Judgment.- This Second Appeal arises from the decree of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam, in A.S. No. 79 of 1955, reversing the decree of the District Munsif, Kumbakonam, in O.S. No. 122 of 1954. The plaintiff is the appellant. The plaintiff filed a suit to recover possession of the suit properties together with mesne profits. The defendant is her mother’s sister. The defendant has a son by name A. D. Sultan Rowther, who has not been evidently fortunate in his married life. He first married a wife and divorced her after a few months. He then married a second wife and divorced her in about a year. Eight months thereafter the plaintiff was married to him. Evidently there was some difficulty in getting a suitable bride for Sultan Rowther. On the eve of the marriage a settlement by way of gift of the suit properties was made by the defendant to the plaintiff, her sister’s daughter. That settlement was undoubtedly made in consideration of the marriage. Exhibit B-1 is the settlement deed executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff on 22nd June, 1948. The document was registered on 24th June, 1948, on which date the marriage of the plaintiff with her cousin brother Sultan Rowther took place. He was evidently fickle minded, and a short time after the marriage he abandoned the plaintiff and it appears that he has taken to another wife. The plaintiff filed the present suit for recovery of possession of the properties from her mother-in-law, the defendant. That suit was resisted on the ground that the gift was sham and not intended to be acted upon and that it could not validly convey the properties as possession of the properties was not given to the plaintiff on the date of the gift. The learned District Munsif held that the settlement deed was executed in consideration of the marriage and that there was delivery of possession and that that was enforceable as a gift. He therefore decreed the suit. The defendant took up the matter in appeal to the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam. The learned Subordinate Judge without really appreciating the relationship between the parties has disposed of the case in a rather mechanical manner. He therefore decreed the suit. The defendant took up the matter in appeal to the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam. The learned Subordinate Judge without really appreciating the relationship between the parties has disposed of the case in a rather mechanical manner. He has held that subsequent possession of the properties always remained with the defendant and her son and therefore there could not have been a valid delivery of possession within the meaning of the Muhammadan Law on the date of the gift. In that view he held that there was no valid gift in favour of the plaintiff. There was also another aspect of the case put forward on behalf of the plaintiff before him. That was that the gift in the present case was not a gift pure and simple but a hiba-bil-iwaz. On tins question also the learned Subordinate Judge held against the plaintiff and allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has come forward with this Second Appeal against the judgment of the lower appellate Court. I am not satisfied that the lower Court was correct in either of the two conclusions arrived at by it. A hiba-bil-iwaz has been defined in Mulla’s Mahomedan Law (14th Edition), at page 155 in section 168 thus: “A hiba-bil-iwaz, as distinguished from a hiba or simple gift, is a gift for a consideration. It is in reality a sale, and has all the incidents of a contract of sale. Accordingly possession is not required to complete the transfer as it is in the case of a hiba, and an undivided share (mushaa) in property capable of division may be lawfully transferred by it, though this cannot be done in the case of a hiba. Two conditions, however, must concur to make the transaction valid, namely, (1) actual payment of consideration (iwaz) on the part of the donee, and (2) a bona fide intention on the part of the donor to divest himself in presenti of the property and to confer it upon the donee.” As regards the latter point there is no difficulty in the present case. Exhibit B-1, the settlement deed, itself says, “I have left the said properties in your possession and enjoyment this day itself”. As regards the first requisite, Mr. Exhibit B-1, the settlement deed, itself says, “I have left the said properties in your possession and enjoyment this day itself”. As regards the first requisite, Mr. Gopalaratnam, the learned Advocate for the defendant contends that a hiba-bil-iwaz could only be for money consideration and it could not be justified, if consideration was other than money. In this connection he relied upon the decision in Rahim Bakhsh v. Muhammad Hasan1 . It was held in that case that a hiba-bil-iwaz or a gift for an exchange, is a transaction made up of two separate acts of donation, i.e., of mutual or reciprocal gifts of specific property between two