Judgment.- This appeal has been filed by Lakshmi Ammal, the petitioner in O.P. No. 83 of 1955 on the file of the District Judge, Ramanathapuram at Madurai, against the order of the learned District Judge dismissing as not maintainable, her petition under sections 11 and 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act XXV of 1955 for declaring the marriage of her husband Ramaswami Naicker, the 1st respondent, with Krishnammal, the 2nd respondent, void and illegal. The facts are briefly these: Lakshmi Ammal, the appellant, was admittedly the legally wedded wife of Ramaswami Naicker. She had no children. Ramaswami Naicker married the 2nd respondent, Krishnammal, as his second wife after Act XXV of 1955 had come into operation. Lakshmi Ammal wanted to get this marriage of her husband with Krishnammal declared void and illegal under section 17 of the Act by filing this application under section 11. Both the respondents contended that she had no right to file an application under section 11, as she was not “a party to the second marriage” sought to be declared illegal and void. Accepting this contention, the learned District Judge dismissed the petition with costs. Hence this appeal. I have perused the records and heard the learned counsel on both sides. Mr. A. Sundaram Ayyar, for the appellant, and Mr. G. N. Chari, for the respondents, have argued the case fully and fairly. Mr. Sundaram Ayyar raised several contentions. The first was that as the marriage of Ramaswami Naicker with Krishnammal was solemnised during the continuance of his marriage with the appellant Lakshmi Ammal, and would be therefore null and void under sections 11 and 17, it would be unjust to deny the first wife the right to file an application under section 11 for declaring this marriage a nullity. He argued that the clause “party thereto” in section 11 would include, by inevitable extention, any other wife or husband of the parties to the illegal marriage and so a co-wife or co husband. I cannot agree. The phrase is “either party thereto”. That can only mean two persons, namely, the actual parties to the second marriage, Ramaswami Naicker and Krishnammal. Any marriage requires only two parties, and no third party. I cannot agree. The phrase is “either party thereto”. That can only mean two persons, namely, the actual parties to the second marriage, Ramaswami Naicker and Krishnammal. Any marriage requires only two parties, and no third party. It will be contrary to sense and commonsense alike to bring in a co-wife, co-husband, concubine, keep, etc., on the ground that they also perform much the same functions, as the husband and wife, the parties to the void marriage. The fact is that the law does not take facts to mean the same things. Thus, a concubine may, for many purposes, no doubt, serve the purpose as a wife, but will not be a wife in law. So too, a co-wife cannot become “a wife under the second marriage”, for she is already a wife under the first marriage, and cannot be married again to her husband, at any rate without the intervention of a divorce and cessation of marriage for some time. The void second marriage was only between Krishnammal and Ramaswami Naicker, and the phrase “either party thereto” in section 11 can only apply to those two persons, and not to the appellant Lakshmi Ammal, the first wife, or to any others. Then Mr. Sundaram Ayyar urged that the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 was passed to benefit women, and save them from their husbands from indulging in polygamy and taking unto themselves other wives, and that this Act also made such second marriage void and illegal, and the children born of that second marriage illegitimate, and that, as the first wife had thus got valuable rights under the Act, and as all rights should have corresponding remedies, to work them out, as held by Broom in his Legal Maxims (see pages 117 and 118), and reinforced by the observations of Chief Justice Holt in an Anonymous case 1 , the first wife should be given the right to file an application under section 11 of the Act, as she will otherwise be left remediless. This argument too is unsustainable for two reasons. First of all, the first wife, the appellant, is not left remediless. This argument too is unsustainable for two reasons. First of all, the first wife, the appellant, is not left remediless. She can file a suit, under the ordinary law, for a declaration that the marriage of her husband Ramaswami Naicker with the 2nd respondent Krishnammal is illegal and void under Act XXV of 1955, and that any children born to her would not have their rights, as legitimate children, in her husband’s properties, and that Krishnammal also would not have the rights of a legally married wife. The mere fact that she will not be entitled to file an application under section 11, as the section does not give her a right to do so, will not show that she is left remediless. She must