciate what the learned Magistrate meant by saying: Because this is what exactly the counsel did. Nor do I find anything disrespectful in the application made by the counsel. He has in appropriate words made a prayer to the Court. Concluding his order, the learned Magistrate has expressed a hope that the counsel would not repeat it. In my opinion that observation was not called for. It is undoubtedly in the discretion of a Court to record or not to record something which a counsel requests to be recorded but it is not fair to prevent a counsel from doing what he thinks to be his duty towards his client. Just as a Judge is pledged to discharge his duties without any fear or favour so is a counsel duty-bound to look after the interest of his client. I can certainly understand that there would have been an occasion to be displeased had the counsel made any statement which was not truthful. It is counsel's duty to himself and to his client that in the discharge of his duty he should be firm but cool, vigilent but courteous and fearless but respectful. Just as this Court is jealous to protect the dignity of the Courts and deals severely with a person who in any way attacks it, so is this Court jealous to protect the privileges of a counsel in the faithful discharge of his duties. Just as this Court is jealous to protect the dignity of the Courts and deals severely with a person who in any way attacks it, so is this Court jealous to protect the privileges of a counsel in the faithful discharge of his duties. Here I recall the following observations of Chagla C.J. which were fully endorsed by Bhagwati J. Counsel has a duty to the Judge, but he has also a duty to himself and a duty to his client and it is entirely unbefitting the dignity of the Bar for any counsel to permit himself to be made a sort of a pliable instrument in the hands of the Judge, It is not for counsel merely to watch which way the wind is blowing and then to trim his sail according to that wind. Our Bar has very great traditions and I am sure that it would never be said of this Bar that a member of it did not do his duty to his client even when he felt that the Judge was for the time being against him. After all, counsel has got to realise that the case does not necessarily end with the Judge. There is a higher Court and the higher Court may take an entirely different view of the evidence that has been led from the one that has been taken by the Court below. In my opinion the aforesaid observation of the learned Magistrate for the counsel's future conduct does not by itself show that the Court became prejudiced against the Petitioners. It is therefore, no ground for transfer. Since, as I have said above, I do not agree with Shri Atal that the Magistrate has become prejudiced against the Petitioners and their counsel and since I do not find that the apprehension of the Petitioners is reasonable, this petition for transfer is dismissed. Petition dismissed.