persons, each of whom is alternately donor and donee, and that it did not include the case of a gift in consideration only of natural love and affection or of services or favours rendered. So the learned counsel for the respondent contends that there can be no hiba-bil-iwaz in respect of a promise to marry. I do not agree. The decision in Rahim Baksh v. Muhammad Hasan1 , related to a case where there was a gift in recognition of past services. The case is only an authority for the proposition that mere natural love and affection could not afford a sufficient consideration to convert a mere gift or hiba into a gift for consideration or hiba-bil-iwaz. That case cannot justify the contention raised on behalf of the defendant that consideration for hiba-bil-iwaz should be only money consideration. Promise to marry has been recognised as a valid consideration, and this could particularly be so when under the Mohammadan Law the concept of the marriage is that it is only a contract. Therefore, when the plaintiff agreed to marry the defendant’s son, there was sufficient consideration for the defendant to execute a settlement deed, as under the Law a consideration can proceed from a third party. In Muhammad Esuph Ravuttan v. Pattamsa Ammal1 , a Muhammadan executed a deed of settlement of certain land in lieu of dower on his wife. It was held that it was a bona fide transaction by way of hiba-bil-iwaz and was supported by consideration, which was said to be a release by the wife of her right to dower. Mr. In Muhammad Esuph Ravuttan v. Pattamsa Ammal1 , a Muhammadan executed a deed of settlement of certain land in lieu of dower on his wife. It was held that it was a bona fide transaction by way of hiba-bil-iwaz and was supported by consideration, which was said to be a release by the wife of her right to dower. Mr. Abdur Rahim, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that there are two types of hiba-bil-iwaz, one which he calls true or the original hiba-bil-iwaz and the second which he styles as a false hiba-bil-iwaz, which is a device adopted by the Indian lawyers to meet the exigencies in certain situations. In this connection he has drawn my attention to the decision in Sarifuddin Md. v. Mohiuddin Md.2According to the learned counsel, for a true hibabil-iwaz consideration in the shape of money is not necessary but any consideration would suffice. In support of that contention he refers to a passage in Tyabji’s Muhammadan Law, 3rd Edition, page 449, section 408. The proposition is stated thus: “Whatever may validly form the subject of hiba may validly form the subject of iwaz or return; and doing or abstaining from doing something may operate as iwaz, whether such act or abstention has been antecedently stipulated for, or subsequently to the primary gift, accepted as iwaz. Quaere, whether part of the subject of hiba may be validly accepted as iwaz.” As I stated above, I am of opinion that there is no authority for the proposition that an iwaz should necessarily be in the shape of money. Anything which is a valid consideration under the law would be an iwaz, and therefore would constitute proper consideration for a hiba-bil-iwaz. Applying that test I am of opinion that in the present case the settlement deed, Exhibit B-1 is only a hiba-bil-iwaz, the consideration thereof being the agreement to marry the defendant’s son. In such a case even if there had been no delivery of possession, the gift would be valid and the plaintiff would be entitled to maintain the suit for ejectment. This finding is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. But I am of opinion that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of possession also is wrong. In such a case even if there had been no delivery of possession, the gift would be valid and the plaintiff would be entitled to maintain the suit for ejectment. This finding is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. But I am of opinion that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of possession also is wrong. It has been held that the question of possession has got to be judged having regard to the relationship between the donor and the donee. In the present case the donor was no other than the maternal aunt cum mother-in-law of the plaintiff. The properties should be held to be in the possession of the plaintiff’s husband as the mother-in-law was admittedly a purdanashin lady. If the plaintiff’s husband’s possession is proved, then the plaintiff herself should in the circumstances be held to be in possession having regard to the solemn declaration contained in the gift deed. Even if Exhibit B-1 is considered merely as a gift pure and simple, I am of opinion that the learned District Munsif is correct in his conclusion that there has been delivery of possession. The judgment and decree of the lower Court are therefore set aside, that of the District Munsif restored and this appeal is allowed with costs throughout. V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.