only pursue the costlier remedy of filing a suit under the ordinary law. There is nothing extraordinary or illegal in this. Nor is the principle of equal laws and equality before the law, guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution affected. There are several laws conferring rights on tenants, pannaiyals, etc., not conferred on people not answering to those descriptions. There are several offences, like adultery, where only the husband and some others can file a complaint or compound the offence. To say that any man in the street or city or country is equally interested in preventing the commission of adultery and, therefore, must be given the same right to file a complaint or to compound the offence, like the husband will not be valid. Again it is not only the first wife who acquires some rights under Act XXV of 1955. Even the first wife’s legitimate children will acquire some rights, as their shares in the property may be affected by children born to the second wife, if held to be legitimate. It is not Mr. Sundaram Ayyar’s contention that those legitimate children of the first wife also can file applications under section 11. The Legislature has restricted the summary remedy of an application under section 11 to the actual parties to the void marriage, so that third parties may not interfere harassingly by taking advantage of this cheap remedy of an application. I cannot agree, however, with Mr. The Legislature has restricted the summary remedy of an application under section 11 to the actual parties to the void marriage, so that third parties may not interfere harassingly by taking advantage of this cheap remedy of an application. I cannot agree, however, with Mr. Chari, learned counsel for the respondents, who urges that as the first wife has been given the remedy to apply for divorce or judicial separation under Act XXV of 1955, she need not be and has not been given the remedy of getting the second marriage itself declared void and illegal even by a suit. She will certainly have the ordinary right to file a suit to have the second marriage declared void and illegal. Only she will have to go by the more expensive way of a regular suit, instead of by the cheaper remedy of an application under section 11. Mr. Chari was unable to show how such a suit will not lie at her instance. The next argument of Mr. Sundaram Ayyar was that, under section 11, either party to the second marriage may present a petition for declaring the marriage null and void, but that will not prevent other parties also from putting in a petition like this, as the word used is “may”. I am afraid he is not justified in this interpretation. What the word “may” shows is that the parties may, if they like, put in a petition under section 11. They are not compelled to do so, and they are also free to file a suit under the ordinary law for declaration and consequential relief, if they think it better to do so. Thus, the use of the word “may” is sufficiently explained. Mr. Sundaram Ayyar urged that, while he could understand this preference in favour of innocent and duped parties to a second and void marriage, section 11 does not confine the relief of an application to the innocent party, but extends it even to guilty parties, who had full knowledge before marriage, and that innocent parties, like the appellant, should not be given a lesser right than such guilty parties. This argument too cannot stand. Our law has moved very far from the ancient law of revenge and vengeance like the laws of Hammurabi. This argument too cannot stand. Our law has moved very far from the ancient law of revenge and vengeance like the laws of Hammurabi. Laws are, in modern times, more concerned with remedying evils in an enlightened way, and have abandoned the savage way of hitting out against malefactors. The law will not, nowadays, compel anybody to live in sin or in crime and will allow them, and indeed encourage them, to get out of sin or crime at the earliest possible moment. The parties vitally affected by the void marriage are, of course, the parties thereto, namely, the husband and the wife, though the first wife and the legitimate children by her, etc., may also be affected to a lesser extent. The law, in its wisdom, has given a preferential treatment to the husband and wife vitally affected, and that comes under “proper classification” and cannot be called an illegal “discrimination” offending Article 14 of the Constitution or any other Article of the Constitution. In the end, therefore, I confirm the order of the lower Court holding that the appellant was not entitled to present an application under section 11 of Act XXV of 1955 for declaring the second marriage illegal and void but could only file a suit, if so advised. I dismiss this appeal, but, in the circumstances, without costs, as this is the first time the point has come up for decision by this Court. P.R.N. ----- Appeal dismissed.